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THORNTONJ(~s

E.
estate)

v.
CALDOR, INC. (employer)
1.

SUMMARY:

Cert. ~o Sup.Ct.Conn.
(opin. by Grillor-<Partial
dissent by Shea)
State/Civil

Timely (w/ ext.)

Petr challenges a state-court decision holding

that a state statute that protects religious observers against
being compelled to work on their Sabbath violates the
Establishment Clause.
2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

When petr's decedent, a

Presbyterian who observed Sunday as his Sabbath, accepted
employment as a manager with resp in 1975, resp's Connecticut
stores were closed on Sundays pursuant to the state's Sundayclosing law.

That law was revised in 1976 after state courts

F
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struck it down to authorize certain businesses to remain open on
Sunday.

The new law specified that no employee could be required

to work more than 6 days in a calendar week.

It also provided,

in §53-303e (b), that:
"No person who states that a particular day
of the week is observed as his Sabbath may be
required by his employer to work on such day. An
employee's refusal to work on his Sabbath shall
not constitute grounds for his dismissal."
Resp then opened its stores on Sunday and demanded that its
employees be available for work.

Petr's decedent initially

acquiesced and worked 31 Sundays between 1977 and 1979.

In late

1979, however, he submitted a written request that he be excused
from work on Sundays because he observed that day as his Sabbath.
Resp refused to honor his request, but offered to transfer him to
an out-of-state store or a lower-paying position.

Petr's

decedent rejected the transfer and was informed that he would be
demoted; he then ceased coming to work and filed a grievance with
the State Board of Mediation.
The Board held a hearing and concluded that resp had
discharged petr's decedent as a management employee for refusing
to work on Sunday, his day of Sabbath.

The Board refused to

consider resp's challenge to the constitutionality of §53-303e(b)
because, as a quasi-judicial body, it had no authority to pass on
the constitutionality of state law.

The Board thus sustained the

grievance and ordered resp to reinstate petr's decedent and to
reimburse him for lost pay and fringe benefits.
to vacate the award in state court.

Resp then sought

Its application was denied

on the ground that the primary effect of the state law was "to
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limit the number of days which an employee may be compelled to
work to six per week."

In the TC's view, it was permissible for

the state to provide for an individually selected day of rest
rather than for one common day.

The TC also affirmed the Board's

conclusion that resp had discharged petr's decedent.
The Su .Ct.Conn. reversed.

It first concluded that petr's

decedent had been discharged and held that the Board had
correctly construed its own authority in refusing to pass on the
constitutional question.

It then turned to the merits of the

Establishment Clause issue.
~emon

v. Kurtzman, 403

u.s.

Applying the three-part test of
602, 612-613 (1971), the court held

§53-303e(b) unconstitutional on its face.

It first considered

whether the statute reflected a "clear secular purpose."

In so

doing, the court rejected the contention that §53-303e(b) merely
provided a "day of rest" without any religious overtones.
Section 53-303e(a), which limits the number of days in a week
that an employee can be required to work, adequately addresses
the valid secular purpose of forbidding uninterrupted labor.

By

authorizing each employee to designate his own observance of the
Sabbath, §53-303e(b) evinced the "unmistakable purpose" of
"allow[ing] those persons who wish to worship on a particular day
the freedom to do so."

Accordingly, §53-303e(b) could not pass

the "clear secular purpose" test of Establishment Clause
scrutiny.
The court then found that §53-303e(b) 's primary effect was
to advance religion; it conferred a "benefit" on an explicitly
religious basis since only those employees who designate a
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Sabbath are entitled not to work on that particular day.
Finally, the court considered whether §53-303e{b) would lead to
excessive governmental entanglement with religion.

The statute

empowered the Board to resolve disputes arising in its
administration, and the Board would be required to decide which
religious activities may be labeled "observance of Sabbath" in
order to assess employees' sincerity.

This analysis would be

"exactly the type of 'comprehensive, discriminating, and
continuing state surveillance' which creates excessive
governmental entanglements between church and state."

{quoting

Lemon, supra, at 619)
The partial dissent agreed with the majority on the
Establishment Clause issue, but believed that the Board should
/

have reached the issue.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

{a) PETR argues that the Sup.Ct.Conn.

should not have applied the Lemon test when deciding whether a
legislative accommodation for individual religious liberties is
constitutionally permissible.

As the recent decision

in~arsh

v.

Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 {1983), indicates, the three-part test
does not control all Establishment Clause questions.

When

individual rights of conscience conflict with seemingly neutral
obligations imposed by government, the Free Exercise Clause
frequently requires
religious observer.
{1963).

gover ~ to

make an exception for the

E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374

u.s.

398

Under the reasoning of the Sup.Ct.Conn., however, such

accommodations would violate the Establishment Clause because
they would be viewed as having plainly religious purposes, having
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the primary effect of advancing religion, and entangling
government with religion.

Legislation designed to safeguard

individual religious observance and accommodate individual
religious interests need not be judged under the three-part test.
See TWA, Inc. v. Hardison, 432

u.s.

63 (1977).

The correct

constitutional standard by which a statute that protects
religious observers against private discrimination is the
rationality standard under which laws prohibiting other forms of
discrimination are tested.
Petr also contends that, if the Lemon test is applied, the
Sup.Ct.Conn. 's decision conflicts with federal decisions that
have upheld the Sabbath-observer protections of §70l(j) of Title
VII and with state decisions upholding local laws prohibiting
private discrimination on account of religious observance.

CA6,

CA7, and CA9 and state courts in Kentucky and Wisconsin have
rejected Establishment Clause challenges to §70l(j).

That

result, in fact, may be compelled by this Court's DFWSFQ in
Rankins v. Comm'n on Professional Competence, 444

u.s.

986

(1980), where the Calif.Sup.Ct. had held that a provision of the
state constitution barring religious discrimination prohibited
disqualifications based on religious practices.
(b)

~P

argues that the decision below does not question

Hardison, the principles of accommodation, or the EEOC's
Religious Discrimination Guidelines.
accommodation case.

This is not an

Hardison left open the question whether a

state can require employers to grant privileges to religious
observers as part of the accommodation process, 432

u.s.,

at 91
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(MARSHALL, J., dissenting), but that question is not presented
here since the statute does not provide for any "accommodation
process."

The real question presented by this case is "whether a

law consistent with the First Amendment can grant a right to all
Lutherans to celebrate a holiday in honor of Martin Luther's
birthday, a holiday to all Catholics for celebrating Pope John's
birthday, etc.?"

Resp also contends that there are no special or

important reasons why the Court should consider §53-303e(b):
"This odd statute and odd factual situation is [sic] designed for
consideration by moot courts and not by the Supreme Court of the
United States."

~~

(c) ~ rgues that the decision below will prompt
challenges to §§70l(j) and 703(a) (1) of Title VII; other federal
interests also are implicated.

Title VII does not create an

absolute right to observance of the Sabbath; §53-303e(b) goes
further.

The constitutionality of the religious accommodation

requirements of Title VII has not been decided by this Court.
Although the three CAs that have considered the question have
.

-

sustained Title VII against constitutional challenge, contrary
decisions continue to appear.
Title VII and §53-303e(b), it

Despite the differences between
~an

be argued that the statutes do

not differ with respect to the factors deemed

dispo~itive

of the

Establishment Clause issue by the Sup.Ct.Conn.; the challenged
decision thus conflicts in material respects with decisions of
CA6, CA7, and CA9 upholding Title VII and presents an opportunity

1to

resolve the constitutional question not reached in Hardison.

An authoritative determination of the constitutionality of laws

.

'
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requiring religious accommodation in the workplace will remove
impediments to voluntary compliance with Title VII, reverse a
possible tendency of some courts toward an unduly narrow
interpretation of Title VII, and resolve questions concerning the
validity of comparable statutes enacted by a number of states.
The SG also believes that the Sup.Ct.Conn. misapplied the
Lemon test and adopted a view of the Establishment Clause that is
inconsistent with the very principle of religious accommodation.
In his view, the decision below conflicts with Sherbert, which
held that extension of unemployment benefits to persons who leave
their jobs because they otherwise would be required to work on
their Sabbath does not violate the Establishment Clause.

The

decision also cannot be reconciled with this Court's decisions on
Sunday closing laws.
(1961).

E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420

These decisions establish that there is no

constitutional bar to state laws permitting individuals the
privilege of selecting their day off on religious grounds, even
though persons with equally strong--though nonreligious-preferences are accorded no such privilege.

The Sup.Ct.Conn.'s

decision renders virtually every form of religious accommodation
constitutionally suspect.
(d) CONNECTICUT moves to intervene as of right under 28

u.s.c.

S2403(b) and This Court's Rule 28.4(c).

On the merits, it

argues: (1) The decision below conflicts with state and federal
decisions upholding statutes imposing on employers a duty to
accommodate employees' religious beliefs.
misapplied the three-part test.

(2) The Sup.Ct.Conn.

Section 53-303e has a clearly

-8-

secular purpose--to eliminate discriminatory employment
practices.

The statute also does not have the primary effect of

advancing the interests of religionists over nonreligionists or
the beliefs of one sect over those of another; it does not confer
a benefit on those accommodated, but relieves individuals of a
burden others do not suffer by permitting them to fulfill their
employment obligations without violating their religion.

The

benefit to religion is as incidental as the benefit conferred by
the Sunday closing laws upheld in McGowan.

Section 53-303e,

moreover, poses no danger of excessive entanglement; the
government is required to ascertain only whether the day in
question is the employee's Sabbath.
will not be in dispute.

In most cases, the issue

(3) The decision conflicts with Sherbert

v. Verner since §53-303e does nothing more than extend to the
private sector the neutrality preserved in the public sector by
Sherbert.

If it is not an "establishment of religion" for the

state to accommodate Sabbath observers as part of its
unemployment compendation program, it cannot be an establishment
for the state to require private employers to make the same
accommodation.

(4) The case provides an opportunity for the

Court to consider the legitimacy of federal and state efforts to
accommodate religious interests of employees.
(e) AMICUS COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS argues that the
Sup.Ct.Conn.'s decision precludes states from exercising their
longstanding power to guarantee that citizens have equal rights
regardless of religious differences.
arguments summarized above.

It also repeats some of the
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4.

DISCUSSION:

This looks like a grant to me.

Although

the SG may overemphasize the effect of the decision, it seems
clear that its potential sweep is quite broad.
As Connecticut argues, the Sup.Ct.Conn. 's application of the
three-part test is suspect.

I that

There is no basis for concluding

the statute represents "a purposeful or surreptitious effort

\ to express some kind of subtle governmental advocacy of a
particular religious message."
10.

Lynch v. Donnelly, draft opin. at

Although a general intent to advance religion over

nonreligion might be

d~scerned

in the statute, the primary

purpose of the statute seems to be to relieve individuals of the
burden of choosing between their jobs and their religious
convictions.

This arguably represents a valid secular purpose.

Whether the primary effect of §53-303e(b) is to advance religion
is a closer question, but I would find it difficult to conclude
that the challenged statute is more of an endorsement of religion
that the Sunday closing laws upheld in McGowan.

The

Sup.Ct.Conn. 's conclusion concerning entanglement is somewhat
puzzling.

I see no reason to believe that an inquiry into what

types of activities constitute proper observance of the Sabbath
would be required in actions brought under the statute.
Connecticut's arguments on entanglement make sense, and I am not
persuaded that §53-303e(b) will produce either administrative
entanglement between state and religion or political
divisiveness.

~·
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I do not think that petr's argument that the three-part test
should not be applied here gets them very far.

They offer no

real reason why the test should not be used in this context.
As the SG recognizes, the reasonable accommodation statutes
are potentially distinguishable from §53-303e(b), which affords
employees greater protection than, for example, §70l(j) of Title
VII.

But there are sufficient similarities to justify the

conclusion that the Sup.Ct.Conn. 's decision conflicts with
decisions upholding reasonable accommodation statutes against
Establishment Clause challenges.
5.

RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend a GRANT.

Connecticut's

motion to intervene as of right should be granted.
There is a response.
intervene.

The

u.s.

Connecticut has filed a motion to

and the Council of State Govts. have filed

amicus briefs.
February 21, 1984

~·

Werder

Opin in petn.

---
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No. 83-1158

t-btion of Connecticut for leave to
Intervene as Party Petitioner

F.STATE OF .IX:NAID E. 'IIDRN'ION

v.
CAIDOR,

rnc.

SUMMARY:

The State of Connecticut seeks leave to intervene in support of

pett in this private litigation in which the Conn. S.Ct. struck down a state
statute.

The Court granted cert on Feb. 27, 1984 but may have overlooked

Connecticut' s motion to intervene.
<X>NTENTI.CNS:

Connecticut notes that the litigation is between private

parties and that there is no state statute or court rule requiring private
litigants in state court to notify the Attorney General that the
constitutionality of a state statute is being challenged.

'llius, Connecticut

did not know of this litigation until the Connecticut S. Ct. declared the
statute unconstitutional.
Title 28 Section 2403(b) provides a state may intervene in private
litigation in "a court of the United States" when the constitutionality of one

&,.~·~_,_

])~v,·,(

of the state's statutef; is in issue.

Supreme Court Rule 28(c) recognizes

§2403(c) ani requires that the state's Attorney General be notified ~n a
petn for cert coocerns the constitutionality of a state statute.
Connecticut concludes that under 28 U.S.C. §2403(b) ani Rule 28 (c) it
has a right to intervene, citing R. Stern and E. Gressman, Supreme Court
Practice, 437-38 (5th ed. 1978) and J. 1-bore, Federal Practice (Supreme Court
Volume) Par. 828.06 (1982).
DISCUSSICN:

Whether Connecticut's intervention is marx:latory or

permissive' it srould be granted.
filing of the petn for cert.

Connecticut moved within 30 days of the

This is the state's first q>portunity to

participate in the litigation ani, obviously, Connecticut has a substantial
interest in the constitutionality of its statute.
The motion to intervene smuld be granted.
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No. 83-1158, Thorton v. Caldor, Inc.
Memorandum for the File
This is a summary memorandum on the basis of a
preliminary reading of the briefs.
This case involves the validity of §53-303(e) and (a) and
(b), a Connecticut statute that permits certain classes of
businesses to remain open on Sunday, but (i) guarantees all
employees at least one day off per week, and (ii) guarantees
the right of any employee who "states that a particular day
of the week is observed as his Sabbath" not to work on that
day.

The employer is prohibited from dismissing any employee

because of his ''refusal to work on his Sabbath."
The Supreme Court of Connecticut, reversing a decision
by the trial court, held this statute invalid as violating
the Establishment Clause.

The facts of the case are simple.

Petitioner, a Presbyterian, was employed as a department
manager for respondent, a multi-state chain of department
stores.

It operated on Sunday.

Under a rotation system,

petitioner was required to work one in four Sundays.

When

he declined to do so, respondent offered him alternatives
that were unsatisfactory.

Petitioner left his job, filed

a grievance with the State Board of Mediation claiming a
violation of the above mentioned statute .

..

No. 83-1158

2.

The board, and subsequently the trial court, held
that petitioner was discharged unlawfully, and ordered
reinstatement with back pay.

The Board declined to consider

the store's claim that the statute violated the Establishment Clause.

But the trial court upheld the statute

as protective of an individual's right to practice the
religion of his or her choice.

As noted above, the

Connecticut court reversed.

a~plied

It

the three part

test of Lemon v. Kurtzmann, and concluded that the statute
failed to pass each of the three tests.

It was found to

lack a secular purpose, to confer its benefit explicitly
on a religious basis, and that the statute would result in
excessive government entanglement.
Petitioner's brief, prepared by Nathan Lewin (Counsel
of Record) of Miller, Cassidy, Larroca and Lewin, is well
written and persuasive.

Its basic argument is that this

Court's prior decisions teach that a law that protects
Sabbath observers against adverse employment consequences
"is a means of perserving and protecting the 'free exercise'
of religion."

This is said to be "an objective which is at

least equal in value and stature to the goal of preventing
government establishment of religion."

No. 83-1158

3.

The respondent's brief is not available to me, and
it may not have been filed.

I do have the brief of the

U.S. as amicus curiae urging us to grant this case.
This brief, although not as full an argument as the SG
probably will file, sufficiently indicates the federal
government's position.

The interest of the U.S. centers

on the effect of the decision in this case on Title VII,
and other federal statutes.

In this connection, the SG

notes that this case involves the facial validity of the
Connecticut statute, and therefore our decision may be of
considerable importance to the enforcement of federal law.
Title VII does not create an absolute right to
observance of the Sabbath.

It merely requires the employer

reasonably to accommodate the employee's Sabbath observance
if it can do so without "undue hardship.''

Connecticut's

statute, therefore, goes somewhat further in that it confers
a legal right to refrain from working on the employee's
Sabbath.

'r"

....
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The SG states that the Connecticut decision "conflicts with two lines of decisions by this Court".
P. 15.

He particularly relies on Sherbert v. Verner,

374 U.S. 398, recently affirmed in Thomas v. Review Board,
450 U.S. 707.

See also Rankins v. Commission on Profes-

sional Competency, 444 U.S. 986 (dismissing for want of
a substantial federal question an Establishment Clause
challenge to a state law interpreted to require employers
to make reasonable accommodation to employee's religious
observances."

The SG discusses these cases briefly at

P. 15 - 17 of his brief, emphasizing that the purpose
of the Connecticut statute is fully consistent with the
"spirit of the Free Exercise clause and the Establishment Clause."
The SG also states that the Connecticut decision
''conflicts in material respect with the decisions of
three federal appellate courts" cited by him.
I

See pp. 9-12.

will of course wish to see the brief of respondent,

and perhaps other amici briefs will be filed.
view is that the SG is right.

LFP

My tentative
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No. 83-1158
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.
October 31, 1984

Dan

Question Presented

Whether a state statute that prohibits an employer
from requiring employees to work on their designated day of
Sabbath

violates

the

Establishment

Clause

of

the

First

Amendment.

.

·

•

I

;:i..:'~i~··
~ M'"

I.

I. Background

A. Statutory Background.

Conn. Gen. Stat. §53-303e(b) provides:
who states that a particular day
of
1
o erve
as h is Sabbath may- be
req uirea 6 y fi! s employer t o work on such a a ay.
An) e~p loy ee's refusal to woR on his Sabbath shall
not constitute grounds for his dismissal."
' '~

.

B. Factual Background.

In 1975,

'

Donald Thornton began working as a de-

partment store manager for Caldor, which operates a chain
of retail department stores in Conn., Mass., and N.Y.

In

1977,

in

Caldor

began

opening

for

business

on

Sundays

Conn., thereby requiring Thornton and other department managers

to

work

one

out

of

every

four

Sundays.

Although

Thornton worked 31 Sundays between 1977 and 1979, in November

1979

he

informed management

that he would

no longer

work on Sunday as that day was his Sabbath.
Thornton met several times with Caldor executives
in an attempt to resolve the problem.

Caldor offered him

two choices:

(i) to continue in a supervisory capacity at a

Mass.

which did

(ii)

store,

not require Sunday employment,

or

to remain at his current location in a nonsupervisory

capacity as a member of the employee union, whose contract

provided for nonattendance of work on the Sabbath.

Thorn-

ton rejected both alternatives because of the distance and
hardship involved in commuting or moving to Mass. and because remaining in Conn. as a union member would have meant
a substantial pay cut.

When Calder

informed him on March

6, 1980 that there was "no alternative other than to revert
you back to a rank and file at $3.50 an hour" beginning on
March 10, Thornton resigned from his job.

His last day of

work was March 8, 1980.

C. Proceedings Below.

On May 6,

1980, Thornton challenged Calder's ac-

tions before the Conn.
tration.
Stat.

state board of mediation and arbi-

He alleged wrongful discharge

§53-303e

in

that

as

a

under

department

Conn.

manager

he

Gen.
was

unable to observe his Sabbath.

Calder answered that Thorn-

ton had

within

not

been

"discharged"

the meaning of

the

,..

statute and further that the statute ' itself was unconstitutional.

The

to decide

boar~

decided that it did not have authority

the consti tut:ional

that the statute was valid.

issue

and

therefore

assumed

-

It then determined that Calder

had indeed "discharged" Thornton and issued an award in his
favor.
On Nov. 18, 1980, Calder sought to vacate the arbitration award,

alleging the award to be illegal and be-

yond the power of the arbitrators in that Thornton was not

.(

"discharged"

violated the Establishment
V'
r,.The TC found the statute constitutional. The cor-

Clause.
rect

and

test,

it

the

statute

believed,

Court employed

was

in Committee

the
for

gious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413

three-factor

test

Public Education

u.s.

&

this
Reli-

756, 772-773 (1973):

"[T)o pass muster under the Establishment Clause
the law in question, first, must reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose, second, must have
a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and, third, must avoid excessive
governmental entanglement with religion."
If

the

statute

fall.

Stone

fails

v.

any one part of

Graham,

449

u.s.

this

39,

test,

40-41

it must

( 1980)

(per

~
9

curiam) .
Citing

the

u.s.

Maryland, 366

Sunday

closing

law

case,

McGowa. : 'v.

420 (1961), the TC found that the stat-

-z:::-

ute "reflects a clearly secular legislative purpose," presumably "to protect all persons from the physical and moral
debasement which comes from uninterrupted labor."
Pet. for Cert.
at 436.

,-:a,

App. to

2la, quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366

u.s.,

It next found that the primary effect of the stat-

ute was "to limit the number of days which an employee may

-------------------------------

be compelled to work to six per week."
Cert.

2la.

App.

to Pet.

for

Allowing an employee to designate his own Sab-

bath, the TC held, did not violate the constitution because
"the

Establishment Clause

does

not

ban

federal

or

state

regulation of conduct whose reason or effect merely happens
to

coincide

with

the

tenets

of

some

Ibid., quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366
nally,

or

all

u.s.,

religions."
at 442.

Fi-

the TC found that the statute did not represent an

.

'

"excessive entanglement with religion" because "the statute
avoids forcing all employees to conform to Sunday as a day
of rest when their own religion may observe a different day
as Sabbath."

Id., at 22a.

By then affirming the arbitra-

tion award the TC implicitly decided that Thornton's resignation constituted a "d/

arge" under the statute.

s.

On appeal, the Conn.

Ct. upheld the TC's find•

ing of a statutory discharge

~t [E- v!,rse~

Clause grounds.

the same three-part test

faun d

none

of

It applied
t he

factors

.

.

sat1sf 1ed.

.

F1rst,

h

t e

Conn.

alloted

pursuant

so."
to

strings attached."

Id.,

at

§53-303e (b)

Id., at I3a.

14a.
come'S

"The day
with

1

.Cj_~

allow those persons who wish to worship on a particular
to do

rc:.

purpose" ~

because "the unmistakable purpose of [the] provision is

freedom

S/Lr
bu~

on Establishment

S.Ct. found that the statute had no "clear secular

the

~

;;=""

that

t~
day ~

is

~

religious ~

Second, the Conn.

s.

Ct.

believed that the statute had the primary effect of advanc-

---

ing religion because
...........

-

"it confers its 'benefit' on an explicitly religious basis.
Only those employees who designate
a Sabbath are entitled not to work on that particular day, and may not be penalized for so doing. Workers who do not 'observe a Sabbath' may
not avail themselves of the benefit provided by
the subsection, and are not entitled to take a
specific day off with impunity." Id., at 15a.

Third,

v::

the Conn.

S.

Ct.

'found

Ill
~
excessive entanglement be-

~

cause it believed that under the statute the board would in
every case have to determine "the scope of religious activities

which

Sabbath. '"

may

fairly

be

labelled

'observance

of

Id., at 15a-16a.

<

~:·rtOf,~;

.'''

This Court granted cert on March 5, 1984 limited
to the Establishment Clause question.

II. Discussion

The first issue in deciding the constitutionality
of

the Conn.

provision

Clause test to apply.

is determining what Establishment

The parties, the intervenor, and the

-----------------

amici propose at least three different tests:

(i)

whether

--------------------

the statute rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose;
(ii)
gious

whether the statute "establishes a religion or relifaith,

or

tends

to do so,"

Lynch v.

Donnelly,

104

s.ct. 1355, 1361 (1984); and (iii) whether the statute satisf ies all

three prongs of

the

Lemon

test,

which

is the

same as the Nyquist test described above.
The . . ._C ourt should reject

th~

a rational

~

relationship test identical to the equal protection minimal ~-
scrutiny standard,

because

it would gut the
I

Clause.

--

Establishment ~

Because of the inherent tension between the Free

and Establishment Clauses,
I Exercise
nizes protecting religious freedom

once this Court recogas

a

legitimate state

goal nearly all discrimination favoring religion over nonreligion

(as opposed to discrimination favoring one brand

of religion over another) would be constitutionally permissible under this test.
The

~~~~ ,

which

finds

support in some of

this Court's most recent Establishment Clause cases,

~,

. '.

Lynch v. Donnelly, supra; Marsh v. Chambers, 103 s.ct. 3330
(1983), is really no test at all.
in only a

few narrow situations to legitimate activities

for which there isv

Ws
A'

approved.

The Court has applied it

s~ence

more an appeal

the Framers would have

to history and original

intent than a test to be generally applied.

There is also

little evidence in the cases which have employed it that
this Court
inquiry.

intended

it

to supplant the

traditional Lemon

Furthermore, the Court could not seriously apply

it to general Establishment Clause cases without giving it
more

content

and

And,

precision.

unless

the

Court were

entirely to abandon inquiry into "religious purpose," any
"tendency to establish religion" test would have to come to
resemble

the

Lemon

test

in application.

Thus,

I

believe

the Lemon test retains its vitality and is the correct test
to apply.

In any event,

the

~e

would

result

in the present

case ~

under any of these tests.
equires that the statute satisfy

three
pose,
nor

that it serve a clearly secular pur(ii)

that its primary effect be neither

inhibit

religion,

and

(iii)

that

government entanglement with religion.
403 u.s. 602, 612-613
all three.

(1971).

avoid

excessive

Lemon v. Kurtzman,

The Conn. statute satisfies

First, under the "secuiar purpose" prong, this

Court has required a showing of
an

it

to advance

exclusive

secular

s.ct.,at 1363 n.6.

purpose.

~

secular purpose, not of
Lynch

v.

Donnelly,

104

"The Court has invalidated legislation

''
"

·r,.l

..

~

,,

'

.

<'

or governmental action on the ground that a secular purpose
was

lacking

only when

it has concluded

there was no

question that the statute or activity was motivated wholly
by

religious

added)

considerations."

(citations omitted).

!d.,

at

(emphasis

1362

sec- ~ 1/1...-

Resp cannot claim that no

One of its aims - ~
~
is to provide employment opportunities to persons who hold

ular purpose supports the Conn.

statute.

provided~

relig1ous convictions equal to those opportunities
others.
e.g.,

This

is

Trans World
(MARSHALL,

(1977)

not

a

wholly

Airlines
J.,

v.

religious
Hardison,

dissenting

one of

from work

432

u.s.

See,
63,

on other grounds)

purpose and primary effect of requiring
ligious observers

purpose.

rules]

90

("The

[exemptions of re-

is the wholly secular

securing equal economic opportunity to members of

minority religions.).

Such anti-discrimination provisions

have at least a secular component.
Second, the primary effect of the Conn. statute is

...___-=--

"'7
~

-

neither to advance nor

inhibit religion.

rectly

interests

promote

the

nonreligionists or
fact,

those of

of

--..::::::.

It does not di-

religionists

one church over another.

over
In

it confers no direct benefit on those it accomodates

but rather relieves them of a special burden that others do
not

suffer

by

permitting

their religious beliefs.

I

them

to

work

without

violating

Furthermore, the statute implies

no approval of certain religions or

religious practices.

Any

religion

benefit

the

statute

gives

to

comes

only

through the private decisions of individual employees.

The

mediating role of individual choice means that "no imprimatur of State approval ••• can be deemed to have been conferred on religion or religious practice."

s. Ct.

len, 103

3062,

3069

( 1983) •

Mueller v. Al-

Nor does the fact that

the law authorizes Sabbath-observers but not others to select a particular day off mean that religion impermissibly
benefits.

If this were the case, several schemes that this

Court

upheld

has

(or

required

on

Free

Exercise

would have violated the Establishment Clause.
Yoder,

406

u.s.

205

(1972)

grounds)

Wisconsin v.

(exemption from compulsory high

school attendance): Gillette v. United States, 401
(1971)

u.s.

437

(exemption from compulsory military service): Sher-

bert v. Verner, 374

u.s.

398 (1963)

(access to unemployment

benefits).

-----

~0he Conn.
tanglem~~he
.........____ _____ _ state

-

statute creates no excessive enin

·::::-:.

religion.

The Conn.

found this the "mos
because

it believed

board to
and •••

inquire

S.

Ct.

of the Lemon test
the statute

required

the

arbitration

into the "particular religious practices

[make] a decision concerning the scope of religious

activities which may fairly be labelled 'observance of Sabbath.'"
quiry,

App. to Pet. for Cert. 15a-16a.
however,

which

considers

both

This type of in-

the

sincerity with

which particular beliefs are held and whether they qualify
as

"religious,"

is

not

unknown

to

the

law.

Courts

and

agencies must undertake it whenever they consider whether

.•

I

'

,'

,.

··.

any religious exemption applies.

Furthermore, it is a dif-

ferent sort of "excessive entanglement" that this Court has
found

troubling

before.

It has worried about "comprehen-

sive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance" of
religious
619,

not

institutions,
of

inquiries

Lemon
into

v.

the

Kurtzman,

403

legitimacy of

u.s.,

at

individual

1'~'""'

religious beliefs.

~

A line of several pre-Lemon cases further supports ~
the constitutionality of the Conn. statute.
Verner,

374

u.s.

398

(1963),

In

~erbert

a Sabbatarian was

fired

v.

~

be-

~

cause she conscientiously refused to work on Saturdays when
her company, which was closed on Sundays pursuant to State
law, expanded its work-week from five to six days and required

Saturday

labor.

Unable

to

find

another

job

that

would not require her to violate the Sabbath, she filed a
claim for unemployment compensation.

The State denied her

request on the ground that she refused to work for "personal

reasons."

This Court held,

however,

that the State's

denial of benefits impermissibly burdened her free exercise
of religion.

It expressly rejected the State's claim that

the Establishment Clause foreclosed benefits to individuals
who refuse to work on their Sabbath:
"In holding as we do, plainly we are not
fostering the 'establishment' of the Seventh-Day
Adventist religion in South Carolina, for the
extension of unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in common with Sunday worshippers reflects
nothing more than the government obligation of
neutrality in the face of religious differences,
and does not represent that involvement of religious with secular institutions which it is the

0/

object of the Establishment Clause to forestall."
374 U~- t 409.
In Gillette v. United States, 401

u.s.

437 (1971),

the Court considered a federal statute which granted conscientious objector status to individuals firmly opposed to
all wars because of "religious training and belief."
Court

upheld

it

against

Establishment

Clause

The

challenge

largely because it was intended to spare conscientious objectors

the

hard

choice

between

obeying

their

religious

beliefs or fulfilling their legal obligation to their country.

The Court stated:
"apart from •.• whether the Free Exercise Clause
might require some sort of exemption, it is hardly impermissible for Congress to attempt to accommodate free exercise values, in line with 'our
happy tradition' of 'avoiding unnecessary clashes
with the dictates of conscience. '"
Id., at 453
(footnote omit ted) •
--

The fact that the policy avoided religious, but not nonreligious, "clashes" made no difference.
In

most

respects,

the

Conn.

achieve a similar accomodation.
ilege

religious

beliefs

over

statute

Verner,

others

but

rather

the practice of

In the words

Selectively unburden-

b~lief

individual

seen as discriminating

relieves

it tries to enforce "neutrality in

the face of religious differences."
ing

to

It does not directly priv-

them of a burden they would otherwise bear.
of Sherbert v.

tries

in favor

can,

of course,

of religion.

be

As long as

the state does not affirmatively advance religion, however,
this Court's precedents
lishment

l.,. ..

Clause

indicate

difficulty.

that there

Furthermore,

is no Estabthe

statute's

possible failure
no difference.

to recoginize a hardship exception makes
The Conn. courts may imply such an excep-

tion when the issue is raised, and, in any case, any failure might pose due process difficulties but none, as far as
the cases indicate, under the Establishment Clause.

Resp's

final argument--that Title VII preempts the Conn. statute-also appears to be raised for
Court and has little merit.

the first time before this

Although Title VII places an

affirmative obligation on employers to accommodate individual

religious

practices

cause undue hardship,

unless

accommodating

them

would

it nowhere implies that further ac-

commodation of the sort here is impermissible.

III. Summary

The

--

Lemon

test

retains

its

vitality

and

is

the

correct test to apply in the circumstances here.

Under it,

the Conn. statute passes constitutional muster.

The stat-

ute

ha~

"clear secular purpose," as that term has been

Cour~does not
religion; a~oes

interpreted by this
of

encouraging

have the primary effect
not

create

entanglement" between Church and State.

"excessive

Furthermore, this

Court's pre-Lemon cases further support the statute's validity.
statute

Like
does

the

~sidered

not

affirmatively

in

favor

tries to achieve a kind of "neutrality."

them,

religion

the
but

Conn.
only

Having said all this, I must admit I am very trou-"
bled by this case.

Given the case law, I do not think the

case is even close.

do worry, however, about the course

I

--:1

this

Court's

past

test

appears

on

cases

its

have

face

to

taken.

Although

protect

against

the

Lemon

"establish-

ments," this Court's past cases have steadily eroded _ it to
~----

the point where I

- -

am not sure it presents any obstacle to

"establishments" of religion over nonreligion as opposed to

-.:::-

"establishments" of one sect over another.

I

mention this

not to argue for affirmance, but rather to put my technical
legal

analysis

in

some

sort

of

perspective.

Perhaps

in

deciding the other Establishment Clause cases this Term, if
not in deciding this one, the Court could consider puttin
more teeth in this doctrine.

Recommendation

I

recommend reversing the judgment of the Conn.
<>

s.

Ct.
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MEMORANDUM

To:

JUSTICE POWELL

From: Dan
Re:

Possible Implications of the Procedural Posture of Thornton
v. Caldor, Inc., No. 83-1158.

I have further

researched and thought about the implica-

tions arising from the fact that this case carne from an arbitration.

Under Connecticut law, it is indeed the case that in unre-

stricted arbitration submissions--and this case was one, App. to
Pet. for Cert. 5a-7a--the state courts do not review arbitration
findings of law or fact.
illustration of how far
f ~ d ~of

law.

Thornton, in fact, presents the perfect
Conn.

courts will defer

Caldor originally challenged

award against it on two grounds:
Establishment Clause and
the statute requires.

(ii}

( i}

to arbitration
the

arbitration

that the law violated the

that there was no "discharge" as

The arbitration board found against Caldor

on the discharge issue and the state TC upheld it on the ground
that Thornton's resignation constituted a
in the circumstances of this case.

statutory "discharge"

The Conn.
on other grounds.

S. Ct. upheld the arbitration board's ruling
It found that the state courts had no power to

review the arbitration board's legal conclusion that Thornton's
resignation was a "discharge."

'

It stated:

the submission is unrestricted, the award is •••
final and binding and cannot be reviewed for errors of
I5:w"' or fact :---M ilford Employees Assn. v. Milford, 179
Conn. 678, 683, 427 A.2d 859 (1980). Carroll v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 189 Conn. 16, 19, 453 A.2d 1158
(1983). Where the submission does not otherwise state,
the arbitrators are empowered to decide factual and
legal questions and an award cannot be vacated on the
grounds that the construction placed upon the facts or
the interpretation of the agreement by the arbitrators
was erroneous.
Courts will not review evidence nor,
where the submission is unrestricted, will they re~
the arbitrators' decision of the legal questions involved.
Meyers v. Lakeridge Develpment Co., 173 Conn.
133, 135, 376 A.2d 1105 (1977). Waterbury v. Waterbury
Police Union, 176 Conn. 401, 404, 407 A.2d 1013 (1979);
Bic Pen Corp. v. Local No. 134, United Rubber, Cork,
Linoleum & Plastic Workers of America, 183 Conn. 579,
584, 440 A.2d 774 (1981) ." App. to Pet. for Cert. Sa-

Ga.
Furthermore,

the Conn.

S.Ct.

found

that §53-303e(c), which per-

mits "any employee, who believes that his discharge was in violation of subsection

(a)

or

(b)

of this section

[to]

appeal such

discharge to the state board of mediation and arbitration .•. ,"
"[c]learly ••• empowers the board to resolve all issues arising
under
303e."

subsections
App.

(a)

to Pet.

or

(b),

for Cert.

the operative provisions of §536a

(emphasis added).

Subsection

(b) is the Sabbath provision at issue in this case.
Finding such limited scope for review, the Conn.

s.

Ct.

upheld the arbitration board's determination that the resignation
constituted a "discharge" without approving of that finding as a
matter of state law.

In fact,

the Conn.

S. Ct. stated that it

.

.,,

..·, ..

had been error for the state TC to review the correctness of the
board's legal decision:
"Because of our conclusion concerning the scope of the
submission, we agree with the defendant's contention
that the trial court erred in reviewing the board's
conclusion and agreeing that the defendant had indeed
been discharged with the meaning of §53-303e.
This
error, however, is harmless, since the court ultimately
reached the correct conclusion •••• " App. to Pet. for
Cert. 7a.
In

other

words,

the

TC

should

have

accepted

the

arbitration

board's legal conclusions as long as they were within the scope
of the submission.
In the present case, the question of whether the statute
requires an absolute rather than a reasonable accommodation was
also decided by the arbitration panel.

The transcript before the

arbitration board reveals that Caldor argued that the statute was
absolute:
"According to the employees' counsel,
[the statute
gives] an absolute preference to which there is simply
no defense.
We say that such a state statute is
unconstitutional on its face.
As a matter of fact, I
would call attention to the very recent decision, summarizing cases under the Civil Rights Act and which of
course Connecticut's version is the Connecticut FAir
Employment Practices Act, which indicates that even
accommodation statutes are highly suspect, and in the
most recent case it holds that even Title VII accommodation provisions are unconstitutional even though they
contain provisions which provide that the employer does
not have to give preference which will cause any hardship ••••• Here we have a statute which provides absolutely no defense for the employer, and it says that he
must absolutely give preference to an employee who simply claims that he claims Sunday is his Sabbath.
We
say that such a statute would be unconstitutional."
Jt. App. 30a-3la (emphasis added).
In fact,
trasted

as
the

the above passage
Connecticut

statute like Title VII.

,...

(

·:

indicates, Caldor expressly con-

statute

~

to

a

reasonable

accommodation

The arbitration board's opinion provides

further evidence that the board considered the statute to be absolute for purposes of the submission.

The board stated:

"If a discharge for refusal to work Sunday hours occurred and Sunday was the Grievant's Sabbath, said act
violated Section 53-303e •••.
In the opinion of
the majority of the panel, Calder discharged Mr. Thornton as a management employee for refusing to work Sundays, which day was Mr. Thornton's day of Sabbath.
Therefore, Calder violated Section 53-303e •••• "
Id.,
at lla-12a.
As a matter of state law, then, this Court appears to be
bound to consider the law in this case as an absolute accommodation statute.
of the Conn.

This would allow the Court to affirm the judgment

s.

Ct. while making it clear that it does so under

the arbitration board's interpretation of the law.

Such a posi-

tion would permit it to invalidate (I previously would have said
"strike down")

the provision

the law in general.

in this case without invalidating

The effect, in other words, would be to in-

validate the Sabbath law as applied to Mr. Thornton without deciding

whether

the

statute

situations--particularly when
state courts construe
tion.

could

be

another

constitutional
arbi tr at ion

in

board

other
or

the

it to require only reasonable accommoda-

This question would be left to another day.

'

l

'.

,,
>
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83-1158 FstatP of

near

~horton,

et al

v.

~aldor,

Inc.

~IJi.ef":

Tn c~eckinq t'le statu~ of ci.rculat(!>r1 opinions that
I have not acte~ on, I find there ha~ b@en no movement since
your draft of March ll. A~ there have hPen no ioins, I assume there will he another draft.

I aqree with your ~ecision that the Connecticut
statute violates the Fstahlishment r1ause. 1 am concern0~,
however hv ~·7hat can he rt>a{i as vour rejc.ct ion of the r.emon
test, an~ the aoParPnt adoption of ~ "coercion" test instead. Althouqh we have never aonlied vour Lemnn test literally in all situations, it h~s b~en viewe~ hv this ~ourt
and the lo•1er courts as f:l test aoplicab1e in most cases.
I am afraid we will further fragment the Court,
and confuse Jo•r1er courts, if lw'.7e are too C'ritic::t1 of IJemon.
Nor ~oul~ T like to see us a~opt a "coercion" test, the contours of which would be 1ifficult to ~Pfine anA m~v ~e at
odds with Lemon.
In sum, ~hiPf, although I will ioin your iudqm~nt,
I hone you will considAr mv concerns when vou circulate ~
second riraft.
Sincerelv,

The Chief Justice
lfP/SS
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CHAMB E RS OF"

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

April 30, 1985

No. 83-1158

Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.

Dear Chief,
I find myself in considerable doubt whether
the Court should adopt the view of the circulating
draft opinion and simply hold outright that the
statute violates the Establishment Clause.
One
recurrent thought I have had is that we should vacate
the judgment below and remand it in light of Wallace
v. Jaffree, No. 83-812.
It seems to me that the Connecticut statute
may have the valid secular purpose of preventing
discrimination on the basis of a particular religious
practice, i.e., observance of the Sabbath. Whether
the statute has an illegitimate purpose, and whether
it has an impermissible effect within the meaning of
the Establishment Clause, turn in my view on whether
it was intended to convey or would objectively be
viewed as conveying a message of endorsement of the
Sabbath observance. Before conclusively deciding that
issue, I would prefer to let the state courts consider
it in the context of the legislative history and the
implementation of the statute.
The remand might also enable the Connecticut
Supreme Court to clarify an issue on which there is
some disagreement in the briefs. It is possible to
read the Connecticut Supreme Court's opinion as
agreeing with the Arbitration Board that S53-303e{b)
confers an "absolute" right not to work on one's
Sabbath. As I read the record, however, the situation
is somewhat more complex. The Arbitration Board
apparently assumed that the statute imposed an
absolute accommodation requirement. J.A. at 12a. In
part because it thought itself required to defer to
the statutory interpretation of the Arbitration Board,
and in part because the parties submitted to the

·~

. \ r..·~

- 2 -

factual and legal determinations of the arbitrators
without restriction, the Connecticut Supreme Court
considered itself bound as a matter of state law by
the Arbitration Board's interpretation of the statute.
484 A.2d 785, 790 (1983). The Connecticut Supreme
Court then struck down the statute, not on the grounds
that it imposed an "absolute" accommodation
requirement, but because it apparently viewed any
accommodation of Sabbath observances as violating all
three prongs of the Lemon test.
As a result of this peculiar procedural
posture, the Connecticut Supreme Court has never held
that S53-303e(b) in fact imposes an absolute
accommodation requirement, but has rather held only
that these parties cannot challenge the Arbitration
Board's legal conclusion to that effect. It remains
possible, although perhaps unlikely, that the
Connecticut Supreme Court, when faced with a
restricted submission to the Arbitration Board in a
case where reasonable accommodation is infeasible,
would interpret the statute as requiring only
reasonable accommodation.
In my view, whether the statute is
"absolute" is relevant to whether an objective
observer would perceive it as conveying a message of
endorsement of the Sabbath. I would let the
Connecticut Supreme Court address this issue in the
first instance as it applies the proper Establishment
Clause test on remand.
As presently disposed, I think my preference
is to suggest that the judgment should be vacated and
the case remanded for reconsideration in light of
Wallace v. Jaffree, No. 83-812, in the hope that the
statute might ultimately be upheld.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice

Copies to the Conference

Ofonrl of tqt ~b ,jlattg
Jfufringhtn. ~.Of. 2Ubi~~

,ju.prtmt

CHAMISERS 01'

May 1, 1985

THE cHIEF JUSTICE

Re:

No. 83-1158 -Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.

Dear Sandra,
I see no principled reason for remanding this case for
reconsideration in light of the impending decision in Wallace v.
Jaffrey, No. 83-812. We can hardly expect the Supreme Court of
Connecticut to apply the "proper Establishment Clause test" when we
now expand the confusion on that issue. Surely the court would be
puzzled by a GVR given its "faithful" application of the Lemon test
-- the very test applied by the Wallace plurality. The courts look
to us for guidance, and we do not help them by sending obscure and
puzzling signals to the Supreme Court of Connecticut.
As I recall, the Conference considered whether Section 53303e(b) may correctly be read as giving Sabbath-observers an
absolute right not to work on a designated day. The Draft Opinion,
p. 10 & n. 13, expresses what I consider to be a proper reading of
the statute, in light of applicable State law, and one that
followed the discussion at Conference.
I plan to circulate a new draft in due course.
welcome comments and suggestions.
Regards,

Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference

As always, I

dro 05/14/85

MEMORANDUM

To:

JUSTICE POWELL

From: Dan
Re:

THE CHIEF

JUSTICE'S

Second Draft of

Thornton v.

Caldor,

Inc., No. 83-1158.

Lynda and I have gone over the THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S second draft and share qualms about it.

In answer to your letter,

the Chief has dropped some of his criticism of the Lemon test,
although he still denigrates it when he states:
"the Court has referred to Lemon for a converiient
shorthand of 'the cumulative criteria developed by the
Court over many years.'
403 u.s., at 612.
However,
the Court has repeatedly rejected the concept that 'any
single
est or
1 er 1on prov1 es
e
ouc stone f"a"r
resolving
sta 1shment Clause cases ••••
Courts must
look beyond the rhetoric of any single approach to determine whether the values protected by the Religion
Clauses have been offended." Slip op. 8-9.
His criticism is a bit puzzling since he purports at one point to
apply

the

effects prong of

See id., at 13.

the

Lemon test

to decide

the case.

The greatest change from the Chief's first draft

is that he now appears to incorporate his coercion analysis and

__.:.;.---------=------

-- -

--

-

JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S "endorsement" analysis under the effects prong
-.....____-~~~~-~~

Lemon.

This

-

represents a significant improvement,

nately the draft is so

disjoi~ted

but unfor tu-

and rambling that it is unclear

whether lower courts would understand what he is doing.

·'
,••.
!,

Lynda and I have two 1!19jor__J2roblems with the draft as it
now stands.

~

it is so disjointed and structureless that it

is unclear what effects it will have in the future.

As it now

stands, a lower court could cite it as authority for adopting an
effects

test,

G)

a

co

,

coerc1on test,

loose~commodation

an endorsement
The

approach.

test,

relationship among

or a very
the many

concepts the Chief puts forward is simply too unclear to say how

---- .

courts will read the opinion.

Furthermore, he lays out some of

. and accommodation
these concepts, particularly the coercion test

----v

doctrine, without ever specifying their content.

The draft, I am

~

afraid,

might

thus

confuse

than it would clarify it.

Establishment

Clause

doctrine

more

This would be a particularly unfortu-

nate result considering the guidelines the Court has managed to
draw

after

great

difficulty

in

the

other

Establishment

Clause

cases this term.
Second, the draft unnecessarily relies on the accommoda- ~

-- --

The case could easily be decided under the Estab-

t ~ d~ct :;!~ ·

.....__

.

lishment
Clause,
but the Chief continually invokes the Free Exer,___
_
,

---

---· -· -- ·---~
cise Clause without ever making clear how it affects his analysis.
some

~

(l

All that can safely be said is that he appears to employ
sort of

balancing

test

by

weighing

State against those of the employer.
ter

to view this case as one

c_~

As far as I know,

1

'

Exercise Clause

~ alleviate

Chief's

implicated

religious

~ttempt

burdens

the

interests

of

the

It would, I think, be bet-

involving

just the Establishment

this Court has never found the Free
in a

case where

created

by

the

private

State tries to
parties.

The

to introduce Free Exercise analysis into situa-

tions lacking nstate actionn may have unforeseen consequences and
might make application of the accommodation doctrine practically
limitless.
Finally, the Chief invalidates the Conn. statute on its
face rather than as applied.
the first draft,

this

As you noted in your annotations to

is unnecessary.

Because this case arose

from arbitration, the Conn. courts had to take the law as it was
settled
not.

by

the

arbitration

panel--whether

this

was

correct

or

Thus, it would be very easy to say that this case involves

only an attack on the statute as applied and to leave the Conn.
--~--~----~~--------~·

-L~,·-----~~

courts free to reinterpret the statute as requiring only a flexi-

---------......

~

.

...

'-

ble accommodation.

----------.....
JUSTICE

BRENNAN apparently will be circulating a draft

concurrence in this case later this week or early next.
is

that he plans to rely on the Lemon test.

The word

At this point,

would recommend that you wait to see what he writes.

I

A simple

Lemon approach seems more consistent with the views you outlined
in your concurrences in the other religion cases.

If you prefer

not to wait for JUSTICE BRENNAN, I would suggest that you consider writing a concurrence in the judgment to the Chief's opinion.
If you agree with my concerns, your concurrence could make clear
(i)

that the case

involves only the Establishment Clause,

(ii)

that Lemon defines the proper inquiry, and (iii) that you believe
that the Chief's endorsement and coercion analyses really represent application of the first two prongs of Lemon.

If you would

like, you could also discuss how the statute should be invalidated only as ap__glied,

rather than on its face.

Lynda and I both

\~

1

feel that joining the Chief's opinion or concurring in it would
not only add authority to a confused and doctrinally destablizing
position but would also

u~dercut

th~ew ~ )you _: xpress~

concurrences in Wallace v. Jaffree and Aguilar v. Felton.

in your

lgs May 18, 1985

MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:

Lynda

Re:
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Thornton v. Caldor, No. 831158

Dan · and I have both read Justice Brennan's opinion and
agree with you that there is much

unnece~sary

lan~uage

included.

-

In particular, Part II discussing the "purpose" prong of the
Lemon test is completely superfluous since at the end of that

- - - -·- - - : - -

section, the opinion declines to decide whether that prong has
been satisfied.

Instead, it "finds it more profitable to examine

respondent's argument under the effects test."

1st Draft, at 9.

Especially in light of footnote 7, see p. 12, one wonders why the
opinion goes on at such length about something that it neither
decides, nor is necessary to decide the case.
The other thing to be wary of is the closing sentence
on p. 13.

Although the opinion has applied the Lemon test, the

opinion ends by stating that because the s atute "places the
imprimatur of governmental endorsement and encouragement on a
particular religious practice, it is a state law 'respecting the
establishment of religion,' and thus invalid under the First

---

Amendment."

----

I'

...::>

, ...

This could be read as approving of an endorsement

j- _j
'f-0p-

\
•.,

test similar to that proposed elsewhere by Justice O'Connor.
Although on pp. 11-12, the opinion seems to include the
endorsement idea within the "effects" prong, which is fine, the
emphasis on endorsement alone in the final sentence could be
quoted out of context in the future and used as support for
weakening the force of the Lemon test.
Dan suggested that you might want to consider joining
Parts I, III, and IV, if you could persuade Justice Brennan to
rewrite the last sentence of Part IV.

I agree that no good can

come of joining Part II's discursive inquiry relating to the
"P ~ ·

As to Parts I and III, I could have wished that

they were a little more concisely written.

While I don't see

anything in there with which I disagree, it's hard to foretell
y far the safest course would be
to concur separately in a few lines, as I suggested yesterday.
You could state that you concur in the judgment and that you
agree with Justice Brennan that Lemon and our Establishment
Clause cases provide the proper framework for analysis of this
case, rather than the Free Exercise cases.
Perhaps the ideal solution would be for the Chief to do
a third draft using a simpler Lemon analysis than that in which
Justice Brennan engaged.

I don't know how likely it is that he

would do that at this point; he certainly did not heed your
previous request to use a Lemon analysis.

Perhaps he might be

persuaded if he thought he might lose his Court.
If you would like for me to do further work on this, or
to draft something for you, please let me know.

~tlttt

/

C!Iourt .n tlf.t ~b J»tatt•

·u~ !J. <II- 211.?-"~
CHAMIS!:RS 01'"

May 20, 1985

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re: No. 83-1158, Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.
Dear Bill:
Please
judgme.nt.

join me

in your opinion concurring in the
Sincerely,

--------

Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference

.inprtnu <!}tturl ttf t4t ~b .Statts
'llasltinghtn. ~. <!}. 211~)1.~
CHAMI!IERS Of'

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

May 22, 1985

Re:

No. 83-1158-Thornton v. Calder

Dear Bill:
Please join me in your concurring opinion.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Justice Brennan
cc:

-·~··.

The Conference

.-upunu <!fanrlaf tlrt :J{nittb .Jtatt•
Jh•Jrhtgt&tn. ~. Cl}. 2llp~~
CHAMI!I E R S Of'

JUSTIC E JOHN PAUL STEVEN S

May 22, 1985

Re:

83-1158 - Thornton v. Caldor

Dear Bill:
Please join me in your opinion concurring in the
judgment.
Respectfully,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

.fUFmtt <!fourl of tJtt~b .itatte
Jfaelfinghm. ~.
CHAMeERS 01"

<!f.

20.;;,.~

PERSONAL

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

May 23, 1985

Re:

No. 83-1158 - Estate of Donald E. Thornton &
Connecticut v. Calder

MEMORANDUM TO:

wha~

Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice

White
Powell
Rehnquist
O'Connor

Four are concurring in the judgment. Let me know
problems you have and I will try to deal with them.
Regards,

81-1158 Thornton v.

~al~n~

Dear Chlef:
As I cannot ioin either vour second ~raft nr Bill
Brf'nnan's 4=ir-:;t draft of a concurring oni.ni.on, I will sirnplv
join the i~~qment as in~icated in the ~raft I am circulatinq
today.
I ;::~qrr->e witr Bi.lJ th~t th~ r.~?rnon test that will be
reaffirmed in Gra.nd RanL~s an~ Aguilar, anolios t.o an~ 0ispones of this case. f.l.y -Hfficultv witl-t Bi 11 's opinion is
that it includes a substantial amount of rHcta that is
irreJevant.

As you know from my letter of April 22 commenti'l"lg
on your first 1raft, I was puzz1ed that vou dj0 not simplv
apply Lemon. Subseqnent t0 that letter, I rnr.~<~e n rather
careful examination of all of nur ~ecisions since vou enunciated the thr.ee-Par:t test in Lemon. It- ~1as relien on in
every Establishment Clause case excePt Marsh v. rhamhers.
I v-1as with you in ~1arsh and also in r..ynch. These
cases were based upon the accePtance over the entire historv
of this countrv of an opening orav~r in a legislature and of
the re 1 ationship of Christmas to religion. In neith~r of
these cases was there anv legislative enactment. ThPse wete
s imp1 v accented pract tees of the peoPle. Yet even in Lync 11
you anplied the Lemon test. This haR been the onlv analytical ~ramework a maioritv of the C0urt has ever anprove~ for
these cases.
In vour nresent oraft vou proPer1v concluC'e that
the Connecticut statute violates the Establishment Clause,
but you mention I,emon on1v twice anrl inr9eet1 re4ect it as tl,e
generally accepte0 test. As you out it:
"T~e Court has reoeate~lv rejected the concept that 'any single test or criterion' provt1es the touchstone for resolving Bqtahlishment Clause cases • • • ", p. 8-9.

.
.

'

,.

t

'

.

2.

It is not clear to me exactly w~at stAn~ar~ vou!
draft woul~ ann,v. You rplv a goo~ ~Pa~ on "accommo~ation"
language t~at has be~n used primarilv in "free exercise"
cases, see p~. 6 , 8, 9, 11, 12 of your draft, and you aone~r
to anont a "bolancing" teRt (op. 8-9, 12-1.5) . Thi.s is a
maior ~eoarture from Lemon t~at woul~ le~d to qre~t uncertaintv because of the a~ hoc wefghfnq of interests th~t
~'lou 1"1 hr.> recp.1 i_ t'<""~ in everv Esta~l i s~meflt Clause case .
In suT'!'I, Chief, t cannot ioi'l"' an opinion alonq t""e
lines of vour. present ci~culation . Your opinion is at or!ds
witlo) th~=> rea~oninq in Nallace , Granc Raoi.ns and Aguilar. anti
mv concurring oninions in these cases.
S i. ncere lv,

The Chief Justi.ce
lfo/ss

cc:

The Conference

~1av

'2 3, 1.9 8 r:;

83-1158 Thornton v.

~al~nr

Dear Bill:
I am circulati.nq this aftet"noon a !Jrief ornn1on
concurring in the iu~g~ent. This is to in~icate why T ~o
not feel comfortAh1e with vour concurring opinion, even
though I aqree ~,odth vour reliance on r.emon.
I admire the Uterary quali.tv of your opinion, hut
sav that a qood deal of it Peems to go well beyond
'"hat needs to be said i.n this case. For examplE>, Part II
discusses thP "nut"POEe" prong of the Lemon test hut does not
decide whether that orong has been satisfied. You then decide the case under the effects test. I see no reason for
Part II at all.
mu~t

I

As your views and mine ~o not alwavs coincide in
thPse religious cases (e.g., r.tars~, v. ~hamhE-rs, an<'! Lvnch),
I do ~ot feel comfort~ble with some of the rather broad lanquaqe in Parts I and III. In mv view, this case coul•.:l 11e
~isposed of quite ~riefly by deci~ing that the statute - at
leaqt as anolio~ - clearly violates the effects test.

In '' i.ew of
tle concurrence, the
stronq reaffi. rmation
have written so well

mv reference to your on i. n ion in mv 1. itsum of O'.H two onjnions will be a
of Lemon- consistent with w;at von
in Granf' Rnoid~:.. ann Aquilar.
SincereJy,

Justi.ce Brennan
lfo/ss

. "

...
''

~

··-

.

.

.

T.

'

C!fouri of tltt~b ~tzdts
.uJringhtn. ~. C!f. 20~,.~

~u.prtmt

CHAMI!IERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

May 23, 1985

Re:

No. 83-1158 - Thornton v. Caldor

Dear Lewis:
I do not agree fully with you on your memo of today on this
case: but the duty of each of us is to execute an assignment as a
majority vote. I will try to do that.
It is unimportant whether we agree fully when Lemon should
be used. A Court majority more than once, you included, made the
point that Lemon did not provide a "test" for all Religion Clause
cases. That aside, I will try to meet your oints with a new
draft.

,....----.

I suspect it is the time of the year that makes it very
difficult for me to see how Bill Brennan's opinion and mine are
at great odds except that
believes Lemon is "the test for all
seasons."

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

•

•
May 28, 1985
CJ43 GINA-POW
83-1158

Estate

of

Thornton

and

Connecticut

v.

Caldor,

Inc.
Dear Chief:
I have read with interest your third draft, and make
the following suggestions.
You explicitly apply the Lemon test, and this meets
my primary concern about prior drafts.
you

state

applicable

that
to

Lemon provides
all

"no

Establishment

On p. 7, however,

rigid,

Clause

fixed
cases

formula

... .
II

I

would agree that the test is not a "fixed formula" in the
sense this term normally is used.
the

only

analytical

Establishment

Clause

framework
cases.

for
The

But Lemon does provide
our

consideration of

Lemon

test

itself

is

firmly "fixed" by the numerous Establishment Clause cases
that followed your Lemon decision.

The application of the

test or formula of course requires a consideration in each
case

of the relevant statutes and facts.
I can join your opinion if this sentence on p.

7 is

clarified.
Sincerely,

.

~

.•

•::-,.

..
'·

2.

Note to Linda and Dan

On the basis of a quick reading, it seems to me that
the Chief has pretty well come around to our view.

His

third draft contains a substantial amount of unnecessary
dicta,

but -

unless

1

have missed something -

1 do not

believe any of it wold be troublesome in the future except
the "fixed formula" sentence that to some extent undercuts
Lemon.
1 still prefer a more straight forward opinion in the

case, but if 1 have read the Chief's draft correctly 1 owe

'

him deference as the member of the Court assigned to write
the opinion.

1 will be quite interested in your views.
LFP, JR.

...

'

.fu;tfmtt <!fouri of tlft ~ .ftaft.e'
Jla.gfringtttn. ~. <If. 2ll~'l-~
CHAMBERS 0 F"

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

May 28, 1985

/
83-1158- Estate,of Donald E. Thornton
and Connecticut v. Caldor, Inc.

Dear Chief,
Although
Lemon

test,

doing so.
is

whether

I
I

would
do not

read your

circulating draft as

On page 13, citing Lemon, you say the issue
the

statute

advancing religion.
agree.

not be averse to modifying the

has

the

primary

effect

of

You conclude that -it does, and I

I therefore join your opinion.
Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
Copies to ·the Conference

dro/lgs May 29, 1985

MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL

From:

Re:

Lynda and Dan

Thornton v. Calder

Although the Chief has made a stab at applying
Lemon, we

still have some doubts about whether you should

join the opinion as it now stands.

As you note, the Chief

still disparages the Lemon test directly on p. 7.

In addi-

tion, however, it appears to us that he has also disparaged
~

it subtlely in several places.

For example, on p. 7, in

the last paragraph, the Chief attempts to define Lemon in
terms of his coercion theory by stating the inquiry in the

2.
following way:

"The government is neither to coerce nor

induce adherence to any religion, nor is it to compel conduct conforming to any particular religious creed or practice; the Lemon criteria themselves are designed generally
to determine whether government has respected this Constitutional tenet."

Lemon has never been focused in this way,

but this opinion would give the Chief the first step toward
implementing his coercion theory, in place of the nowsettled Lemon criteria, in future cases.
Similarly, on p. 12, the Chief liberally mixes in
"accommodation,"
r-------"

11

------

endorsement, .. and

11

Coercion 11 language in

~

stating the conclusion that the Connecticut statute has the
impermissible effect of advancing religion.

While this lan-

guage may seem tolerable now, we are afraid it will help
muddy the now-clear Lemon analysis for the future.
erence on p. 14 in the last paragraph to the State's

The ref11

coer-

cive 11 conduct helps cement coercion as a primary factor in
the analysis of this case, as does the Chief's statement on
pages 5 and 6 that "the Establishment Clause was intended to
foreclose governmental compulsion of some of the people to
support and facilitate the religious activities of others ...
All of these references combined appear to make the Lemon
test at most a surrogate for a compulsion test.
We are also generally concerned about the lengthy
discussion early in Part II about the history of the Religion Clauses and their root in

11

[t]he Framers' fear of gov-

ernmental coercion, .. and how the government must guard

3.
against ucompellingu citizens to act in the name of a particular religion.

See p. 6.

While this all may be true in

part, its effect is to give a relatively narrow view of the
historical significance of the Religion Clauses that could
be cited as precedent in the future for a narrower reading
of those Clauses than you might prefer.
Part IV of the opinion also poses serious difficulties.

-----

~

In this part, the Chief describes why Sherbert and

Thomas v. Review Board do not require a different holding in
this case.

--

In those cases, the Court held that the Free

Exercise Clause required the State to extend unemployment
~

benefits to religious employees who had lost their jobs as a
result of their refusal to compromise their religious practices at the workplace.

These cases are irrelevant to the

present case because they concern burdens on religion created by the State, whereas the Conn. case concerns burdens
created by private parties.

The Chief, however, does not

make this difference clear.

Rather, he distinguishes these

two cases on the ground that uthe State is reaching out into
the private sector to compel absolute deference to a certain
religious practice--this goes beyond accommodation and constitutes an impermissible advancement of a particular religious practice.u

Draft at 14.

By failing to distinguish

this case from Sherbert and Thomas on the proper ground,
Part IV of the Chief's opinion could be cited for the proposition that the Free Exercise Clause applies to burdens ereated by private parties.

This is a remarkable proposition,

4.
especially considering that Part IV is unnecessary to the
disposition of the case.
We propose one approach for your consideration.
Since the most dangerous parts of the opinion are unnecessary for disposing of the case, you might think of joining
only the other parts and suggesting that the Chief revise
~

minor parts of them.

In particular, you could join Parts I,

III, and V of his opinion--the facts, application of the
effects prong of Lemon, and the conclusion, respectively-and request that he revise two sentences on page 12.

The

first troubling sentence states: "This is not the
'accommodation' envisioned by the Religion Clauses; §53303e(b), by compelling others to conform their conduct to
the Sabbath observers', virtually 'confer[s]

[an]

imprimatur

of state approval on [particular] religious .•• practices,'
Widmar v. Vincent, 454

u.s.

263, 274 (1981)."

This sentence

appears to balance free exercise against establishment concerns in an "endorsement" calculus that is not clearly tied
to the Lemon effects test, as this endorsement language was
in your Widmar opinion.

We would suggest that you propose

something like the following sentence in its place: "By
'confer[ring] a[n]

imprimatur of state approval on religious

sects or practices,' §53-303e(b)

'violate[s] the prohibition

against the "primary advancement" of religion.' Widmar v.
Vincent, 454

u.s.

263, 273-274 (1981), quoting Committee for

Public Education v. Nyquist, 413

u.s.

756,771 (1973) ."

5.
The second troubling sentence, which begins the
bottom paragraph on page 12 states:
"Given its absolutist terms, which automatically subordinate the treatment of all
secular concerns to those of the Sabbath observers, §53-303e(b), by coercing conduct on
behalf of particular religious adherents,
see, ~, Abington School District, supra:
Engle v. Vitale, supra, has the primary effect of advancing a particular religious tenet."

Like the other sentence, it appears to make "coercion" the
focus of the effects test.

Together with the Chief's dis-

cussion of Sabbatarianism and non-Sabbatarianism earlier on
this page, this sentence also has the effect of suggesting
that the case is being decided on the ground that the Conn.
statute discriminated among religions, not because it discriminated between religion and non-religion more generally.
Because this gloss on a coercion test would particularly
restrict the Establishment Clause, we suggest that you consider the following sentence as a replacement:
"Given its absolutist terms, which automatically subordinate the treatment of secular concerns to those of the Sabbath observers, §53-303e(b) has the primary effect of
advancing religion."

Finally, two small points.

First, the opinion

still does not limit its holding to an "as applied" ruling.
We're not sure that this is terribly important, but we wanted to bring it to your attention.

Second, the Chief's clerk

says that he has become very accommodating about this opin-

.

'

\.

6.
ion and is particularly interested in your vote.

Thus, he

feels confident that the Chief would follow any reasonable
suggestion of yours.

·~

•

.inprtw ~DUri .ltf t4t 1lttittb .itatt.&'
'Jht#Jriqtott, ~. ~· 2llc?'l&'
CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

/

May 29, 1985

No. 83-1158

Estate of Donald E. Thornton
and - Co~necticut v. Calder, Inc.

Dear Chief,
Please join me in Parts I and III of your
opinion circulated May 23 and in the judgment.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice

Copies to the Conference

May 30, 1985

Re:

\

No. 83-1158

Estate of Thornton v. Caldor

Dear Chief:

I have read with interest your third draft.

You

explicitly apply the Lemon test, and this meets my primary
concern about prior drafts.

I continue to have reservations

about much of the opinion, however, and conclude that I cannot join Parts II and IV, as I do not agree with much of the
analysis contained therein, and I view those parts as entirely unnecessary to the disposition of the case.

In par-

ticular, on p. 7 you continue to deemphasize the importance
of the Lemon test, and attempt to define its contours in
terms of your own coercion theory that dominated your prior
~

drafts.
I could join Parts I, III, and V of your opinion if
you would be willing to make a couple of minor changes in
Part III.

First, on p. 12, in the last sentence of the

r~

first full paragraph on that page, you state th W'" [t] his is

' '.J.'
..

.'

'.(,

2.
not the 'accommodation' envisioned by the Religion Clauses;
§53-303e(b), by compelling others to conform their conduct
to the Sabbath observers', virtually 'confer [s]

[an]

impri-

matur of state approval on [particular] religious • • •
practices,' Widmar v. Vincent, 454

u.s.

263, 274 (1981)."

Like Sandra, I do not agree with your use of "accommodation"
analysis in the

opini~ ,

and, as noted above, I object to

the attempt to define Lemon in terms of "coercion" or "com...____,.

pulsion."

.A

....____

Perhaps you could substitute something like the

following for the above-quoted sentence:

~/

I)

.~

'"By 'confer[ring] a[n] imprimatur of state
approval on religious sects or practices,'
§53-303e(b) 'violate[s] the prohibition
against the "primary advancement" of religion.' Widmar v. Vincent, 454 u.s. 263 , 273274 (1981), quoting Committee for Public Edu- \\
cation v. Nyquist, 413 u.s. 756, 771 (1973) ." ~

~ Second,

state:

on the carryover sentence on pp. 12-13, you

"Given its absolutist terms, which automatically

subordinate the treatment of all secular concerns to those
of the Sabbath observers, §53-303e(b), by coercing conduct
on behalf of particular religious adherents, see, e.g.,
Abingdon School District, supra; Engle v. Vitale, supra, has
the primary effect of advancing a particular religious tenet."

This sentence also appears to make "coercion" the

focus of the "effects" test.

would you consider replacing

the sentence with something like the following?
"Given its absolutist terms, which automatically subordinate the treatment of secular

'•

3.
concerns to those of the Sabbath observers,
§53-303e(b) has the primary effect of advancing religion ...
If you would be willing to make these changes, I
would be happy to join Parts I, III, and V and to withdraw
my separate concurring opinion.

Sincerely \ \

L.

• ,

I

cc:

•'

The Conference

Jr.

.Z...,

.iu.prnnt <!Jmttt af tltt ~tb .itabs
jirasftingt1t1t. ~. <If. 20.;;~~
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 3, 1985

Re:

83-1158 - Thornton v. Caldor

Dear Chief:
Please add at the end of your opinion, "JUSTICE
REHNQUIST dissents."
Sincerely,

t'AJrv-

The Chief Justice
cc:

'

'·

The Conference

<!fouri llf tlft 'Jii'ttitth ;%ta.tts
~asfrington. ~. <!f. 2'll~J.1~

;%uvrttttt

CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL , ..JR.

June 3, 1985

83-1158 Estate of Thornton v. Calder

Dear Chief:
Your third draft relies explicitly on the Lemon
test, and this meets one of my primary concerns about prior
drafts.
I am still troubled by other portions of your
opinion. I suppose the truth is our views as to the Establishment Clause have diverged since I followd Lemon in my
Nyquist opinion. Our differences are evidenced in the Wallace, Grand Rapids and Aguilar cases. See my concurring
opinions.
I am inclined, therefore, to stay with my brief
opinion in this case concurring in the judgment. But as you
have the responsibility of trying to put a Court together
and have invited further discourse, I write this letter.
In light of my views elsewhere expressed, I cannot
JOln Parts II and IV of your opinion. Much of what is written in these Parts is unnecessary to the disposition of the
case, and the analysis is not consistent with my joins in
the three cases mentioned above in which you are dissenting.
An example of what troubles me is your deemphasizing the
importance of the Lemon test {see p. 7) and defining its
contours in terms of a "coercion" theory that - so far as I
know - the Court has never adopted in an Establishment
Clause case.
I could JOln Parts I, III and V if you are agreeable to a couple of changes that I now suggest. On p. 12,
in the last sentence of the first full paragraph on that
page, you rely on an "accommodation" theory. And you also
describe Lemon in terms of "coercion" or "compulsion" - a
theory I do not understand. Perhaps you would be willing to
substitute something like the following:
"By 'confer[ring] a[n] imprimatur of state
approval on religious sects or practices,'
§53-303e{b) 'violate[s] the prohibition
against the "primary advancement" of reli-

2.

gion.' Widmar v. Vincent, 454 u.s. 263 , 273274 (1981), quoting Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 u.s. 756, 771 (1973) ."
Second, on the carryover sentence on pp. 12-13, you
state: "Given its absolutist terms, which automatically
subordinate the treatment of all secular concerns to those
of the Sabbath observers, §53-303e(b), by coercing conduct
on behalf of particular religious adherents, see, e.g.,
Abingdon School District, supra~ Engle v. Vitale, supra, has
the primary effect of advancing a particular religious tenet." This sentence also appears to make "coercion" the
focus of the "effects" test. Would you consider replacing
the sentence with the following?
"Given its absolutist terms, that automatically subordinate the treatment of secular
concerns to those of the Sabbath observers,
§53-303e(b) has the primary effect of advancing religion."
If you would be willing to make these changes, I
would be happy to join the judgment and Parts I, III, and v.
I would then withdraw my separate concurring opinion. I
will understand, of course, if you find these changes unacceptable. Also we both have other cases to work on.
Sincerely

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

~-

,.. '

..

1gs June 4, 1985

MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL

From:

Lynda

Re:

No. 83-1158

Thornton v. Calder

You asked me to look at Justice Brennan's draft to
see what changes would have to be made for you to join it.
First, I think that he could easily omit the last
half of Part I, beginning with the first full paragraph on
p. 3 and continuing to the end of that part on p. 5.

These

pages discuss the Free Exercise Clause and why it is not
applicable here.

This is no longer necessary, it seems to

me, since the Chief has applied the Lemon test to decide the
case.

I don't see anything objectionable in the remaining

first half of Part I.

2.
Second, Part II should be omitted entirely.

As we

discussed before, this is the superfluous discussion of the
·~urpose"

prong of the Lemon test.

As you may recall, Jus-

tice Brennan ultimately does not rely on this part to decide
the case, but concludes instead that the case should be decided on the "effects" prong in Part III.
point to having Part II.

Thus, there is no

This would also eliminate the dis-

crimination language you found objectionable.
Third, you should ask Justice Brennan to change
the last sentence of Part IV on p. 13 to read something like
the following:
"Because the heavy-handed approach adopted by
§53-303e(b) places the imprimatur of governmental endorsement and encouragement on a
particular religious practice, with the primary effect of advancing religion, it is a
state law 'respecting the establishment of
religion,' and thus invalid under the First
Amendment."
This change will ensure that the final sentence may not be
quoted as support for some separate endorsement test, but
rather reaffirms the draft's inclusion on pp. 11-12 of "endorsement" and

"imprimatur~

language as part of the effects

test.
If Justice Brennan is not willing to make all of
these changes, it is possible that you could join parts of
his opinion, making a majority for his application of the
effects prong of the Lemon test, but not associating yourself with the more extraneous parts of his opinion.

Dear Ch1.....
In view

ced by Sandra and

t... .

Bill Rehnquist's request thaL

.y be recorded as

t:Ltss.e.""'-i.. ~ _,
)eiRiR9 t~~d9meR~~ it is clear that there can be no
Court for your

opinion~

therefore am inclined to stay

with my brief opinion concurring in the

judgment ~our

third draft does rely on the Lemon test, and this meets
one of my primary concerns.

I still would have difficulty

joining Parts II and IV of your opinion.

It seems to me

that a good deal of what is written in these Parts is
unnecessary to the

'

dispo ~ on of the case.

More

importantly, some of the analysis is not consistent with
my joins - and my concurring opinions in Wallace, Grand

2.

Rapids and Aguilar.

For example, you continue to

deemphasize the importance of Lemon (see p. 7), and define
its contours in terms of a "coercion" theory that 1 do not
recall we have ever adopted in an Establishment Clause
case.

Also, your draft continues to rely on an

"accommodation" theory in conjunction with coercion that I
do not fully understand.
I suppose the truth is that our views as to
Establishment Clause analysis have diverged since I
followed Lemon in my Nyquist opinion,

a~

Bill

Brennan's concurring opinion in this case is closer to my
views - although Bill has included a

ood deal of

unnecessary language.
In sum, Chief, while there will be

m~~ UUGR11w:loEmt> e~on

~~t~

--'f or the

judgment,
We both have other cases to work on, in which I trust that
~

you and I will be together -

~

we usually are.

Sincerely,
The Chief Justice
lfp/ss

June 7, 1985

83-1158 Thornton v. Calder

Dear Chief:
Before I received your today's memo to the Conference {with your postcript to me), I had written you - and
was about to send - the encloset'! letter ln which I suggested
that we had spent more than enough time on this case (your
first draft was circulated March 13), that it is a case of
little importance, and that I am prepared to rest on my little concurring opinion and let the chips fall.
Your postcript on today's note asks if I can "pinpoint" changes in your third draft that would b~ acceptable.
It is not easy for me to "pinpoint" because I think you and
aill Brennan both have written a great deal more than is
necessary in a fairly simple case in which a straightforward
application of the Lemon test - in a brief opinion would
suffice.
I could not join Parts II and IV of your third
draft as presently drafted. Much of both parts is unnecessary to the disposition of the case, and the analysis is not
consistent with my joins in the other three Establishment
Clause cases in which you and I disagree. An example of
what troubles me i.s your continued deemphas:f.s of the importance of Lemon (seep. 7). I do not understand your continued use of language related to your "coercion" theory - a
theory so far as I know that has never been adopted in an
Establishment Clause case. Nor do I understand your continued reliance on "accommodation".
As indicated in my other letter enclosed, there
is no way you can get a Court for an opinion. Indeed, if
you make major changes, you may lose Byron - the only Justice to join you. And, if he and I both wer.e able to join
you, you would have only three votes as agai.nst Bill Brennan's four.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss

•X

.

·· .• ~

·'
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•

'
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'
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June 7, 1985

83-1158 Thornton v. Calder

Dear Chief:
Since our pleasant conversation in your Chambers
on Wednesday, for the third time I have reviewed my file and
the several oPinions circulated in this miserable case.
My own record is as follows: At Conference, I
voted to affirm on an "as applied basis", saying that the
Connecticut statute "flunked the Lemon test". After there
had been no response to your first draft of March 13, I
\-lrote you on April 22 restating my view as to the applicability of Lemon. In that letter, I did say Lemon had not
always been applied literally. I had in mind your decisions
in ft.lar.sh and Lynch in which the pr .tmarv reliance was on the
history - thouqh Lemon was applied in Lynch. As to history,
see my n 5, on p. 3 in my concurring opinion in Wallace.
Again, after a careful reexamination, I wrote you
on May 23, with copi.es to the Conference, stating that I
"will simply join the judgment". I circulated a draft to
that effect.
In your third draft, you do apply the Lemon test
but I still have considerable difficulty with your opinion
as a whole. A good deal of it seems unnecessary, and also
some of the analysis is not consistent with my joins in Wallace, Grand Rapids and Aguilar.
As the situation now stands, there will be no
Court for an opinion. Byron has joined you, Sandra disagrees with much of your opinion, and would join only Parts
I and III. Bill Brennan has four votes for his opinion.
Bill Rehnquist is the only .Justice dissenting from the judgment. Thus, even if I were to join your present opinion or
some revision of it, you would have only three votes for
your opinion, and Bill would have four for his. There would
be eight votes for the judgment.
I suppose this means that he would have a plurality but only for his opinion. As I have indicated, and is
made clear from my opinions in Wallace, Grand Rapids and
Aquilar, I am closer to Bill Brennan on Establishment Clause
analysis than I am to you, and I could join him if he made

....

;

~-

-,_

:

•.

,,_..

.,
··.·'

2.

some changes. But, I feel more comfortable with my little
opinion concurring in the judgment.
The decision and writing in this case will not be
too important for the future. The Connecticut statute may
well be unique. Moreover, the Court decisions in the other
three religion cases mentioned abovP., in which you and I
disagree, will be the controlling precedents. I therefore
think the time has come simply to "let the chips fall". We
both have other and more important cases to work on - cases
in which I trust that you and I will be together - as we
usually are.
Sincerely,

'rhe Chief Just ice
lfp/ss
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.in.prttttt <lfltltrl of t4t ~ltb .italtg
..a:glfinghtn, ~. <g. 2ll~~~

June 7, 1985

\

\

Re:

83-1158 - Estate of Donald E. Thornton & Connecticut v. Calder

\

\

\
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
I will undertake another effort to resolve the "logjam"
in this case.

P.S. (LFP only)
meet your problems?

Can you "pinpoint" just what it would take to

.in.p:rttttt <!fonrl of tJrt ~~ .itattg

Jlagltittgton, !fJ. QI.

2ll?'!~

CHAMBERS OF"

PERSONAL

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 10, 1985

Re:

No. 83-1158 - Estate of Donald E. Thornton and
Connecticut v. Calder, Inc.

Dear Lewis:
I have your two "personal" memos of June 7. My
effort to try to accommodate all views has plainly been
unproductive and I will now pare my opinion down to a
tight and brief draft on the effect.
I am baffled by the Brennan opinion which paraphrases
mine, but at greater length.
I fear it is the June Syndrome at work--at least
in part!
Please stand by.

Justice Powell

,jltJtrttttt <q1tttrtaf tltt ~ittb ,jbdt.&'

Jht.&'qingbn, ~. <q.

2.ll,?'i~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR

June 13, 1985

No. 83-1158

/

Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.

Dear Chief,
Please join me in your draft circulated June 12, 1985.
I am circulating a revised concurring opinion.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice

Copies to the Conference

Jltp'rttttt ~aurt "f l4t ,nittb Jtalt.e'
Jla.e'lfington, ~. ~· 2llp~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

June 14, 1985

Re:

83-1158, Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
The second draft of my concurring opinion in
this case, circulated yesterday, was erroneously
marked "Stylistic Changes Throughout". It should have
been marked "Substantial Changes Throughout." I
apologize for any inconvenience.
Sincerely,

.•

·'

June 14, 1985

83-1158

Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.

Dear Chief:
I returned from Mayo late yesterday, and was happy to
find your draft of June 12 on Caldor. I have sent you a
join note.

The changes you made have accommodated by concerns.
appreciate your making them.

I

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
LFP/vde

.···
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June 14, 1985

83-1158

Estate of Thornton v. Calder, Inc.

Dear BlJl:
I have noted vour letter to the Chief about his draft
of June 12.
Although you identified language that shouldn't be in
the opinion, the Chief has come so far in response to our
criticism of his prior ooinions that I can join him. As we
have agreed, your excellent O'J?inions in Ball and Aguilar
will he the 1a~;, and I also make clear in my concurring
opinion that I am in agreement with you as to the apolicability of !,emon analysis in Establishment Clause cases.
May I say also, Bill, that I think you ar~ very gracious to qive up your opinion in deference to the Chief. I
would say that he has met our criticisms about 90% - which
is quite a constructive change.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
LFP/vde

June 14, 1985

83-1158

Estate of Thornton v. Cal1or, Inc.

Dear Chief:
Please io{n me in your 4th Draft, circulated on June
12.

I will withdra'"' the little concurring opinion that I
have heretofore circulate~.
Sincerelv,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
LFP/vae

.,

.

'

CHAMI!IER5 OF"

.JUSTICE

w.. . .J .

BRENNAN, .JR .

June 12, 1985

No. 83-1158 -- Estate of Thornton v. Calder

Dear Chief:
The draft of your op1n1on that circulated
today comes closer to accommodating my views. On
page 6, however, the opinion states:
"In setting
the appropriate boundaries in Establishment Clause
cases, the Court has frequently relied on our
holding in Lemon, supra, for guidance."
In light
of the other decisions this Term, would not
consistency be better served by changing the
underlined portion of the sentence to read:
"we
apply the criteria set out in Lemon, supra."
If
you would make that change, I would join.

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

•,!

..

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE

w... .J.

BRENNAN, .JR.

June 18, 1985

No. 83-1158
Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.

Dear Chief,
Please join me in your fifth draft
in this case.

I appreciate the changes

you

and

have

made

I

will

separate concurring opinion.
Sincer~ly,
! •

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

withdraw my

.hvrmt.t aroun &tf ttr~ ~b .Blatt•
JluJrbtgf~ ~.

ar.

2LT.;t~~

CHAM!!E:RS OP'

.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:

June 18, 1985

No. 83-1158, Estate of Thornton v. Calder, Inc.

Dear Chief:
Please join me in your 5th draft circulated today.

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

i

jbprtmt Of,utrlltf tltt ~niftb ~httt•
'~lhudfinghtn, ~·

Of.

2ll~'l-~

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 18, 1985

Re:

83-1158 - Thornton v. Calder

Dear Chief:

(
(

Please join me.

./)

Respectfully,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

~-

.t'!tJtunu C!J~turi !tf tlrt ~b ,ttatte
11htefringhtn. ~. C!J. 21l,?,..;t
CMAMISI!:"'S 01'

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 19, 1985

Re:

No. 83-1158-Estate of Donald E. Thornton and
Connecticut v. Caldor

Dear Sandra:
Please join me in your concurring opinion.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Justice O'Connor
cc: The Conference

'I

C_:d,-~.~
)

(c r')
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II
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83-1158 Estate of Thornton v. Ca1dor (Dan)
CJ for the Court 11/9/84
1st draft 3/13/85
2nd draft 5/13/85
3rd draft 5/23/85
4th draft 6/12/85
5th draft 6/18/85
Joined by BRW 5/28/85
SOC joins Parts I and Ill 5/29/~
Joined by SOC 6/13/85
IFP joins 4th draft and withdraws concurring
opinion 6/14/85
Joined by JPS 6/18/85
Joined by HAB 6/18/85
Joined by WJB 6/18/85 - withdrawing concurring
opinion.
WJB concurring in the judgment
1st draft 5/17/85
~d draft 5/21/85
3rd draft 5j22j85
Joined by JPS 5j20j85
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JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in the judgment.
I join in affirming the judgment of the Connecticut Su- ~~ J ~
preme Court that Con. Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b) violates the
.
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. I believe ~
that this result is required by our consistent understanding of
~
the Establishment Clause, as applied in this Court's precedents over at least the past 40 years. However, I do not ~ /. __, /-T;;
agree with the Court's evident distaste for the Establishment
- ......., ,.~
Clause guidelines derived from our prior cases and set forth ~ ~ ~
in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971). Because I believe that resolution of the sensitive issues in this case is best ~ ~
advanced by concentrating on the Lemon analysis, I therefore write separately to offer a less innovative explanation ~ ~
for today's result.
I
The statute at issue in this case, as interpreted by the
Connecticut Supreme Court, requires employers absolutely
to accommodate the needs of employees who desire not to
work on their Sabbath, regardless of the resulting impact on
the employer or other employees. See ante, at 10-11, and
n. 13. From petitioner's perspective, the statute is an example of a familiar kind of antidiscrimination ordinance; it
declares that a citizen whose religious beliefs require observance of a Sabbath should not thereby be disabled from par-
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ticipating on an equal basis with other employees in the
State's workforce. Petitioner contends that the statute, far
from inhibiting the freedom of religion, expands the realm of
religious freedom in accordance with the purposes underlying
the First Amendment's Religion Clauses. From respol!,dent's perspective, however, the statute does not merely rem{ edy ~ion, but also goeS'fartli;faer to enlist the powers
of the State to promote a certain religious practice (observing
a Sabbath aay)and un!afrly to penaliZe those who do not take
part in that pradice.-'1t·e aatnafwaf,the statute is a law
"re~tablishment of religion" and thus forbidden
by the First Amendment. Because the statute may be
viewed from either of these two perspectives, today's case
raises sensitive and difficult issues concerning the scopeof
perm1ssi0 e s ate actiOn under the Establishment Clause.
Lemon v. Kurtz1fl,an, 403 .. U. S. 602 (1972), set forth a
t ree-part tes that summarizes the constraints of the Establishmen lause as understood in our cases:
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally the
statute must not foster an excessive govern~nt entanglement with religion." I d., at 612-613.
To be sure, the Lemon test provides no mechanistic formula
for generating results in Establishment Clause cases, as attested by the sharp disagreements among the Members of
this Court concerning the application of the test in many of
our Establishment Clause cases. Religion is a vital element
in the life of our people, 1 and government actions of various
sorts often have a substantial impact on the individual's practice of religion. Consequently, our goal in this area has been
~

'Indeed, a major purpose of both Religion Clauses of the First Amendment is not hostility toward religion, but protection of the vitality of religion from the interference of civil government. See, e. g., Engle v.
Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 431 (1962) .

.

~
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to permit the States as much flexibility as possible to accomplish legitimate state purposes, while preserving the fundamental rights to freedom of conscience that are the legacy of
the Framers of the Bill of Rights. 2 Given this goal, no plausible standard would make resolution of the sensitive cases
that come before us easy. Nonetheless, the Lemon test focuses attention on the issues that are crucial in defining the
limi~ov~rnm~n~a action urider the Establishment
Clause;the tlireeprongs of Lemon "constitute a convenient,
accurate distillation of this Court's efforts over the past decades to evaluate a wide range of governmental action challenged as violative of the [Establishment Clause]." Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 358 (1975). Because it thus concentrates the constitutional inquiry on the values protected
by the Establishment Clause, the Lemon test should be employed to analyze the difficult case before us today.
Petitioner argues that the Lemon test is inappropriate
here because "a law protecting religious freedom is a constitutionally encouraged means of implementing the values of
the Free Exercise Clause." Brief for Petitioner 22. For
this reason, petitioner urges that the statute should be upheld, like any statute not implicating constitutionally protected rights, if it rationally furthers a legitimate state
purpose. Presumably, any statute that could be claimed to
"implement the values" of the Religion Clauses would be held
constitutional under this test, even if it had the purpose and
effect of advancing religion and even if it deeply entangled
the state in religious matters.
The understanding of the Free Exercise Clause advanced
by petitioner is deeply at odds with our interpretation of both
Religion Clauses. Virtually every Establishment Clause
case that comes before tfie Coui"'tiiiVOIVes an effort by a State
to ru t e practice of religion in a way at is sru merely to
=

~

...__.

It is not necessary here to recount at length the history and purpo~
of the Religion Clauses. See, e. g. , Everson v. Board of Education, 330
2

U. S. 1, 8-15 (1947); id., at 33-43 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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"accommodate" the religious beliefs of some group of citizens.
For example, the state subsidies struck down in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, supra, could be defended as designed to accommodate those whose religion requires them to attend religious schools rather than public schools. State sponsorship
of school prayers, see School District of Abington Township
v. Sche
,
. . 226 (1963), similarly could be defended
as ' accommodating" hose who desire to meet their religious
obhgaticms- while attending public school. These claims of
"accommodation" are unsuccessful because the F~cise
Cla~ot provide all-purpose authority to the govern- .
ment to extend positive assistance to those who choose to
practice religion.
The guarantees of the Free Exercise Clause come into play
only when t e vernment itse has, in the course of pursuing W 0 y SeCU ar 0 ~ec IVeS, imposed reg_uirem~ that
burden or penalize individuals in fhe exercise of their religio~ee, e. g., 'fliomas v. Review Board, 450 u-:s. 707
(1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972); Gillette v.
United States, 401 U. S. 437 (1971); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U. S. 398 (1963 . There is no allegation in this case that
§ 53-303e(b) alleviates a governmentally-imposed obligation
that burdens private parties in the free exercise of their
religion. See School District of Abington Township v.
Schempp, supra, at 222-223. 3 Cf. McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U. S. 420, 429 (1961). This is therefore not a case in
which the Free Exercise Clause determines the result or, indeed, in which its mandates are in any serious tension with
the strictures of the Establishment Clause. See Engle v.
3
The Court in Schempp stated the controlling ptinciple: "Hence it is
necessary ~cise case for one to show the coercive effect of the
enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion. The
distinction between the two clauses is apparent-a violation of the Free
Excercise Clause 1s pre icate on ~on while the Establishment Clause
violation need not be so attended." 374 U. S., at 223. See also id., at
296-299 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 311

(1952) •

.

'
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Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 430 (1962). Consequently, although
there may be cases in which such tension influences the analysis under both Religion Clauses, I see no reason here to depart from application of the Lemon test, our settled mode of
Establishment Clause analysis.
II

The first prong of the Lemon test involves an examination
of the statute to determine whether it has a clear secular purose. Petitioner alleges that the purpose of the Connecticut
statute is to assure that all citizens have an equal opportunity
to participate in the economic life of the state. In the service
of this goal, the statute seekSto attack a particular barrierthe need to observe a weekly Sabbath-that stands in the
way of equal participation; it permits those whose religious
beliefs require the observance of a Sabbath to avoid being
relegated to isolated or segregated employment "ghettos"
where their religious beliefs do not interfere with their work.
Rather, such individuals are permitted by the statute to
enter the world of work on an equal basis with all other
citizens.
Respondent paints rather a different picture. Respondent
alleges that t e
of the statute itself betra s an intent to
benefit citizens w o are re 1gious. The statute gives those
individuals who for religious reasons seek not to work on a
particular day of the week the absolute right to do so, while
individuals who have other reasons for refusin to work are
at t e mercy o their em oyer. An employee who, for examp e, refuses to work on Sunday because it is the only day
he can spend together with the rest of his family has no legal
recourse if his employer fires him as a result. But if another
employee refuses to work on Sunday for religious reasons,
the law bars the employer from taking any action against
him. By thus favoring the religious employee over the
employee who has secular reasons for his refusal to work,

race
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the statute, in respondent's view, impermissibly promotes
religion.
If carried to the limits of its lo ·c, respondent's argument
might reaten any legislation that embodies a facial religious
classification.
ny sue egis a 1on is hkely either to promote orto inhibit religion under this analysis, and both of
these purposes are illegitimate under the Establishment
Clause. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 15
(1947). Yet this extreme version of the ar ment misa rehends the scope o e 1ma e state action under the Lemon
test.- The Esfii6hslimentciause rorbids the government
from requiring religious exercises or practices in public institutions, or from attempting to propagate, encourage, or induce religious beliefs. However, a statute's facial refe~ce
to religion is insufficient without more to conclude that it is
mOtiVated by a forbidden religious purpose. 4 Where the
governmen seeKs" o expan the domain of civil liberty by
protecting the rights of all citizens to participate on an equal
basis, without regard to religion, in important public and
private aspects of our national life, its purpose is wholly
legitimate.
To hold that the government ~_cts in acco~ secular purpose when combattin reli ·ou 1scrimina~ay
seem to some paradoxica . ndeei:l, if t
te!s-oniyl{urpose in prohibiting religious discrimination were to encourage otherwise indifferent or hostile citizens to join religious
institutions and to participate in religious activities, it would
surely be unco titutional. However, a prohibition of religio
protects not only believers, but un• Cf. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U. S. 116, 123 (1982) (valid secular
purpose of statute giving church veto power over nearby liquor applicants
is to protect spiritual, cultural, and educational centers from the 'burlyburly' associated with liquor outlets); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.. S. 349, 363
(1975) (valid purpose of statute authorizing loan of instructional materials
to parochial schools is to assure students ample opportunity to develop
their intellectual capacities).

?
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believers as well: protecting the freedom of the religious
individual to practice as his conscience dictates necessarily
protects the freedom of the nonreligious individual to refuse
to practice if his conscience so dictates. The ideal of a society bereft of obstacles to the full participation' of each citizen
is a fully secular ideal, and I have little doubt that ridding the
workplace of such barriers to equal participation and achievement is a state purpose fully in keeping with our deepest national aspirations.
This conclusion is supported by our prior cases. We have
repeatedly recognized that state aid to parochial schools may
be motivated by "the interest in preserving a healthy and
safe educational environment for all of its schoolchildren."
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756,
773 (1973). Acco~, Committee for Public Education v.
Regan, 444 l.k~646, 654 (1979); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U. S., at 613; E'Uerson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 16
(1947). The mere fact that a statute makes available a public
benefit or activity to those who profess religious beliefs does
not imply that the statu~e is motivated by a religious purpose. The fact that the statute includes an explicitly religious classification does not necessarily alter this conclusion.
See, e. g., Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664 (1971).
Although statutes designed with this purpose may have an
effect of promoting religion, e. g., Committee for Public
Education v. Nyquist, supra, the purpose of "securing equal
economic opportunity" to all individuals regardless of religion
has consistently been recognized as legitimate. Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63, 90, n. 4
(1977) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).
A statute that did no more than require an employer to
make a reasonable accommodation to employees who seek to
practice their religion could be based on this valid secular
purpose. 5 A statute of this sort would be aimed at relieving
For instance, sections 701(j) and 703(a)(l) of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-2(a)(l), forbid dis5

I
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religious discrimination that erects obstacles to the full participation by each individual in the nation's economic life.
Cf. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, supra, at 63
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Of course, merely forbidding
religious discrimination as such-without requiring reasonable accommodation-would be one way of accomplishing this
objective. But a state may reasonably believe that such a
statute would be ineffective and that a reasonable accommodation by private employers to the employees' religious needs
is necessary fully to permit them to participate in the state's
economic life. Thus, although the statute may require private parties to give particular attention to their treatment of
members of religious groups, this special attention would be
required only in service of the goal of equal opportunity and
full participation, not as an effort to institute a religious
preference.
The Connecticut statute in this case, however, goes far beyond reasonable accommodation. It requires the~
and other emp oyees o accommodate the Sabbath observer,
regardless of cost, inconvenience, or disruption. Respondent argues cogently that a statute so sweeping on its face
could only be motivated by the forbidden purpose of granting
religious observers a position of primacy in the workplace;
the assertion of a goal of nondiscrimination for such an extreme statute could, according to respondent, be no more
than a pretext. Cf. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S 39 (1980).
Yet petitioner argues that even a statute embodying this
kind of absolute accommodation requirement could be motivated by the legitimate secular purpose of making the opportunities of the state's economic life available to all, including
crimination in employment on the basis of religion except where "an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an
employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." See
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63 (1977).
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those whose religious beliefs would otherwise render them
out of reach. According to petitioner, the statute is, like
a "reasonable accommodation" statute, a form of legitimate
anti-discrimination legislation.
Petitioner and respondent both advance arguments of
some force. But respondent's argument rests in large part
on the effects that must accompany a statute requiring absolute accommodation; the crucial premise is that the statute
will necessarily enlist the powers of government positively to
promote religion. This effect being so certain, according to
respondent, it must be seen as the intended goal. The effects test, however, is an independent criterion of the validity of a statute under the Lemon test. I therefore find it
more profitable to examine respondent's argument under the
effects test.

III
Under the second prong of the Lemon test, a challenged
statute violates the Establishment Clause if, regardless of its
purpose, it has a "principal" or "primary'' effect of advancing
religion. See Cemmittee for Public Education v. Nyquist,
413 U. S. 756, 783, n. 39 (1973). The Court has repeatedly
held that a statute having an incidental or remote effect of
advancing religion, if accomplished in the pursuit of a legitimate secular end, is not forbidden under the Establishment
Clause. Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426
U. S. 736, 747 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734,
742-743 (1973); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236
(1968); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 442 (1961);
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947). On the
other hand, even unintended consequences of an otherwise
legitimate government program may render .that program
unconstitutional if they have the "direct" and "immediate"
effect of promoting or inhibiting religion. Committee for
Public Education v. Nyquist, supra, at 783, n. 39.
In my view, the Connecticut statute at issue here has the
impermissible effect of advancing religion in two different,

83-1158-CONCUR
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though related, ways. First, the statute allocates a substantial public benefit on an explicitly and exclusively religious
basis, while at the same time concentrating the costs of the
benefit on others on an exclusively religious basis. The right
not to work on a day of one's choice is surely a scarce and valued benefit in our society. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U. S. 420, 451-452 (1961). Under the Connecticut statute,
employees who need a specific day off to celebrate their Sabbath have the absolute right to do so; they need sacrifice no
other interests to avail themselves of the statutory preference. Yet employees who have strong but non-religious reasons for wanting a day off-to be with their family, to participate in community activities, to undertake a part-time
educational program-have no positive rights under the
Connecticut statute. These other employees must nonetheless sacrifice days off that would otherwise be available to
them in order to "accommodate" their religious colleagues.
Thus, the statute makes available a substantial and highlyvalued benefit to religious observers and in effect imposes a
tax on non-observers to pay the cost.
It might be argued that the benefit afforded religious ob- ~
servers by the statute is merely a remote and incidental byproduct of its central goal of ending religious discrimination.
Yet the benefit accorded by the statute is the right to impose
whatever cost is necessary on others in order to have one's
religious preferences satisfied. This is simply too valuable a
right, and too central to the operation of the statute, to be
declared a merely "incidental" or "remote" effect that may
pass muster under the Establishment Clause. 6
There are certain circumstances in which public benefits of
considerable value may be made available to religious institu• In contrast, the religious effects of a statute mandating only a "reasonable accommodation" may well be only the "incidental" and "remote"
effects that often flow from an attempt to pursue a legitimate secular objective. See Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 784,
n. 39 (1973).

f:
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tions, even if the costs are necessarily spread among the society at large, including nonadherents of the benefitted institutions. In Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664 (1970),
the Court held that the provision of tax exemptions to religious institutions, as part of a general program of tax deductions for private, nonprofit organizations, did not violate the
Establishment Clause. The tax deductions were used by a
wide range of institutions, while the "costs" of the tax
subsidy were spread among all taxpayers. Cf. Everson v.
Board of Education, supra, at 17. Our result in Walz, of
course, depended on a number of factors aside from the size
of the affected class. But the Connecticut statute gains little
support from Walz in any event, because it has precisely the
opposite effect of the tax deductions in Walz. It concentrates its benefits exclusively among religious observers,
while tending to concentrate its substantial costs on those
who do not engage in the favored religious observance.
Compare Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S. 825, 832 (1973) (challenged program "singled out a class of its citizens for an
economic benefit" on religious lines). Thus, unlike the tax
deductions in Walz, the benefits accorded by the Connecticut
statute have the effect of advancing a particular religious
practice at the expense of those, whether they profess a religion or not, who do not engage in that practice.
The statute has an additional effect that reinforces my conviction that it transgresses tilelimits of the Establishment
Clause. In Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116
(1983), we held unconstitutional a statute giving churches absolute authority to exclude liquor establishments from within
a fixed radius of the church. We stated that "the mere appearance of a joint exercise of legislative authority by Church
and State provides asignificant symbolic benefit to religion in
the minds of some by reason of the power conferred." I d., at
125-126. Granting this kind of governmentally backed veto
power to certain private individuals to be exercised on an explicitly religious basis is likely to be perceived by the adher-
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ents as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval, of their respective religious choices. See Lynch v.
Donnelly,-- U.S.--,-- (1984) (O'CONNOR, J., Concurring). Either effect is equally forbidden under the Establishment Clause.
Like the statute at issue in Grendel's Den, the Connecticut
statute in this case gives Sabbath observers an absolute veto
over interests of the employer as well as other employees; it
permits the Sabbath observer to enlist the powers of the
State to force others to sacrifice their own substantial interests so that the observer may engage in his religious practice.
The effect of such a delegation of absolute power to individuals could only be perceived as a governmental preference for
certain religious conduct over other interests, both religious
and non-religious. The insinuation of governmental power
in this way into the religious choices of each individual devalues both the religious commitments of observers and the
status in the political community of nonobservers. It is precisely the kind of governmental involvement in matters of
conscience whose avoidance, according to our cases, is the
primary aim of the Establishment Clause. See, e. g., Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, at 625; School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S., at 226; Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U. S., at 15-16. 7

IV
During the debates in the First Congress on the Bill of
Rights, Representative Daniel Carroll of Maryland noted
that "the rights of conscience are, in their nature, of pecular
delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest touch of governmental hand ... " I Annals of Cong. 730 (Aug. 15, 1789).
When a state acts to overcome barriers that stand as obstacles to the ability of each citizen to take full part in our
Because I find the statute to be unconstitutional under the effects test,
I need not reach the issue of its validity under the third, entanglement
prong of the Lemon test .
7

.'•
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economic life, the state acts to further the very interests underlying the Religion Clauses, and much of the remainder of
the Bill of Rights. Yet state action in this area, as in others
in which the individual's freedom of conscience is involved,
must be circumspect. Because the heavy-handed approach
adopted by § 53-303e(b) places the imprimatur of governmental endorsement and encouragement on a particular religious practice, it is a state law "respecting the establishment
of religion," and thus invalid under the First Amendment.
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JUSTICE BRENNAN, concuiTing in t
ent of the Connecticut SuI join in affirming the ·
preme Court that Co . en. Stat. § 53-303e(b) violates the
Establishment Clause f the First Amendment. I believe
that this result is required by our consistent understanding of
the Establishment Clause, as applied in this Court's precedents over at least the past 40 years. However, I do not
agree with the Court's evident distaste for the Establishment
Clause guidelines derived from our prior cases and set forth
in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971). Because I believe that resolution of the sensitive issues in this case is best
advanced by concentrating on the Lemon analysis, I therefore write separately to offer a less innovative explanation
for today's result.
I
The statute at issue in this case, as interpreted by the
Connecticut Supreme Court, requires employers absolutely
to accommodate the needs of employees who desire not to
work on their Sabbath, regardless of the resulting impact on
the employer or other employees. See ante, at 10-11, and
n. 13. From petitioner's perspective, the statute is an example of a familiar kind of antidiscrimination ordinance; it
declares that a citizen whose religious beliefs require observance of a Sabbath should not thereby be disabled from par-
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ticipating on an equal basis with other employees in the
State's workforce. Petitioner contends that the statute, far
from inhibiting the freedom of religion, expands the realm of
religious freedom in accordance with the purposes underlying
the First Amendment's Religion Clauses. From respondent's perspective, however, the statute does not merely remedy discrimination, but also goes farther to enlist the powers
of the State to promote a certain religious practice (observing
a Sabbath day) and unfairly to penalize those who do not take
part in that practice. Read that way, the statute is a law
"respecting the establishment of religion" and thus forbidden
by the First Amendment. Because the statute may be
viewed from either of these two perspectives, today's case
raises sensitive and difficult issues concerning the scope of
permissible state action under the Establishment Clause.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), set forth a
three-part test that summarizes the constraints of the Establishment Clause as understood in our cases:
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally the
statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion." I d., at 612-613.
To be sure, the Lemon test provides no mechanistic formula
for generating results in Establishment Clause cases, as attested by the sharp disagreements among the Members of
this Court concerning the application of the test in many of
our Establishment Clause cases. Religion is a vital element
in the life of our people, 1 and government actions of various
sorts often have a substantial impact on the individual's practice of religion. Consequently, our goal in this area has been
'Indeed, a major purpose of both Religion Clauses of the First Amendment is not hostility toward religion, but protection of the vitality of religion from the interference of civil government. See, e. g., Engle v.
Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 431 (1962).
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to permit the States as much flexibility as possible to accomplish legitimate state purposes, while preserving the fundamental rights to freedom of conscience that are the legacy of
the Framers of the Bill of Rights. 2 Given this goal, no plausible standard would make resolution of the sensitive cases
that come before us easy. Nonetheless, the Lemon test focuses attention on the issues that are crucial in defining the
limits of governmental action under the Establishment
Clause; the three prongs of Lemon "constitute a convenient,
accurate distillation of this Court's efforts over the past decades to evaluate a wide range of governmental action challenged as violative of the [Establishment Clause]." Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 358 (1975). Because it thus concentrates the constitutional inquiry on the values protected
by the Establishment Clause, the Lemon test should be employed to analyze the difficult case before us today.
Petitioner argues that the Lemon test is ina,ppropriate
here because "a law protecting religious freedom is a constitutionally encouraged means of implementing the values of
the Free Exercise Clause." Brief for Petitioner 22. For
this reason, petitioner urges that the statute should be upheld, like any statute not implicating constitutionally protected rights, if it rationally furthers a legitimate state
purpose. Presumably, any statute that could be claimed to
"implement the values" of the Religion Clauses would be held
constitutional under this test, even if it had the purpose and
effect of advancing religion and even if it deeply entangled
the state in religious matters.
The understanding of the Free Exercise Clause advanced
by petitioner is deeply at odds with our interpretation of both
Religion Clauses. Virtually every Establishment Clause
case that comes before the Court involves an effort by a state
to aid the practice of religion in a way that is said merely to
2

It is not necessary here to recount at length the history and purposes
of the Religion Clauses. See, e. g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U. S. 1, 8-15 (1947); id., at 33-43 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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"accommodate" the religious beliefs of some group of citizens.
For example, the state subsidies struck down in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, supra, could be defended as designed to accommodate those whose religion requires them to attend religious schools rather than public schools. State sponsorship
of school prayers, see School District of Abington Township
v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 226 (1963), similarly could be defended
as "accommodating" those who desire to meet their religious
obligations while attending public school. These claims of
"accommodation" are unsuccessful because the Free Exercise
Clause does not provide all-purpose authority to the government to extend positive assistance to those who choose to
practice religion.
The guarantees of the Free Exercise Clause come into play
only when the government itself has, in the course of pursuing wholly secular objectives, imposed requirements that
burden or penalize individuals in the exercise of their religion. See, e. g., Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U. S. 707
(1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972); Gillette v.
United States, 401 U. S. 437 (1971); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U. S. 398 (1963). There is no allegation in this case that
§ 53-303e(b) alleviates a governmentally-imposed obligation
that burdens private parties in the free exercise of their
religion. See School District of Abington Township v.
Schempp, supra, at 222-223. 3 Cf. McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U. S. 420, 429 (1961). This is therefore not a case in
which the Free Exercise Clause determines the result or, indeed, in which its mandates are in any serious tension with
the strictures of the Establishment Clause. See Engle v.
3
The Court in Schempp stated the controlling principle: "Hence it is
necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of the
enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion. The
distinction between the two clauses is apparent-a violation of the Free
Excercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause
violation need not be so attended." 374 U. S., at 223. See also id., at
296-299 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306,311
(1952).
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Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 430 (1962). Consequently, although
there may be cases in which such tension influences the analysis under both Religion Clauses, I see no reason here to depart from application of the Lemon test, our settled mode of
Establishment Clause analysis.
II

The first prong of the Lemon test involves an examination
of the statute to determine whether it has a clear secular purpose. Petitioner alleges that the purpose of the Connecticut
statute is to assure that all citizens have an equal opportunity
to participate in the economic life of the state. In the service
of this goal, the statute seeks to attack a particular barrierthe need to observe a weekly Sabbath-that stands in the
way of equal participation; it permits those whose religious
beliefs require the observance of a Sabbath to avoid being
relegated to isolated or segregated employment "ghettos"
where their religious beliefs do not interfere with their work.
Rather, such individuals are permitted by the statute to
enter the world of work on an equal basis with all other
citizens.
Respondent paints rather a different picture. Respondent
alleges that the face of the statute itself betrays an intent to
benefit citizens who are religious. The statute gives those
individuals who for religious reasons seek not to work on a
particular day of the week the absolute right to do so, while
individuals who have other reasons for refusing to work are
at the mercy of their employer. An employee who, for example, refuses to work on Sunday because it is the only day
he can spend together with the rest of his family has no legal
recourse if his employer fires him as a result. But if another
employee refuses to work on Sunday for religious reasons,
the law bars the employer from taking any action against
him. By thus favoring the religious employee over the
employee who has secular reasons for his refusal to work,

,,
t'
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the statute, in respondent's view, impermissibly promotes
religion.
If carried to the limits of its logic, respondent's argument
might threaten any legislation that embodies a facial religious
classification. Any such legislation is likely either to promote or to inhibit religion under this analysis, and both of
these purposes are illegitimate under the Establishment
Clause. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 15
(1947). Yet this extreme version of the argument misapprehends the scope of legitimate state action under the Lemon
test. The Establishment Clause forbids the government
from requiring religious exercises or practices in public institutions, or from attempting to propagate, encourage, or induce religious beliefs. However, a statute's facial reference
to religion is insufficient without more to conclude that it is
motivated by a forbidden religious purpose. 4 Where the
government seeks to expand the domain of civil liberty by
protecting the rights of all citizens to participate on an equal
basis, without regard to religion, in important public and.
private aspects of our national life, its purpose is wholly
legitimate.
To hold that the government acts in accordance with a secular purpose when combatting religious discrimination may
seem to some paradoxical. Indeed, if the statute's only purpose in prohibiting religious discrimination were to encourage otherwise indifferent or hostile citizens to join religious
institutions and to participate in religious activities, it would
surely be unconstitutional. However, a prohibition of religious discrimination protects not only believers, but un4
Cf. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U. S. 116, 123 (1982) (valid secular
purpose of statute giving church veto power over nearby liquor applicants
is to protect spiritual, cultural, and educational centers from the 'burlyburly' associated with liquor outlets); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 363
(1975) (valid purpose of statute authorizing loan of instructional materials
to parochial schools is to assure students ample opportunity to develop
their intellectual capacities).
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believers as well: protecting the freedom of the religious
individual to practice as his conscience dictates necessarily
protects the freedom of the nonreligious individual to refuse
to practice if his conscience so dictates. The ideal of a society bereft of obstacles to the full participation of each citizen
is a fully secular ideal, and I have little doubt that ridding the
workplace of such barriers to equal participation and achievement is a state purpose fully in keeping with our deepest national aspirations.
This conclusion is supported by our prior cases. We have
repeatedly recognized that state aid to parochial schools may
be motivated by "the interest in preserving a healthy and
safe educational environment for all of its schoolchildren."
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756,
773 (1973). Accord, Committee for Public Education v.
Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 654 (1979); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U. S., at 613; Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 16
(1947). The mere fact that a statute makes available a public
benefit or activity to those who profess religious beliefs does
not imply that the statute is motivated by a religious purpose. The fact that the statute includes an explicitly religious classification does not necessarily alter this conclusion.
See, e. g., Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664 (1971).
Although statutes designed with this purpose may have an
effect of promoting religion, e. g., Committee for Public
Education v. Nyquist, supra, the purpose of "securing equal
economic opportunity" to all individuals regardless of religion
has consistently been recognized as legitimate. Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63, 90, n. 4
(1977) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).
A statute that did no more than require an employer to
make a reasonable accommodation to employees who seek to
practice their religion could be based on this valid secular
purpose. 5 A statute of this sort would be aimed at relieving
For instance, sections 701(j) and 703(a)(l) of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-2(a)(l), forbid dis5
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religious discrimination that erects obstacles to the full participation by each individual in the nation's economic life.
Cf. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, supra, at 63
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Of course, merely forbidding
religious discrimination as such-without requiring reasonable accommodation-would be one way of accomplishing this
objective. But a state may reasonably believe that such a
statute would be ineffective and that a reasonable accommodation by private employers to the employees' religious needs
is necessary fully to permit them to participate in the state's
economic life. Thus, although the statute may require private parties to give particular attention to their treatment of
members of religious groups, this special attention would be
required only in service of the goal of equal opportunity and
full participation, not as an effort to institute a religious
preference.
The Connecticut statute in this case, however, goes far beyond reasonable accommodation. It requires the employer
and other employees to accommodate the Sabbath observer,
regardless of cost, inconvenience, or disruption. Respondent argues cogently that a statute so sweeping on its face
could only be motivated by the forbidden purpose of granting
religious observers a position of primacy in the workplace;
the assertion of a goal of nondiscrimination for such an extreme statute could, according to respondent, be no more
than a pretext. Cf. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S 39 (1980).
Yet petitioner argues that even a statute embodying this
kind of absolute accommodation requirement could be motivated by the legitimate secular purpose of making the opportunities of the state's economic life available to all, including
crimination in employment on the basis of religion except where "an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an
employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." See
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63 (1977).

..
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those whose religious beliefs would otherwise render them
out of reach. According to petitioner, the statute is, like
a "reasonable accommodation" statute, a form of legitimate
anti-discrimination legislation.
Petitioner and respondent both advance arguments of
some force. But respondent's argument rests in large part
on the effects that must accompany a statute requiring absolute accommodation; the crucial premise is that the statute
will necessarily enlist the powers of government positively to
promote religion. This effect being so certain, according to
respondent, it must be seen as the intended goal. The effects test, however, is an independent criterion of the validity of a statute under the Lemon test. I therefore find it
more profitable to examine respondent's argument under the
effects test.
III
Under the second prong of the Lemon test, a challenged
statute violates the Establishment Clause if, regardless of its
purpose, it has a "principal" or "primary" effect of advancing
religion. See Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,
413 U. S. 756, 783, n. 39 (1973). The Court has repeatedly
held that a statute having an incidental or remote effect of
advancing religion, if accomplished in the pursuit of a legitimate secular end, is not forbidden under the Establishment
Clause. Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426
U. S. 736, 747 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734,
742-743 (1973); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236
(1968); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 442 (1961);
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947). On the
other hand, even unintended consequences of an otherwise
legitimate government program may render that program
unconstitutional if they have the "direct" and "immediate"
effect of promoting or inhibiting religion. Committee for
Public Education v. Nyquist, supra, at 783, n. 39.
In my view, the Connecticut statute at issue here has the
impermissible effect of advancing religion in two different,
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though related, ways. First, the statute allocates a substantial public benefit on an explicitly and exclusively religious
basis, while at the same time concentrating the costs of the
benefit on others on an exclusively religious basis. The right
not to work on a day of one's choice is surely a scarce and valued benefit in our society. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U. S. 420, 451-452 (1961). Under the Connecticut statute,
employees who need a specific day off to celebrate their Sabbath have the absolute right to do so; they need sacrifice no
other interests to avail themselves of the statutory preference. Yet employees who have strong but non-religious reasons for wanting a day off-to be with their family, to participate in community activities, to undertake a part-time
educational program-have no positive rights under the
Connecticut statute. These other employees must nonetheless sacrifice days off that would otherwise be available to
them in order to "accommodate" their religious colleagues.
Thus, the statute makes available a substantial and highlyvalued benefit to religious observers and in effect imposes a
tax on non-observers to pay the cost.
It might be argued that the benefit afforded religious observers by the statute is merely a remote and incidental byproduct of its central goal of ending religious discrimination.
Yet the benefit accorded by the statute is the right to impose
whatever cost is necessary on others in order to have one's
religious preferences satisfied. This is simply too valuable a
right, and too central to the operation of the statute, to be
declared a merely "incidental" or "remote" effect that may
pass muster under the Establishment Clause. 6
There are certain circumstances in which public benefits of
considerable value may be made available to religious institu6
In contrast, the religious effects of a statute mandating only a "reasonable accommodation" may well be only the "incidental" and "remote"
effects that often flow from an attempt to pursue a legitimate secular objective. See Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 784,
n. 39 (1973).
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tions, even if the costs are necessarily spread among the society at large, including nonadherents of the benefitted institutions. In Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664 (1970),
the Court held that the provision of tax exemptions to religious institutions, as part of a general program of tax deductions for private, nonprofit organizations, did not violate the
Establishment Clause. The tax deductions were used by a
wide range of institutions, while the "costs" of the tax
subsidy were spread among all taxpayers. Cf. Everson v.
Board of Education, supra, at 17. Our result in Walz, of
course, depended on a number of factors aside from the size
of the affected class. But the Connecticut statute gains little
support from Walz in any event, because it has precisely the
opposite effect of the tax deductions in Walz. It concentrates its benefits exclusively among religious observers,
while tending to concentrate its substantial costs .on those
who do not engage in the favored religious observance.
Compare Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S. 825, 832 (1973) (challenged program "singled out a class of its citizens for an
economic benefit" on religious lines). Thus, unlike the tax
deductions in Walz, the benefits accorded by the Connecticut
statute have the effect of advancing a particular religious
practice at the expense of those, whether they profess a religion or not, who do not engage in that practice.
The statute has an additional effect that reinforces my conviction that it transgresses the limits of the Establishment
Clause. In Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116
(1983), we held unconstitutional a statute giving churches absolute authority to exclude liquor establishments from within
a fixed radius of the church. We stated that "the mere appearance of a joint exercise of legislative authority by Church
and State provides a significant symbolic benefit to religion in
the minds of some by reason of the power conferred." I d., at
125-126. Granting this kind of governmentally backed veto
power to certain private individuals to be exercised on an explicitly religious basis is likely to be perceived by the adher-
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ents as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval, of their respective religious choices. See Lynch v.
Donnelly,-- U.S.--,-- (1984) (O'CONNOR, J., Concurring). Either effect is equally forbidden under the Establishment Clause.
Like the statute at issue in Grendel's Den, the Connecticut
statute in this case gives Sabbath observers an absolute veto
over interests of the employer as well as other employees; it
permits the Sabbath observer to enlist the powers of the
State to force others to sacrifice their own substantial interests so that the observer may engage in his religious practice.
The effect of such a delegation of absolute power to individuals could only be perceived as a governmental preference for
certain religious conduct over other interests, both religious
and non-religious. The insinuation of governmental power
in this way into the religious choices of each individual devalues both the religious commitments of observers and the
status in the political community of nonobservers. It is precisely the kind of governmental involvement in matters of
conscience whose avoidance, according to our cases, is the
primary aim of the Establishment Clause. See, e. g., Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, at 625; School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S., at 226; Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U. S., at 15-16. 7
IV
During the debates in the First Congress on the Bill of
Rights, Representative Daniel Carroll of Maryland noted _(;j
that "the rights of conscience are, in their nature, of pecu~ '-V'
delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest touch of governmental hand ... " I Annals of Cong. 730 (Aug. 15, 1789).
When a state acts to overcome barriers that stand as obstacles to the ability of each citizen to take full part in our
7

Because I find the statute to be unconstitutional under the effects test,
I need not reach the issue of its validity under the third, entanglement
prong of the Lemon test.
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economic life, the state acts to further the very interests underlying the Religion Clauses, and much of the remainder of
the Bill of Rights. Yet state action in this area, as in others
in which the individual's freedom of conscience is involved,
must be circumspect. Because the heavy-handed approach
adopted by § 53-303e(b) places the imprimatur of governmental endorsement and encouragement on a particular religious practice, it is a state law "respecting the establishment
of religion," and thus invalid under the First Amendment.
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JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL, JusTICE BLACKMUN, and JUSTICE STEVENS join, concurring in
the judgment.
I join in affirming the judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court that Con. Gen, Stat. § 53-303e(b) violates the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. I believe
that this result is required by our consistent understanding of
the Establishment Clause, as applied in this Court's precedents over at least the past 40 years. However, I do not
agree with the Court's evident distaste for the Establishment
Clause guidelines derived from our prior cases and set forth
in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971). Because I believe that resolution of the sensitive issues in this case is best
advanced by concentrating on the Lemon analysis, I therefore write separately to offer a less innovative explanation
for today's result.
I

I

The statute at issue in this case, as interpreted by the
Connecticut Supreme Court, requires employers absolutely
to accommodate the needs of employees who desire not to
work on their Sabbath, regardless of the resulting impact on
the employer or other employees. See ante, at 10-11, and
n. 13. From petitioner's perspective, the statute is an example of a familiar kind of antidiscrimination ordinance; it
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declares that a citizen whose religious beliefs require observance of a Sabbath should not thereby be disabled from participating on an equal basis with other employees in the
State's workforce. Petitioner contends that the statute, far
from inhibiting the freedom of religion, expands the realm of
religious freedom in accordance with the purposes underlying
the First Amendment's Religion Clauses. From respondent's perspective, however, the statute does not merely remedy discrimination, but also goes farther to enlist the powers
of the State to promote a certain religious practice (observing
a Sabbath day) and unfairly to penalize those who do not take
part in that practice~ Read that way, the statute is a law
"respecting the establishment of religion" and thus forbidden
by the First Amendment. Because the statute may be
viewed from either of these two perspectives, today's case
raises sensitive and difficult issues concerning the scope of
permissible state action under the Establishment Clause.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1972), set forth a
three-part test that summarizes the constraints of the Establishment Clause as understood in our cases:
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances :aor inhibits religion; finally the
statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion." ld., at 612-613.
To be sure, the Lemon test provides no mechanistic formula
for generating results in Establishment Clause cases, as attested by the sharp disagreements among the Members of
this Court concerning the application of the test in many of
our Establishment Clause cases. Religion is a vital element
in the life of our people, 1 and government actions of various
sorts often have a substantial impact on the individual's prac'Indeed, a major purpose of both Religion Clauses of the First Amendment is not hostility toward religion, but protection of the vitality of religion from the interference of civil government. See, e. g., Engle v. Vitale,
370 u. s. 421, 431 (1962).
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tice of religion. Consequently, our goal in this area has been
to permit the States as much flexibility as possible to accomplish legitimate state purposes, while preserving the fundamental rights to freedom of conscience that are the legacy of
the Framers of the Bill of Rights. 2 Given this goal, no plausible standard would make resolution of the sensitive cases
that come before us easy. Nonetheless, the Lemon test focuses attention on the issues that are crucial in defining the
limits of governmental action under the Establishment
Clause; the three prongs of Lemon "constitute a convenient,
accurate distillation of this Court's efforts over the past decades to evaluate a wide range of governmental action challenged as violative of the [Establishment Clause]." Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 358 (1975). Because it thus concentrates the constitutional inquiry on the values protected
by the Establishment Clause, the Lemon test should be employed to analyze the difficult case before us today.
Petitioner argues that the Lemon test is inappropriate
here because "a law protecting religious freedom is a constitutionally encouraged means of implementing the values of
the Free Exercise Clause.'" · Brief for Petitioner 22. For
this reason,· petitioner urges that the statute should be upheld, like any statute not implicating constitutionally protected rights, if it rationally furthers a legitimate state
purpose. Presumably, any statute that could be claimed to
"implement the values" of the Religion Clauses would be held
constitutional under this test, even if it had the purpose and
effect of advancing religion and even if it deeply entangled
the state in religious matters.
The understanding of the Free Exercise Clause advanced
by petitioner is deeply at odds with our interpretation of both
Religion Clauses. Virtually every Establishment Clause
case that comes before the Court involves an effort by a state
It is not necessary here to recount at length the history and purposes
of the Religion Clauses. See, e. g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U. S. 1, 8-15 (1947); id., at 33-43 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) .
2
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to aid the practice of religion in a way that is said merely to
"accommodate" the religious beliefs of some group of citizens.
For example, the state subsidies struck down in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, supra, could be defended as designed to accommodate those whose religion requires them to attend religious schools rather than public schools. State sponsorship
of school prayers, see School District of Abington Township
v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 226 (1963), similarly could be defended
as "accommodating".- those who desire to meet their religious
obligations while attending public school. These claims of
"accommodation" are unsuccessful because the Free Exercise
Clause does not provide all-purpose authority to the government to extend positive assistance to those who choose to
practice religion.
The guarantees of the Free Exercise Clause come into play
only when the government itself has, in the course of pursuing wholly secular objectives, imposed requirements that
burden or penalize individuals in the exercise of their religion. See, e. g., Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U. S. 707
(1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder,_ 406 U. S. 205 (1972); Gillette v.
United States, 401 U. S. 437 (1971); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U. S. 398 (1963). There is no allegation in this case that
§ 53-303e(b) alleviates a governmentally-imposed obligation
that burdens private parties in the free exercise of their
religion. See School District of Abington Township v.
Schempp, supra, at 222-223. 3 Cf. McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U. S. 420, 429 (1961). This is therefore not a case in
which the Free Exercise Clause determines the result or, indeed, in which its mandates are in any serious tension with
3

The Court in Schempp stated the controlling principle: "Hence it is
necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of the
enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion. The
distinction between the two clauses is apparent-a violation of the Free
Excercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause
violation need not be so 1:\ttended." 374 U. S., at 223. See also id., at
296-299 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 311
(1952).
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the strictures of the Establishment Clause. See Engle v.
Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 430 (1962). Consequently, although
there may be cases in which such tension influences the analysis under both Religion Clauses, I see no reason here to depart from application of the Lemon test, our settled mode of
Establishment Clause analysis.
II

The first prong or"the Lemon test involves an examination
of the statute to determine whether it has a clear secular purpose. Petitioner alleges that the purpose of the Connecticut
statute is to assure that all citizens have an equal opportunity
to participate in the economic life of the state. In the service
of this goal, the statute seeks to attack a particular barrierthe need to ·observe a weekly Sabbath-that stands in the
w~y of equal participation; it permits those whose religious
beliefs require the observance of a Sabbath to avoid being
relegated to isolated or segregated employment "ghettos"
where their religious beliefs do not interfere with their work.
Rather, such individuals are permitted by the statute to
enter the world of work on an equal basis with all other
citizens.
Respondent paints rather a different picture. Respondent
alleges that the face of the statute itself betrays an intent to
benefit citizens who are religious. The statute gives those
individuals who for religious reasons seek not to work on a
particular day of the week the absolute right to do so, while
individuals who have other reasons for refusing to work are
at the mercy of their employer. An employee who, for example, refuses to work on Sunday because it is the only day
he can spend together with the rest of his family has no legal
recourse if his employer fires him as a result. But if another
employee refuses to work on Sunday for religious reasons,
the law bars the employer from taking any action against
him. By thus favoring the religious employee over the
employee who has secular reasons for his refusal to work,
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the statute, in respondent's view, impermissibly promotes
religion.
If carried to the limits of its logic, respondent's argument
might threaten any legislation that embodies a facial religious
classification. Any such legislation is likely either to promote or to inhibit religion under this analysis, and both of
these purposes are illegitimate under the Establishment
Clause. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 15
(1947). Yet this extreme version of the argument misapprehends the scope of legitimate state action under the Lemon
test. The Establishment Clause forbids the government
from requiring religious exercises or practices in public institutions, or from attempting to propagate, encourage, or induce religious beliefs. However, a statute's facial reference
to religion is insufficient without more to conclude that 'i t is
motivated by a forbidden religious purpose. 4 Where the
government seeks to expand the domain of civil liberty by
protecting the rights of all citizens to participate on an equal
basis, without regard to religion, in important public and
private aspects of our nati.onal life, its purpose is wholly
legitimate.
'
··
To hold that the government acts in accordance with a secular purpose when combatting religious discrimination may
seem to some paradoxical. Indeed, if the statute's only purpose in prohibiting religious discrimination were to encourage otherwise indifferent or hostile citizens to join religious
institutions and to participate in religious activities, it would
surely be unconstitutional. However, a prohibition of religious discrimination protects not only believers, but un'Cf. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U. S. 116, 123 (1982) (valid secular
purpose of statute giving church veto power over nearby liquor applicants
is to protect spiritual, cultural, and educational centers from the 'burlyburly' associated with liquor outlets); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 363
(1975) (valid purpose of statute authorizing loan of instructional materials
to parochial schools is to assure students ample opportunity to develop
their intellectual capacities).
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believers as well: protecting the freedom of the religious
individual to practice as his conscience dictates necessarily
protects the freedom of the nonreligious individual to refuse
to practice if his conscience so dictates. The ideal of a society bereft of obstacles to the full participation of each citizen
is a fully secular ideal, and I have little doubt that ridding the
workplace of such barriers to equal participation and achievement is a state purpose fully in keeping with our deepest national aspirations. •
This conclusion is supported by our prior cases. We have
repeatedly recognized that state aid to parochial schools may
be motivated by "the interest in preserving a healthy and
safe educational environment for all of its schoolchildren."
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, ·413 U. S. 756,
773 (1973). Accord, Committee for Public Education v.
Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 654 (1979); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U. S., at 613; Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 16
(1947). The mere fact that a statute makes available a public
benefit or activity to those who profess religious beliefs does
not imply that the statute is motivated by a religious purpose. The fact that the statute hicludes an explicitly religious classification does not necessarily alter this conclusion.
See, e. g., Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664 (1971).
Although statutes designed with this purpose may have an
effect of promoting religion, e. g., Committee for Public
Education v. Nyquist, supra, the purpose of "securing equal
economic opportunity" to all individuals regardless of religion
has consistently been recognized as legitimate. Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63, 90, n. 4
(1977) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).
A statute that did no more than require an employer to
make a reasonable accommodation to employees who seek to
practice their religion could be based on this valid secular
purpose. 5 A statute of this sort would be aimed at relieving
5
For instance, sections 701(j) and 703(a)(l) of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-2(a)(l), forbid dis-

·'

~,.

83-1158-CONCUR
8

ESTATE OF THORNTON v. CALDOR, INC.

religious discrimination that erects obstacles to the full participation by each individual in the nation's economic life.
Cf. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, supra, at 63
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Of course, merely forbidding
religious discrimination as such-without requiring reasonable accommodation-would be one way of accomplishing this
objective. But a state may reasonably believe that such a
statute would be ineffective and that a reasonable accommodation by private employers to the employees' religious needs
is necessary fully to permit them to participate in the state's
economic life. Thus, although the statute may require private parties to give particular attention to their treatment of
members of religious groups, this special attention would be
required only in service of the goal of equal opportunity and
full participation, not as an effort to institute a religious
preference.
The Connecticut statute in this case, however, goes far beyond ·reasonable accommodation. It requires the employer
and other employees to accommodate the Sabbath observer,
regardless of cost, inconvenience, or disruption. Respondent argues cogently that a statute so sweeping on its face
could only be motivated by the forbidden purpose of granting
religious observers a position of primacy in the workplace;
the assertion of a goal of nondiscrimination for such an extreme statute could, according to respondent, be no more
than a pretext. Cf. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S 39 (1980).
Yet petitioner argues that even a statute embodying this
kind of absolute accommodation requirement could be motivated by the legitimate secular purpose of making the opportunities of the state's economic life available to all, including
crimination in employment on the basis of religion except where "an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an
employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." See
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63 (1977).
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those whose religious beliefs would otherwise render them
out of reach. According to petitioner, the statute is, like
a "reasonable accommodation" statute, a form of legitimate
anti-discrimination legislation.
Petitioner and respondent both advance arguments of
some force. But respondent's argument rests in large part
on the effects that must accompany a statute requiring absolute accommodation; the crucial premise is that the statute
will necessarily enlist the powers of government positively to
promote religion. This effect being so certain, according to
respondent, it must be seen as the intended goal. The effects test, however, is an independent criterion of the validity of a statute under the Lemon test. I therefore find it
more profitable to ·examine respondent's argument under the
effects test.

III
Under the second prong of the Lemon test, a challenged
statute violates the Establishment Clause if, regardless of its
purpose, it has a "principal" or "primary'' effect of advancing
religion. See Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,
413 U. S. 756, 783, n. 39 (1973). The Court has repeatedly
held that a statute having an incidental or remote effect of
advancing religion, if accomplished in the pursuit of a legitimate secular end, is not forbidden under the Establishment
Clause. Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426
U. S. 736, 747 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734,
742-743 (1973); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236
(1968); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 442 (1961);
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947). On the
other hand, even unintended consequences of an otherwise
legitimate government program may render that program
unconstitutional if they have the "direct" and "immediate"
effect of promoting or inhibiting religion. Committee for
Public Education v. Nyquist, supra, at 783, n. 39.
In my view, the Connecticut statute at issue here has the
impermissible effect of advancing religion in two different,
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though related, ways. First, the statute allocates a substantial public benefit on an explicitly and exclusively religious
basis, while at the same time concentrating the costs of the
benefit on others on an exclusively religious basis. The right
not to work on a day of one's choice is surely a scarce and valued benefit in our society. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U. S. 420, 451-452 (1961). Under the Connecticut statute,
employees who need a specific day off to celebrate their Sabbath have the absolute right to do so; they need sacrifice no
other interests to avail themselves of the statutory preference. Yet employees who have strong but non-religious reasons for wanting a day off-to be with their family, to participate in community activities, to undertake a part-time
educational program-have no positive rights under the
Connecticut statute. These other employees must nonetheless sacrifice days off that would otherwise be available to
them in order .to "accommodate" their religious colleagues.
Thus, the statute makes available a substantial and highlyvalued benefit to religious observers and in effect imposes a
tax on non-observers to pay. the cost.
It might be argued that the benefit afforded religious observers by the statute is merely a remote and incidental byproduct of its central goal of ending religious discrimination.
Yet the benefit accorded by the statute is the right to impose
whatever cost is necessary on others in order to have one's
religious preferences satisfied. This is simply too valuable a
right, and too central to the operation of the statute, to be
declared a merely "incidental" or "remote" effect that may
pass muster under the Establishment Clause. 6
There are certain circumstances in which public benefits of
considerable value may be made available to religious institu6
In contrast, the religious effects of a statute mandating only a "reasonable accommodation" may well be only the "incidental" and "remote"
effects that often flow from an attempt to pursue a legitimate secular objective. See Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 784,
n. 39 (1973).
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tions, even if the costs are necessarily spread among the society at large, including nonadherents of the benefitted institutions. In Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664 (1970),
the Court held that the provision of tax exemptions to religious institutions, as part of a general program of tax deductions for private, nonprofit organizations, did not violate the
Establishment Clause. The tax deductions were used by a
wide range of institutions, while the "costs" of the tax
subsidy were spread among all taxpayers. Cf. Everson v.
Board of Education, supra, at 17. Our result in Walz, of
course, depended on a number of factors aside from the size
of the affected class. But the Connecticut statute gains little
support from Walz in any event, because it has precisely the
opposite effect of the tax deductions in Walz. It concentrates its benefits exclusively among religious observers,
while tending to concentrate its substantial costs on those
who do not engage in the favored religious observance.
Compare Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S. 825, 832 (1973) (challenged program "singled out a class of its citizens for an
economic be"nefit" on religio!ls lines). Thus, unlike the tax
deductions in Walz, the benefits accorded by the Connecticut
statute have the effect of advancing a particular religious
practice at the expense of those, whether they profess a religion or not, who do not engage in that practice.
The statute has an additional effect that reinforces my conviction that it transgresses the limits of the Establishment
Clause. In Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116
(1983), we held unconstitutional a statute giving churches absolute authority to exclude liquor establishments from within
a fixed radius of the church. We stated that "the mere appearance of a joint exercise of legislative authority by Church
and State provides a significant symbolic benefit to religion in
the minds of some by reason of the power conferred." I d., at
125-126. Granting this kind of governmentally backed veto
power to certain priv~te individuals to be exercised on an explicitly religious basis is likely to be perceived by the adher-
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ents as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval, of their respective religious choices. See Lynch v.
Donnelly,-- U.S.--,-- (1984) (O'CONNOR, J., Concurring). Either effect is equally forbidden under the Establishment Clause.
Like the statute at issue in Grendel's Den, the Connecticut
statute in this case gives Sabbath observers an absolute veto
over interests of the employer as well as other employees; it
permits the Sabbath observer to enlist the powers of the
State to force others to sacrifice their own substantial interests so that the observer may engage in his religious practice.
The effect of such a delegation of absolute power to individuals could only be perceived as a governmental preference for
certain religious conduct over other interests, both religious
and non-religious. The insinuation of governmental power
in this way into the religious choices of each individual devalues both the religious commitments of observers and the
status in the political community of nonobservers. It is precisely the kind . of governmental involvement in matters of
conscience whose avoidance, according to our cases, is the
primary aim of the Establishhient Clause. See, e. g., Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, at 625; School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S., at 226; Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U. S., at 15~16. 7

IV
During the debates in the First Congress on the Bill of
Rights, Representative Daniel Carroll of Maryland noted
that "the rights of conscience are, in their nature, of pecular
delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest touch of governmental hand ... " I Annals of Cong. 730 (Aug. 15, 1789).
When a state acts to overcome barriers that stand as obstacles to the ability of each citizen to take full part in our
Because I find the statute to be unconstitutional under the effects test,
I need not reach the issue of its validity under the third, entanglement
prong of the Lemon test.
7
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economic life, the state acts to further the very interests underlying the Religion Clauses, and much of the remainder of
the Bill of Rights. Yet state action in this area, as in others
in which the individual's freedom of conscience is involved,
must be circumspect. Because the heavy-handed approach
adopted by § 53-303e(b) places the imprimatur of governmental endorsement and encouragement on a particular religious practice, it is a state law "respecting the establishment
of religion," and thus invalid under the First Amendment.
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CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered
of the
Court.
We granted certiorari to decide whether a State statute
that provides employees with the absolute right not to work
on their chosen Sabbath violates the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment.
I
In early 1975, petitioner's decedent Donald E. Thornton 1
began working for respondent Caldor, Inc., a chain of New
England retail stores; he managed the men's and boys' clothing department in respondent's Waterbury, Connecticut,
store. At that time, respondent's Connecticut stores were
closed on Sundays pursuant to state law. Conn. Gen. Stat.
§§ 53-300 to 53-303 (1975 ed.).
In 1977, following the state legislature's revision of the
Sunday-closing laws, 2 respondent opened its Connecticut
Thornton died on February 4, 1982, while his appeal was pending before the Supreme Court of Connecticut. The administrator of Thornton's
estate has continued the suit on behalf of the decedent's estate.
2
The state legislature revised the Sunday-closing laws in 1976 after a
state court held that the existing laws were unconstitutionally vague.
State v. Anonymous, 33 Conn. Supp. 55, 364 A. 2d 244 (C. P. 1976). The
legislature modified the laws to permit certain classes of businesses to remain open. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-302a (1976 ed.). At the same time, a
1
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stores for Sunday business. In order to handle the expanded store hours, respondent required its managerial
employees to work every third or fourth Sunday. Thornton,
a Presbyterian who observed Sunday as his Sabbath, initially
complied with respondent's demand and worked a total of 31
Sundays in 1977 and 1978. In October 1978, Thornton was
transferred to a management position in respondent's Torrington store; he continued to work on Sundays during the
first part of 1979. In November 1979, however, Thornton
informed respondent that he would no longer work on Sundays because he observed that day as his Sabbath; he invoked the protection of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b), which
provides:
"No person who states that a particular day of the week
is observed as his Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on such day. An employee's refusal to
work on his Sabbath shall not constitute grounds for his
dismissal." 3
new provision was added, Section 53-303e, which prohibited employment
of more than six days in any calendar week and guaranteed employees the
right not to work on the Sabbath of their religious faith. See n. 3, infra.
Soon after the revised Sunday-closing law was enacted, the Court of
Common Pleas once again declared it unconstitutional. State v. Anonymous, 33 Conn. Supp. 141, 366 A. 2d 200 (C. P. 1976). This decision was
limited to the provision requiring Sunday closing, Section 53-302a; the
court did not consider the validity of other provisions such as Section
53-303e. In 1978, the state legislature tried its hand at enacting yet
another Sunday-closing law, Pub. Act No. 78-329, 1978 Conn. Pub. Acts
700-702; the Supreme Court of Connecticut declared the statute unconstitutional. Caldor's Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn. 304, 417 A. 2d
343 (1979). As had the Court of Common Pleas, the Connecticut Supreme
Court did not address the constitutionality of Section 53-303e and that provision remained in effect until challenged in this action.
a Thornton had learned of this statutory protection by consulting with
an attorney. See J. A. 88a-90a.
Section 53-303e was enacted as part of the 1976 revision of the Sundayclosing laws. Apart from the six-day week and the Sabbath-observance
provisions, see n. 2, supra, the remainder of the statute provides:
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Thornton rejected respondent's offer either to transfer him
to a management job in a Massachusetts store that was
closed on Sundays, or to transfer him to a nonsupervisory
position in the Torrington store at a lower salary. 4 In
March 1980, respondent transferred Thornton to a clerical
position in the Torrington store; Thornton resigned two days
later and filed a grievance with the State Board of Mediation
and Arbitration alleging that he was discharged from his
manager's position in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. §53303e(b).
Respondent defended its action on the ground that Thornton had not been "discharged" within the meaning of the statute; respondent also urged the Board to find that the statute
violated Article 7 of the Connecticut Constitution as well as
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
After holding an evidentiary hearing the Board evaluated
the sincerity of Thornton's claim and concluded it was based
on a sincere religious conviction; it issued a formal decision
sustaining Thornton's grievance. The Board framed the statutory issue as follows, "[i]f a discharge for refusal to work
Sunday hours occurred and Sunday was the Grievant's Sabbath ... ," Section 53-303e(b) would be violated; the Board
held that respondent had violated the statute by "discharg[ing] Mr. Thornton as a management employee for refusing
"(c) Any employee, who believes that his discharge was in violation of
subsection (a) or (b) of this section may appeal such discharge to the state
board of mediation and arbitration. If said board finds that the employee
was discharged in violation of said subsection (a) or (b), it may order whatever remedy will make the employee whole, including but not limited to
reinstatement to his former or a comparable position.
"(d) No employer may, as a prerequisite to employment, inquire
whether the applicant observes any Sabbath.
"(e) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall not be
fined more than two hundred dollars."
• The collective bargaining agreement in effect for nonsupervisory employees provided that they were not required to work on Sundays if it was
"contrary [to the employee's] personal religious convictions." J. A. 91a.
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to work ... [on] Thornton's ... Sabbath." J. A. lla, 12a.
The Board ordered respondent to reinstate Thornton with
back pay and compensation for lost fringe benefits. 5 The
Superior Court, in affirming that ruling, concluded that the
statute did not offend the Establishment Clause.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed, holding the
statute did not have a "clear secular purpose." Caldor, Inc.
v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 349, 464 A. 2d 785, 792 (1983). 6
By authorizing each employee to designate his own Sabbath
rpose
as a day off, the statute evince t e 'unrrusta a
... [of] allow[ing] those persons who wish to worship on a
particular day the freedom to do so." !d., at 349, 464 A. 2d,
at 792. The court then held that the "primary effect" of the
statute was toaavarice reli ·on; the statute "coniers i£81benefi on an e phc1 reli ous basis.-Dnly those emplOyees~ ·
w o designate a Sabbath are entitled not to work on that particular day, and may not be penalized for so doing." !d., at
350, 464 A. 2d, at 794. The court noted that the statute required the State Mediation Board to decide which religious
activities may be characterized as an "observance of Sabbath" in order to assess employees' sincerity, and concluded
that this type of inquiry is "exactly the type of 'comprehensive, discriminating and continuing state surveillance' ...
which creates excessive governmental entanglements between church and state." !d., at 351, 464 A. 2d, at 794
(quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 619 (1971)).
We granted certiorari, - - U. S. - - (1984). 7 We

j

affirm.
5

The Board refused to consider respondent's constitutional challenge on
the ground that, as a quasi-judicial body, it had no authority to pass on the
constitutionality of state law. J. A. 9a-10a.
6
The court expressly chose not to consider whether the statute violated
Article 7 of the Connecticut Constitution. Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191
Conn. 336, 346, n. 7, 464 A. 2d 785, 792, n. 7 (1983).
'We also granted the State of Connecticut's motion to intervene as of
right to defend the constitutionality of the state law.
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II
A

Petitioner and the State of Connecticut assert that decisions such as Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), and
Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U. S. 707 (1981), recognized
the government's duty to take account of the special needs of
religious observers and thus insulate the Connecticut statute
from constitutional attack. In Sherbert, a Seventh-day
Adventist lost her job because she would not work on Saturday, her Sabbath. Similarly, in Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness lost employment after refusing to participate in the production of armaments, an activity contrary to the tenets of
his faith.
In each of these cases the Free Exercise Clause was held to
require the State to extend unemployment benefits to these
persons who, having lost their jobs as a result of their refusal
to compromise their religious practices at the workplace,
were not able to secure employment. Sherbert, 374 U. S., at
410; Thomas, 450 U. S., at 718-719.
The State must provide the religious employee with the
benefits of "an otherwise available public program," available to all, id., at 716; the Free Exercise Clause prohibited
the State from unduly burdening the employee's exercise of
religion. In other words, the State could not exclude the
employee from participating in the government programreceipt of unemployment compensation-because unemployment resulted from the employee's religious beliefs.
B

The First Amendment's guarantee against the "establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof"
turned away from the tradition of government-supported religions long prevalent in Europe. 8 Acknowledgment and
8
In Blackstone's words, for example, "the civil magistrate . .. is bound
indeed to protect the established church: and, if this can be better effected,
by admitting none but its genuine members to offices of trust and emolu-
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accommodation of religion have been closely identified with
our history, beginning at the Constitutional Convention and
notably in actions taken in the first days of the First Congress. See generally Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783
(1983). 9 Since the colonial era, our society has set aside
Sunday as a common day of rest and religious observance. 10
Reviewing the history of "Sunday Closing Laws" extant in
the colonies in 1787 when the Constitution was drafted and
debated, and when the First Amendment was adopted in
1791, this Court recognized the "strongly religious origin of
these laws." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 433
(1961).
Throughout our entire history there has been widespread
acceptance of having one day of the week set aside for worship and pursuits other than labor. In McGowan, the Court
rejected the contention that the religious overtones of laws in
vogue since the beginning of the Republic rendered them unconstitutional. On the contrary, the Court held expressly
that such laws were within constitutional bounds because
they also achieve a secular goal-providing a uniform day of
rest for all, notwithstanding the widespread use of the day
for religious worship. To conclude otherwise would "give a
constitutional interpretation of hostility to the public welfare
rather than one of mere separation of church and State."
Id., at 445.
The background of accommodation and acknowledgment of
religion must be weighed, however, against an equally instructive lesson from history: that the Establishment Clause
ment, he is certainly at liberty to do so .... " 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 52*.
9
In the space of a single week in the opening sessions of the First Congress in 1789, paid chaplains were authorized for each House. See Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,- (1983).
0
' In Connecticut, for example, laws requiring businesses to close on
Sunday, the traditional Christian day of Sabbath, date back to 1656. The
Earliest Laws of the New Haven and Connecticut Colonies 1639-1673, at
47 (J. Cushing ed. 1977) .

.. J .......
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was intended to foreclose governmental compulsion of some
of the people to support and facilitate the religious activities
of others. Clearly all forms of direct, absolute coercion were
proscribed. See, e. g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U. S. 1, 8-16 (1947). Justice Frankfurter, concurring in
McGowan, observed:
"In assuring the free exercise of religion, the Framers
of the First Amendment were sensitive to the then recent history of those persecutions and impositions of civil
disability with which sectarian majorities in virtually all
of the Colonies had visited deviation in the matter of conscience. This protection of unpopular creeds, however,
was not to be the full extent of the Amendment's guarantee of freedom from governmental intrusion in matters of
faith." 366 U. S., at 464-465 (footnotes omitted).
The Framers' fear of governmental coercion in religious
matters 11 stemmed from their awareness of how often in their
own time governmental authority intruded into the religious
sphere and led to unwanted conflict and oppression. See
Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 431-432 (1962). Government, Madison asserted, should not "employ Religion as an
engine of Civil policy," 2 The Writings of James Madison 187
(G. Hunt ed. 1901). Concurring in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 694 (1970), Justice Harlan suggested that
at stake
"is preventing that kind of governmental involvement in
religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead
to strife and frequently strain a political system to the
breaking point . . . . "
11
The Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, an acknowledged antecedent of
the First Amendment, proclaimed as one of its guiding principles that
"no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship
. . . nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body
or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or
beliefs . . . ." 12 Hening, Statutes of Virginia 84 (1823).
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Government must not only guard against activity that impinges on religious freedom, but it must take pains not to
compel citizens to act in the name of any religion. Cf.
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 714-717 (1977). The
genius of the Religion Clauses preserves the Framers'
"awareness of the historical fact that governmentally established religions and religious persecutions go hand in hand."
Engle, supra, at 432. Concurring in McGowan, supra, at
460, Justice Frankfurter pointed to
"the long colonial struggle for disestablishment [was] the
struggle to free all men, whatever their theological
views, from state-compelled obligation to acknowledge
and support state-favored faiths."

c
This history of accommodating all religious exercise while
guarding against governmental efforts to press any religion
on the people counsels against rigid rules under the Establishment Clause. In the recent Term we emphasized that
"[i]n our modern, complex society, whose traditions and constitutional underpinnings rest on and encourage diversity and
pluralism in all areas, an absolutist approach in applying the
Establishment Clause is simplistic and has been uniformly rejected by this Court." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. - - ,
- - (1984); see, e. g., Walz, supra, at 671.
In setting the appropriate boundaries in Establishment
Clause cases, the Court has referred to Lemon for a convenient shorthand of "the cumulative criteria developed by the
Court over many years." 403 U. S., at 612. However, the
Court has repeatedly rejected the concept that "any single
test or criterion" provides the touchstone for resolving
Establishment Clause cases, see, e. g., Lynch, supra, at
- - ; id., at--, n. 1 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); id., at
- - , n. 2 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); the Court has expressly characterized Lemon as establishing "'no more than
[a] helpful signpost' in dealing with Establishment Clause
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challenges," Mueller v. Allen, - - U. S. - - , - - (1983)
(quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 741 (1973)). 12
Our recent decision in Lynch v. Donnelly, supra, suggests
the limited utility of fixed tests in that category of cases
where the Court must decide whether a particular governmental accommodation of religion violates the prohibition
against the establishment of religion. As Lynch makes
clear, the effort to accommodate religion may have predominantly nonsecular purposes and even may encourage and
foster religion. By definition efforts toward accommodation
inevitably implicate consideration of religious factors; such
consideration, however, does not necessarily contravene the
Establishment Clause, as Lynch demonstrates. See also
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 (1943). To pigeonhole
analysis in all cases into fixed inquiries may well obscure
rather than illuminate the sensitive issues surrounding accommodation of religion. Cf. Lynch, supra, at-- (O'CoNNOR, J., concurring). No single "test" or formula fits every
case raising Establishment Clause questions. Courts must
look beyond the rhetoric of any single approach to determine
whether the values protected by the Religion Clauses have
been offended.
When a court considers the extent to which government
may accommodate religion, the focus must be on the core
objectives of the Religion Clauses themselves: is the challenged action a step toward the establishment of a religion by
or with the approval of government, or does such action substantially impair the free exercise of religion. Thus, the
12
Where a mechanistic inquiry obscures rather than illuminates the concerns underlying the Establishment Clause, the Court has not hesitated to
proceed along different lines. In Marsh v. Chambers, supra, for example,
the Court did not consider the Lemon analysis relevant in determining the
validity of state-sponsored legislative prayer. Although Lemon was discussed in Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 251-255 (1982), the Court did
not find the Lemon criteria particularly useful where there was substantial
evidence of overt discrimination against particular types of religious
groups.
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government may neither coerce or induce adherence to any
religion, nor compel conduct to conform to a religious creed
or practice. This circumscribed scope of accommodation fulfills the Constitutional purpose "to promote and assure the
fullest possible scope of religious liberty and tolerance for all
and to nurture the conditions which secure the best hope of
attainment of that end." Abington School District v.
c empp, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
III
The challenged statute guarantees every employee, who
"states that a particular day of the week is observed as his
Sabbath," the right not to work on his chosen day. Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b). In the view of the legislature a Sabbath observer should not be forced to choose between compromising a religious conviction and jeopardizing a job. In
short, the State has decreed that a person who observes one
day of the week as a matter of religious conviction must be
relieved of any contract duty to work on that day, without
regard to the burdens or inconvenience this imposes on the
employer or fellow workers. We cannot accept the suggestion that the statute does not arm Sabbath observers with an
absolute and unqualified right not to work on their designated Sabbath. Such a reading of Section 53-303e(b) contradicts the unambiguous wording of the statute and ignores the
statute's construction by the Connecticut authorities entrusted with this task, including the State's highest court. 13
18
The State Board of Mediation and Arbitration construed the statute as
providing Thornton with the absolute right not to work on his Sabbath.
Caldor, Inc. v. Tlwrnton, Conn. Bd. Arb. & Med. No. 7980-A-727 (Oct.
20, 1980), J. A. lla-12a; accord, G. Fox & Co. v. Rinaldi, Conn. Bd. Arb.
& Med. No. 8182-A-440 (Nov. 17, 1982) ("There is no question that .. . the
employee has an absolute right to designate any day of the week as his or
her sabbath [and that Section 53-303e(b) would be violated if] the termination was as a result of the employee's refusal to work on her sabbath.").
Following settled state law, see, e. g., Bruno v. Department of Consumer
Protection, 190 Conn. 14, 18, 458 A. 2d 685, 688 (1983) (per curiam), the
State Superior Court and the Supreme Court of Connecticut adopted the
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This case does not bear on the constitutionality of the religious accommodation provisions of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and its various state counterparts. In
1972, Congress amended Title VII, which outlawed employment discrimination based on an individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. As amended, Title VII requires employers only "to reasonably accommodate" an
employee's religious observances and practices when so doing
does not cause "undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business," 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e(j) and 2000e-2(a)(1). A
number of states have comparable legislation. 14 The
Connecticut statute, however, goes beyond the "accommodation" laws currently in force; the commands of Section
303e(b) are absolute and unqualified. 15
In essence, the Connecticut statute imposes on some people an absolute duty to conform their conduct and business
practices to the religious practices of others; it enforces
Board's construction of the statute, Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 Conn.
336, 340-343, 350, 464 A. 2d 785, 789-790, 794 (1983). This construction of
the state law is, of course, binding on federal courts. E. g., Brown v.
Ohio, 432 U. S. 161, 167 (1977); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157, 169
(1961); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 (1875).
14
See, e. g., Alaska Stat. § 18.80.200 (1983); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 41-1461(6), 41-1463 (1956); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 10-1-570, 45-19-22 (1982);
Iowa Code Ann. § 601A.6(1)(a) (West 1975); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 344.030(5)
(1975); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4572(1)(A) (1979); Mass. Ann. Laws ch.
151B, § 4.1A (Law. Co-op. 1976); S. C. Code Ann. § 1-13-30(k) (Law. Coop. 1976); Tex. Ann. Civ. St. art. 5221k, §§ 1.01, 2.01(13), 5.01 (Vernon
Supp. 1984); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.337 (West Supp. 1983).
Mter the Connecticut Supreme Court invalidated Section 53-303e(b),
the Connecticut legislature enacted a statute prohibiting religious discrimination in employment that precisely tracks the language of Title VII.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-51(18). The legislature, however, did not repeal
Section 53-303e(b), which indicates that Sabbath observers have an absolute right not to work on their Sabbath.
15
The United States, as amicus curiae, acknowledges that "[i]fthere is a
constitutional defect in Section 53-303e(b), it is its absolute character-a
character that Title VII and the parallel state statutes do not share."
Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae at 24 .

..
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observance of whatever religious holiday the employee designates. The State thus commands that Sabbath religious concerns automatically trump all secular and other religious interests at the workplace; the statute takes no account of the
convenience or interests of the employer or those of other
employees who do not observe a Sabbath. The employer
and others must adjust their affairs to the command of the
State whenever the statute is invoked by an employee.
There is no exception under the statute for special circumstances, such as the Friday Sabbath observer employed in an
activity, such as school with a Monday through Friday schedule; the statute provides for no special consideration if a high
percentage of an employer's workforce asserts rights to the
same day off; and there is no exception to take account of employers whose work schedules reflect their own religious
practices. In addition, there is no exception when following
the dictates of Sabbath observers would cause the employer
substantial economic burdens or when the employer's compliance would require the imposition of significant burdens on
other employees who must work in place of the Sabbath observers.16 Finally, the statute allows for no consideration as
to whether the employer has made reasonable accommodation proposals. This unyielding weighting in favor of SabSection 53-303e(b) gives Sabbath observers the valuable right to designate a particular weekly day off-typically a weekend day, widely prized
as a day off. Other employees who have strong and legitimate, but nonreligious reasons for wanting a weekend day off have no rights under the
statute. For example, those employees who have earned the privilege
through seniority to have weekend days off may be forced to surrender this
privilege to the Sabbath observer; years of service and payment of "dues"
at the workplace simply cannot compete with the Sabbath observer's absolute right under the statute. Similarly, those employees who would like a
weekend day off, because that is the only day their spouses are also not
working, must take a back seat to the Sabbath observer. As explained
infra, the Establishment Clause does not permit the state to coerce persons' conduct in such a direct and absolute manner in order to facilitate the
religious practices of others.
16
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bath observers over all other interests contravenes a fundamental principle of the Religion Clauses:
"The First Amendment . . . gives no one the right to insist that in pursuit of their own interests others must
conform their conduct to his own religious necessities."
Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 205 F. 2d 58, 61 (CA2
1953) (L. Hand, J. ).
The government may insist that religion be treated in a
spirit of accommodation, but accommodation is just that-a
reasonable balancing of all the competing interests involved,
both secular and religious, see, e. g., United States v. Lee,
455 u. s. 252 (1982).
Connecticut singles out Sabbath observance and commands
that all such observance override every other legitimate
interest of employers and employees alike. Any conflict between Sabbath observance and other interests is resolved
mandatorily under the statute; the State lends its power exclusively to the religious practice of the demanding employee.
This goes well beyond acknowledging religion's place as an
aspect of our society's "diversity and pluralism," Lynch,
465 U. S., at--, and leaves no "play in the joints," Walz,
397 U. S., at 669, for other substantial secular and religious
values.
We conclude, therefore, that the Connecticut statute's absolute mandate constitutes governmental coercion of conduct
on behalf of particular religious adherents.
IV
The Court's holdings in Sherbert and Thomas on the one
hand, and the Connecticut statute on the other, as in so many
cases arising under the Religion Clauses, calls for line drawing. Distinguishing between cases falling next to the line on
either side is often difficult, but lines must be drawn. See,
e. g., United States v. Lee, supra; Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U. S. 599 (1961). Sherbert and Thomas involved situations
where the State was called upon to take steps to "accommo-

.,...
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date" religious observers in order to allow them the benefit of
an unemployment insurance program open to all other unemployed; the eligibility factor for that economic benefit coult
not be made to rest on a religious conviction or practice. 17
Under such circumstances the Religion Clauses require the
accommodation to avoid a state-created conflict between affirmative governmental action and free exercise of religious
beliefs. 18 Those holdings carried accommodation to its outer
limits.
Such accommodation for religious observers or religious institutions from governmental coercion has been long recognized by the Court. In Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S.
437 (1971), for example, the Court rejected an Establishment
Clause challenge to statutory provisions exempting religious
and conscientious objectors from the draft. The Court concluded that such an exemption was "in line with 'our happy
17
See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972), where the Court
held that the state must exempt Amish children from compulsory school
attendance laws in order to allow the Amish to exercise their religious beliefs. This did little more than states have done with respect to churchsponsored elementary schools. All such non-public mandatory education
must meet State standards.
18
Sherbert explained that the Free Exercise Clause's requiring the state
to dole out benefits to religious employees did not violate the Establishment Clause because the state was merely fulfilling its "obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences." Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 409 (1963). This reasoning was expressly affirmed in Thomas v.
Review Board, 450 U. S. 707, 720 (1981).
As is evident from the tension inherent in the Religion Clauses, see,
e. g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. - - , - - - - - (1984); Wale v. Tax
Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 668-669 (1970). The state's adhering to the
constitutional command of one Clause does not readily create a violation of
its counterpart. This is especially true where the state's efforts draw no
lines with respect to particular religions and where the state's actions are
motivated for reasons wholly divorced from religious ones. In the end, it
should come as no surprise that the Establishment Clause's concern that
government refrain from endorsing or coercing adherence to religion is
implicated only slightly, if at all, where the state administers an unemployment benefits program consistent with the Free Exercise Clause.

r:.
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tradition' of 'avoiding unnecessary clashes with the dictates
of conscience."' !d., at 453 (quoting United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605, 634 (1931) (Hughes, C. J., dissenting)).
Similarly, as the Court held in Walz, supra, the Establishment Clause did not forbid the granting of a property tax exemption to all churches. The exemption "simply spar[ed]
the exercise of religion from the burden of property taxation
levied on private profit institutions," 397 U. S., at 673, and
avoided tensions between governmental power and religious
institutions. See also Mueller v. Allen, supra; Braunfeld v.
Brown, supra.
Our prior holdings relied on a careful balancing of two
overriding factors: the government's adherence to the command of the Free Exercise Clause to eliminate a burden created by governmental action; moreover, the Establishment
Clause's concern with governmental advancement or coercion
of conduct on behalf of religion was not seriously at issue.
Section 53-303e(b) offers a strikingly different situation. In
enforcing the statute, Connecticut coercively burdens a host
of others to conform their conduct in order to facilitate the
religious activity of Sabbath observers. Far from preventing its own programs from unnecessarily burdening religious
exercise, the State is reaching out into the private sector to
compel absolute deference to a certain religious practice-this goes beyond accommodation.
The Connecticut statute, unlike governmental actions upheld in our holdings, contravenes a core principle of the
Establishment Clause that the government may not compel
private parties to conform their conduct and subordinate
their own legitimate interests to the religious needs of
others. At the same time, the statute takes this impermissible step where there is no equally competing constitutional
need of avoiding governmental coercion of religious activity.
See, e. g., Sherbert, 374 U. S., at 406-409; Braunfeld, supra,
at 603-604.
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v
We hold that the Connecticut statute, which provides Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to
work on their Sabbath, constitutes impermissible governmental coercion of private conduct on behalf of religion in
violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Connecticut is
affirmed.
It is so ordered.

1-J.

.~

VL.

To: Justice Brennan -/
Justice White
?--..Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor

~

J~~~~~
~~~~

~4w-e-~~~
tJ-f ~~ s~ %,1
·

From:

1- (//J~

The Chief Justice

Circulated:

MAR 13 1985

Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-1158
ESTATE OF DONALD E. THORNTON AND
CONNECTICUT, PETITIONERS v.
CALDOR, INC.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF CONNECTICUT
[March - , 1985]
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the
Court.
We granted certiorari to decide whether a State statute
that provides employees with the absolute right not to work
on their chosen Sabbath violates the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment.
I
In early 1975, petitioner's decedent Donald E. Thornton 1
began working for respondent Caldor, Inc., a chain of New
England retail stores; he managed the men's and boys' clothing department in respondent's Waterbury, Connecticut,
store. At that time, respondent's Connecticut stores were
closed on Sundays pursuant to state law. Conn. Gen. Stat.
§§ 53-300 to 53-303 (1975 ed.).
In 1977, following the state legislature's revision of the
Sunday-closing laws, 2 respondent opened its Connecticut
1
Thornton died on February 4, 1982, while his appeal was pending before the Supreme Court of Connecticut. The administrator of Thornton's
estate has continued the suit on behalf of the decedent's estate.
2
The state legislature revised the Sunday-closing laws in 1976 after a
state court held that the existing laws were unconstitutionally vague.
State v. Anonymous, 33 Conn. Supp. 55, 364 A. 2d 244 (C. P. 1976). The
legislature modified the laws to permit certain classes of businesses to remain open. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-302a (1976 ed.). At the same time, a
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stores for Sunday business. In order to handle the expanded store hours, respondent required its managerial
employees to work every third or fourth Sunday. Thornton,
a Presbyterian who observed Sunday as his Sabbath, initially
complied with respondent's demand and worked a total of 31
Sundays in 1977 and 1978. In October 1978, Thornton was
transferred to a management position in respondent's Torrington store; he continued to work on Sundays during the
first part of 1979. In November 1979, however, Thornton
informed respondent that he would no longer work on Sundays because he observed that day as his Sabbath; he invoked the protection of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b), which
provides:
"No person who states that a particular day of the week
is observed as his Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on such day. An employee's refusal to
work on his Sabbath shall not constitute grounds for his
dismissal." 3
new provision was added, Section 53-303e, which prohibited employment
of more than six days in any calendar week and guaranteed employees the
right not to work on the Sabbath of their religious faith. See n. 3, infra.
Soon after the revised Sunday-closing law was enacted, the Court of
Common Pleas once again declared it unconstitutional. State v. Anonymous, 33 Conn. Supp. 141, 366 A. 2d 200 (C. P. 1976). This decision was
limited to the provision requiring Sunday closing, Section 53-302a; the
court did not consider the validity of other provisions such as Section
53-303e. In 1978, the state legislature tried its hand at enacting yet
another Sunday-closing law, Pub. Act No. 78-329, 1978 Conn. Pub. Acts
700-702; the Supreme Court of Connecticut declared the statute unconstitutional. Caldor's Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc ., 177 Conn. 304, 417 A. 2d
343 (1979). As had the Court of Common Pleas, the Connecticut Supreme
Court did not address the constitutionality of Section 53-303e and that provision remained in effect until challenged in this action.
3
Thornton had learned of this statutory protection by consulting with
an attorney. See J. A. 88a-90a.
Section 53-303e was enacted as part of the 1976 revision of the Sundayclosing laws. Apart from the six-day week and the Sabbath-observance
provisions, see n. 2, supra, the remainder of the statute provides:

'
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Thornton rejected respondent's offer either to transfer him
to a management job in a Massachusetts store that was
closed on Sundays, or to transfer him to a nonsupervisory
position in the Torrington store at a lower salary. 4 In
March 1980, respondent transferred Thornton to a clerical
position in the Torrington store; Thornton resigned two days
later and filed a grievance with the State Board of Mediation
and Arbitration alleging that he was discharged from his
manager's position in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53303e(b).
Respondent defended its action on the ground that Thornton had not been "discharged" within the meaning of the statute; respondent also urged the Board to find that the statute
violated Article 7 of the Connecticut Constitution as well as
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
After holding an evidentiary hearing the Board evaluated
the sincerity of Thornton's claim and concluded it was based
on a sincere religious conviction; it issued a formal decision
sustaining Thornton's grievance. The Board framed the statutory issue as follows, "[i]f a discharge for refusal to work
Sunday hours occurred and Sunday was the Grievant's Sabbath . . . ," Section 53-303e(b) would be violated; the Board
held that respondent had violated the statute by "discharg[ing] Mr. Thornton as a management employee for refusing
"(c) Any employee, who believes that his discharge was in violation of
subsection (a) or (b) of this section may appeal such discharge to the state
board of mediation and arbitration. If said board finds that the employee
was discharged in violation of said subsection (a) or (b), it may order whatever remedy will make the employee whole, including but not limited to
reinstatement to his former or a comparable position.
"(d) No employer may, as a prerequisite to employment, inquire
whether the applicant observes any Sabbath.
"(e) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall not be
fined more than two hundred dollars."
• The collective bargaining agreement in effect for nonsupervisory employees provided that they were not required to work on Sundays if it was
"contrary [to the employee's] personal religious convictions." J. A. 91a .

•·f...
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to work ... [on] Thornton's ... Sabbath." J. A. lla, 12a.
The Board ordered respondent to reinstate Thornton with
back pay and compensation for lost fringe benefits. 5 The
Superior Court, in affirming that ruling, concluded that the
statute did not offend the Establishment Clause.
The Supreme Court of Co ecticut reversed, holding the
statute did not ave a "clear secular purpose." Caldor, Inc.
v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 349, 464 A. 2d 785, 792 (1983). 6
By authorizing each employee to designate his own Sabbath
as a day off, the statute evinced the "unmistakable purpose
... [of] allow[ing] those persons who wish to worship on a
particular day the freedom to do so." ld., at 349, 464 A. 2d,
at 792. The court then held that the "primary effect" of the
statute was to a~nce ~on; the statute "confe~ its 'benefit' on an exJ?.!iCit~ous ~asis. Only those employees
who designate a-saooath b.feeiitit!ed not to work on that particular day, and may not be penalized for so doing." ld., at
350, 464 A. 2d, at 794. The court noted that the statute required the State Mediation Board to decide which religious
activities may be characterized as an "observance of Sabbath" in order to assess employees' sincerity, and concluded
that this type of inquiry is "exactly the type of 'comprehensive, discriminating and continuing state surveillance' . . .
which creates excessive governmental entanglements between church and state." ld., at 351, 464 A. 2d, at 794
(quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 619 (1971)).
We granted certiorari, - - U. S. - - (1984). 7 We
affirm.
The Board refused to consider respondent's constitutional challenge on
the ground that, as a quasi-judicial body, it had no authority to pass on the
constitutionality of state law. J. A. 9a-10a.
6
The court expressly chose not to consider whether the statute violated
Article 7 of the Connecticut Constitution. Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191
Conn. 336, 346, n. 7, 464 A. 2d 785, 792, n. 7 (1983).
7
We also granted the State of Connecticut's motion to intervene as of
right to defend the constitutionality of the state law .
5

..
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II

A
Petitioner and the State of Connecticut assert that decisions such as Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), and
Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U. S. 707 (1981), recognized
the government's duty to take account of the special needs of
religious observers and thus insulate the Connecticut statute
from constitutional attack. In Sherbert, a Seventh-day
Adventist lost her job because she would not work on Saturday, her Sabbath. Similarly, in Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness lost employment after refusing to participate in the production of armaments, an activity contrary to the tenets of
his faith.
In each of these cases the Free Exercise Clause was held to
require the State to extend unemployment benefits to these
persons who, having lost their jobs as a result of their refusal
to compromise their religious practices at the workplace,
were not able to secure employment. Sherbert, 374 U. S., at
410; Thomas, 450 U. S., at 718-719.
The State must provide the religious employee with the
benefits of "an otherwise available public program," available to all, id., at 716; the Free Exercise Clause prohibited
the State from unduly burdening the employee's exercise of
religion. In other words, the State could not exclude the
employee from participating in the government programreceipt of unemployment compensation-because unemployment resulted from the employee's religious beliefs.
B

The First Amendment's guarantee against the "establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof"
turned away from the tradition of government-supported religions long prevalent in Europe. 8 Acknowledgment and
8
In Blackstone's words, for example, "the civil magistrate ... is bound
indeed to protect the established church: and, if this can be better effected,
by admitting none but its genuine members to offices of trust and emolu-

83-1158---0PINION
6

ESTATE OF THORNTON v. CALDOR, INC.

accommodation of religion have been closely identified with
our history, beginning at the Constitutional Convention and
notably in actions taken in the first days of the First Congress. See generally Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783
(1983). 9 Since the colonial era, our society has set aside
Sunday as a common day of rest and religious observance. 10
Reviewing the history of "Sunday Closing Laws" extant in
the colonies in 1787 when the Constitution was drafted and
debated, and when the First Amendment was adopted in
1791, this Court recognized the "strongly religious origin of
these laws." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 433
(1961).
Throughout our entire history there has been widespread
acceptance of having one day of the week set aside for worship and pursuits other than labor. In McGowan, the Court
rejected the contention that the religious overtones of laws in
vogue since the beginning of the Republic rendered them unconstitutional. On the contrary, the Court held expressly
that such laws were within constitutional bounds because
they also achieve a secular goal-providing a uniform day of
rest for all, notwithstanding the widespread use of the day
for religious worship. To conclude otherwise would "give a
constitutional interpretation of hostility to the public welfare
rather than one of mere separation of church and State."
Id., at 445.
The background of accommodation and acknowledgment of
religion must be weighed, however, against an equally instructive lesson from history: that the Establishment Clause
ment, he is certainly at liberty to do so .... " 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 52*.
9
In the space of a single week in the opening sessions of the First Congress in 1789, paid chaplains were authorized for each House. See Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,- (1983).
10
In Connecticut, for example, laws requiring businesses to close on
Sunday, the traditional Christian day of Sabbath, date back to 1656. The
Earliest Laws of the New Haven and Connecticut Colonies 1639-1673, at
47 (J. Cushing ed. 1977) .
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was intended to foreclose governmental compulsion of some
of the people to support and facilitate the religious activities
of others. Clearly all forms of direct, absolute coercion were
proscribed. See, e. g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U. S. 1, 8-16 (1947). Justice Frankfurter, concurring in
McGowan, observed:
"In assuring the free exercise of religion, the Framers
of the First Amendment were sensitive to the then recent history of those persecutions and impositions of civil
disability with which sectarian majorities in virtually all
of the Colonies had visited deviation in the matter of conscience. This protection of unpopular creeds, however,
was not to be the full extent of the Amendment's guarantee of freedom from governmental intrusion in matters of
faith." 366 U. S., at 464-465 (footnotes omitted).
The Framers' fear of governmental coercion in religious
matters 11 stemmed from their awareness of how often in their
own time governmental authority intruded into the religious
sphere and led to unwanted conflict and oppression. See
Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 431-432 (1962). Government, Madison asserted, should not "employ Religion as an
engine of Civil policy," 2 The Writings of James Madison 187
(G. Hunt ed. 1901). Concurring in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 694 (1970), Justice Harlan suggested that
at stake
"is preventing that kind of governmental involvement in
religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead
to strife and frequently strain a political system to the
breaking point . . . . "
11
The Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, an acknowledged antecedent of
the First Amendment, proclaimed as one of its guiding principles that
"no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship
. . . nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body
or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or
beliefs .... " 12 Hening, Statutes of Virginia 84 (1823).
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Government must not only guard against activity that impinges on religious freedom, but it must take pains not to
compel citizens to act in the name of any religion. Cf.
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 714-717 (1977). The
genius of the Religion Clauses preserves the Framers'
"awareness of the historical fact that governmentally established religions and religious persecutions go hand in hand."
Engle, supra, at 432. Concurring in McGowan, supra, at
460, Justice Frankfurter pointed to
"the long colonial struggle for disestablishment [was] the
struggle to free all men, whatever their theological
views, from state-compelled obligation to acknowledge
and support state-favored faiths."

c
This history of accommodating all religious exercise while
guarding against governmental efforts to press any religion
on the people counsels a ainst rigid rules under the Establishment Clause. In the recent erm we emphasized that
"[i]n our modern, complex society, whose traditions and constitutional underpinnings rest on and encourage diversity and
pluralism in all areas, an absolutist approach in applying the
Establishment Clause is simplistic and has been uniformly rejected by this Court." vLynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. - - ,
- - (1984); see, e. g., Walz, supra, at 671.
In setting the appropriate boundaries in Establishment
Clause cases, the Court has referred o emon for a convenient shorthand of "the cumu a 1ve criteria eveloped by the
Court over many years." 403 U. S., at 612. However, the
Court has repeatedly rejected the concept that "any single
test or criterion" provides the touchstone for resolving
Establishment Clause cases, see, e. g., Lynch, supra, at
- - ; id., at--, n. 1 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); id., at
- - , n. 2 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); the Court has exch ac rized Lemon as establishing "'no more tlPan
pres
[a] helpful signpos
1sliment Clause
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challenges," Mueller v. Allen, - - U. S. - - , - - (1983)
(quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 741 (1973)). 12
Our recent decision in Lynch v. Donnelly, supra, suggests
the lim_ite~y~of fixed tests in that category of cases
where the Court-mus~whether a particular governmental accommodation of religion violates the prohibition
against the establishment of religion. As Lynch makes
clear, the effort to accommodate religion may have predominantly nonsecular purposes and even may encourage and
foster religion. By definition efforts toward accommodation
inevitably implicate consideration of religious factors; such
consideration, however, does not necessarily contravene the
Establishment Clause, as Lynch demonstrates. See also
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 (1943). To pigeonhole
analysis in all cases into fixed inquiries may well obscure
rather than illuminate the sensitive issues surrounding accommodation of religion. Cf. Lynch, supra, at-- (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). No single "test" or formula fits every
case raising Establishment Clause questions. Courts must )
look beyond the rhetoric of any single approach to determine
whether the values protected by the Religion Clauses have
been offended.
When a court considers the extent to which government
may accommodate religion, the focus must be on the core
objectives of the Relig!o Clauses themselves: is the Cliallenged action a s ep owar
e establishment of a religion by ?
or with the approval of government, o~sub
stantially impair the free exercise of religion. Thus, the
12
Where a mechanistic inquiry obscures rather than illuminates the concerns underlying the Establishment Clause, the Court has not hesitated to
proceed along different lines. In Marsh v. Chambers , supra, for example,
the Court did not consider the Lemon analysis relevant in determining the
validity of state-sponsored legislative prayer. Although Lemon was discussed in Larson v. Valente , 456 U. S. 228, 251-255 (1982), the Court did
not find the Lemon criteria particularly useful where there was substantial
evidence of overt discrimination against particular types of religious
groups.
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government may neither coerce or induce adherence to any
religion, nor compel conduct to conform to a religious creed
or practice. This circumscribed scope of accommodation fulfills the Constitutional purpose "to promote and assure the
fullest possible scope of religious liberty and tolerance for all
and to nurture the conditions which secure the best hope of
attainment of that end." Abington School District v.
Schempp, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
III
The challenged statute guarantees every employee, who
"states th~ paf€Icuh1r day of the week is observed as his
Sabbath," the right not to work on his chosen day. Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b). In the view of the legislature a Sabbath observer should not be forced to choose between compromising a religious conviction and jeopardizing a job. In
short, the State has decreed that a person who observes one
day of the week as a matter of religious conviction must be
relieved of any contract duty to work on that day, without
regard to the urdens or inconvenience this imposes Onthe
e ~r fello workers. We cannot accep t e suggestion hat the statute oes not arm Sabbath observers with an
absolute and unqualified right not to work on their designated Sabbath. Such a reading of Section 53-303e(b) contradicts the unambiguous wording of the statute and ignores the
statute's construction by the Connecticut authorities entrusted with this task, including the State's highest court. 18

a

13
The State Board of Mediation and Arbitration construed the statute as
providing Thornton with the absolute right not to work on his Sabbath.
Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton , Conn. Bd. Arb. & Med. No. 7980-A-727 (Oct.
20, 1980), J. A. lla-12a; accord, G. Fox & Co. v. Rinaldi, Conn. Bd. Arb.
& Med. No. 8182-A-440 (Nov. 17, 1982) ("There is no question that ... the
employee has an absolute right to designate any day of the week as his or
her sabbath [and that Section 53-303e(b) would be violated if] the termination was as a result of the employee's refusal to work on her sabbath.").
Following settled state law, see, e. g. , Bruno v. Department of Consumer
Protection, 190 Conn. 14, 18, 458 A. 2d 685, 688 (1983) (per curiam), the
State Superior Court and the Supreme Court of Connecticut adopted the
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This case does not bear on the constitutionality of the religious accommodation provisions of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and its various state counterparts. In
1972, Congress amended Title VII, which outlawed employment discrimination based on an individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. As amended, Title VII requires employers only "to reasonably accommodate" an
employee's religious observances an prac Ices w en so doing
does not cause "undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business," 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e(j) and 2000e-2(a)(l). A
number of states have comparable legislation. 14 The
Connecticut statute, however, goes beyond the "accommodation" laws currently in force; the commands of Section
303e(b) are absolute and unqualified. 15 ~
In essence, the Connecticut statute imposes on some people an absolute duty to conform their conduct and business
practices to the religious practices of others; it enforces
Board's construction of the statute, Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 Conn.
336, 340-343, 350, 464 A. 2d 785, 789-790, 794 (1983). This construction of
the state law is, of course, binding on federal courts. E. g., Brown v.
Ohio, 432 U. S. 161, 167 (1977); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157, 169
(1961); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 (1875).
1
' See, e. g., Alaska Stat. § 18.80.200 (1983); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 41-1461(6), 41-1463 (1956); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 10-1-570, 45-19-22 (1982);
Iowa Code Ann. § 601A.6(1)(a) (West 1975); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 344.030(5)
(1975); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4572(1)(A) (1979); Mass. Ann. Laws ch.
151B, § 4.1A (Law. Co-op. 1976); S. C. Code Ann. § 1-13-30(k) (Law. Coop. 1976); Tex. Ann. Civ. St. art. 5221k, §§ 1.01, 2.01(13), 5.01 (Vernon
Supp. 1984); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.337 (West Supp. 1983).
After the Connecticut Supreme Court invalidated Section 53-303e(b),
the Connecticut legislature enacted a statute prohibiting religious discrimination in employment that precisely tracks the language of Title VII.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-51(18). The legislature, however, did not repeal
Section 53-303e(b), which indicates that Sabbath observers have an absolute right not to work on their Sabbath.
16
The United States, as amicus curiae, acknowledges that "[i]fthere is a
constitutional defect in Section 53-303e(b), it is its absolute character-a
character that Title VII and the parallel state statutes do not share."
Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae at 24.

83-1158--0PINION
12

ESTATE OF THORNTON v. CALDOR, INC.

observance of whatever religious holiday the employee designates. The State thus commands that Sabbath religious concerns automatically trump all secular and other religious interests at the workplace; the statute takes no account of the
convenience or interests of the employer or those of other
employees who do not observe a Sabbath. The employer
and others must adjust their affairs to the command of the
State whenever the statute is invoked by an employee.
There is no exception under the statute for special circumstances, such as the Friday Sabbath observer employed in an
activity, such as school with a Monday through Friday schedule; the statute provides for no special consideration if a high
percentage of an employer's workforce asserts rights to the
same day off; and there is no exception to take account of employers whose work schedules reflect their own religious
practices. In addition, there is no exception when following
the dictates of Sabbath observers would cause the employer
substantial economic burdens or when the employer's compliance would require the imposition of significant burdens on
other employees who must work in place of the Sabbath observers.16 Finally, the statute allows for no consideration as
to whether the employer has made reasonable accommodation proposals. This unyielding weighting in favor of Sab16
Section 53-303e(b) gives Sabbath observers the valuable right to designate a particular weekly day off-typically a weekend day, widely prized
as a day off. Other employees who have strong and legitimate, but nonreligious reasons for wanting a weekend day off have no rights under the
statute. For example, those employees who have earned the privilege
through seniority to have weekend days off may be forced to surrender this
privilege to the Sabbath observer; years of service and payment of "dues"
at the workplace simply cannot compete with the Sabbath observer's absolute right under the statute. Similarly, those employees who would like a
weekend day off, because that is the only day their spouses are also not
working, must take a back seat to the Sabbath observer. As explained
infra, the Establishment Clause does not permit the state to coerce persons' conduct in such a direct and absolute manner in order to facilitate the
religious practices of others.

1
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bath observers over all other interests contravenes a fundamental principle of the Religion Clauses:
"The First Amendment ... gives no one the right to insist that in pursuit of their own interests others must
conform their conduct to his own religious necessities."
Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 205 F. 2d 58, 61 (CA2
1953) (L. Hand, J.).
The government may insist that religion be treated in a
spirit of accommodation, but accommodation is just that-a
reasonable balancing of all the competing interests involved,
both secular and religious, see, e. g., United States v. Lee,
455 u. s. 252 (1982).
Connecticut singles out Sabbath observance and commands
that all such observance override every other legitimate
interest of employers and employees alike. Any conflict between Sabbath observance and other interests is resolved
mandatorily under the statute; the State lends its power exclusively to the religious practice of the demanding employee.
This goes well beyond acknowledging religion's place as an
aspect of our society's "diversity and pluralism," Lynch,
465 U. S., at--, and leaves no "play in the joints," Walz,
397 U. S., at 669, for other substantial secular and religious
values.
We conclude, therefore, that the Connecticut statute's absolute mandate constitutes governmental coercion of conduct
on behalf of particular religious a~
The Court's holdings in Sherbert and Thomas on the one
hand, and the Connecticut statute on the other, as in so many
cases arising under the Religion Clauses, calls for line drawing. Distinguishing between cases falling next to the line on
either side is often difficult, but lines must be drawn. See,
e. g., United States v. Lee, supra; Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U. S. 599 (1961). Sherbert and Thomas involved situations
where the State was called upon to take steps to "accommo-

(
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date" religious observers in order to allow them the benefit of
an unemployment insurance program open to all other unemployed; the eligibility factor for that economic benefit coult
not be made to rest on a religious conviction or practice. 17
Under such circumstances the Religion Clauses require the
accommodation to avoid a state-created conflict between affirmative governmental action and free exercise of religious
beliefs. 18 Those holdings carried accommodation to its outer
limits.
Such accommodation for religious observers or religious institutions from governmental coercion has been long recognized by the Court. In Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S.
437 (1971), for example, the Court rejected an Establishment
Clause challenge to statutory provisions exempting religious
and conscientious objectors from the draft. The Court concluded that such an exemption was "in line with 'our happy
17
See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972), where the Court
held that the state must exempt Amish children from compulsory school
attendance laws in order to allow the Amish to exercise their religious beliefs. This did little more than states have done with respect to churchsponsored elementary schools. All such non-public mandatory education
must meet State standards.
18
Sherbert explained that the Free Exercise Clause's requiring the state
to dole out benefits to religious employees did not violate the Establishment Clause because the state was merely fulfilling its "obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences." Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 409 (1963). This reasoning was expressly affirmed in Thomas v.
Review Board, 450 U. S. 707, 720 (1981).
As is evident from the tension inherent in the Religion Clauses, see,
e. g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. - - , - - - - - (1984); Wale v. Tax
Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 668-669 (1970). The state's adhering to the
constitutional command of one Clause does not readily create a violation of
its counterpart. This is especially true where the state's efforts draw no
lines with respect to particular religions and where the state's actions are
motivated for reasons wholly divorced from religious ones. In the end, it
should come as no surprise that the Establishment Clause's concern that
government refrain from endorsing or coercing adherence to religion is
implicated only slightly, if at all, where the state administers an unemployment benefits program consistent with the Free Exercise Clause.

...
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tradition' of 'avoiding unnecessary clashes with the dictates
of conscience."' !d., at 453 (quoting United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605, 634 (1931) (Hughes, C. J., dissenting)).
Similarly, as the Court held in Walz, supra, the Establishment Clause did not forbid the granting of a property tax exemption to all churches. The exemption "simply spar[ed]
the exercise of religion from the burden of property taxation
levied on private profit institutions," 397 U. S., at 673, and
avoided tensions between governmental power and religious
institutions. See also Mueller v. Allen, supra; Braunfeld v.
Brown, supra.
Our prior holdings relied on a careful balancing of two
overriding factors: the governmen~m
ma~ee Exercise Clause to eliminate a burden created by governmental action; moreover, the Establishment
Clause's concern with governmental advancement or coercion
of conduct on behalf of religion was not seriously at issue.
Section 53-303e(b) offers a strikingly different situation. In
enforcing the statute, Connecticut coercively burdens a host
of others to conform their conduct in order to facilitate the
religious activity of Sabbath observers. Far from preventing its own programs from unnecessarily burdening religious
exercise, the State is reaching out into the private sector to
compel absolute deference to a certain religious practicethis goes beyond accommodation.
The Connecticut statute, unlike governmental actions upheld in our holdings, co~!_:avenes ~ore __principle of the
Establishmen Clause that the government may not compel
private parties to con orm e1r con uct and su ordmate
their own eg~timate interests to e religious needs of
others. At the same time, the statute takes this impermissible step where there is no equally competing constitutional
need of avoiding governmental coercion of religious activity.
See, e. g., Sherbert, 374 U. S., at 406-409; Braunfeld, supra,
at 603-604.

I
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We hold that the Connecticut statut
hich provides Sabbath observers with an absolute and u q alified right not to
work on their Sabbath, constitutes impermissible governmental coercion of private conduct on behalf of religion in
violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Connecticut is
affirmed.

It is so ordered.
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ESTATE OF DONALD E. THORNTON AND
CONNECTICUT, PETITIONERS v.
CALDOR, INC.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF CONNECTICUT
[May - , 1985]

CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the
Court.
We granted certiorari to decide whether a State statute
that provides employees with the absolute right not to work
on their chosen Sabbath violates the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment.
I
In early 1975, petitioner's decedent Donald E. Thornton 1
began working for respondent Caldor, Inc., a chain of New
England retail stores; he managed the men's and boys' clothing department in respondent's Waterbury, Connecticut,
store. At that time, respondent's Connecticut stores were
closed on Sundays pursuant to state law. Conn. Gen. Stat.
§§ 53-300 to 53-303 (1975 ed.).
In 1977, following the state legislature's revision of the
Sunday-closing laws, 2 respondent opened its Connecticut
'Thornton died on February 4, 1982, while his appeal was pending before the Supreme Court of Connecticut. The administrator of Thornton's
estate has continued the suit on behalf of the decedent's estate.
1
The state legislature revised the Sunday-closing laws in 1976 after a
state court held that the existing laws were unconstitutionally vague.
State v. Anony11WU8, 33 Conn. Supp. 55, 364 A. 2d 244 (C. P. 1976). The
legislature modified the laws to permit certain classes of businesses to re• main open. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-302a (1976 ed.). At the same time, a

'.
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stores for Sunday business. In order to handle the expanded store hours, respondent required its managerial
employees to work every third or fourth Sunday. Thornton,
a Presbyterian who observed Sunday as his Sabbath, initially
complied with respondent's demand and worked a total of 31
Sundays in 1977 and 1978. In October 1978, Thornton was
transferred to a management position in respondent's Torrington store; he continued to work on Sundays during the
first part of 1979. In November 1979, however, Thornton
informed respondent that he would no longer work on Sundays because he observed that day as his Sabbath; he invoked the protection of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b), which
provides:
"No person who states that a particular day of the week
is observed as his Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on such day. An employee's refusal to
work on his Sabbath shall not constitute grounds for his
dismissal." 3
new provision was added,§ 53-303e, which prohibited employment of more
than six days in any calendar week and guaranteed employees the right not
to .work on the Sabbath of their religious faith. See n. 3, infra. Soon
after the revised Sunday-closing law was enacted, the Court of Common
Pleas once again declared it unconstitutional. State v. Anonymous, 33
Conn. Supp. 141, 366 A. 2d 200 (C. P. 1976). This decision was limited to
the provision requiring Sunday closing, § 53-302a; the court did not consider the validity of other provisions such as § 53-303e. In 1978, the state
legislature tried its hand at enacting yet another Sunday-closing law, Pub.
Act No. 78-329, 1978 Conn. Pub. Acts 700-702; the Supreme Court of
Connecticut declared the statute unconstitutional. Caldor's Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn. 304, 417 A. 2d 343 (1979). As had the Court of
Common Pleas, the Connecticut Supreme Court did not address the constitutionality of § 53-303e and that provision remained in effect until challenged in this action.
• Thornton had learned of this statutory protection by consulting with
an attorney. See J. A. 88a-90a.
Section 53-303e was enacted as part of the 1976 revision of the Sundayclosing laws. Apart from the six-day week and the Sabbath-observance
provisions, see n. 2, supra, the remainder of the statute provides:

'
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Thornton rejected respondent's offer either to transfer him
to a management job in a Massachusetts store that was
closed on Sundays, or to transfer him to a nonsupervisory
position in the Torrington store at a lower salary. 4 In
March 1980, respondent transferred Thornton to a clerical
position in the Torrington store; Thornton resigned two days
later and filed a grievance with the State Board of Mediation
and Arbitration alleging that he was discharged from his
manager's position in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. §53303e(b).
Respondent defended its action on the ground that Thornton had not been "discharged" within the meaning of the statute; respondent also urged the Board to find that the statute
violated Article 7 of the Connecticut Constitution as well as
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
After holding an evidentiary hearing the Board evaluated
the sincerity of Thornton's claim and concluded it was based
on a sincere religious conviction; it issued a formal decision
sustaining Thornton's grievance. The Board framed the statutory issue as follows, "[i]f a discharge for refusal to work
Sunday hours occurred and Sunday was the Grievant's Sabbath . . . ," § 53-303e(b) would be violated; ·the Board held
that respondent had violated the statute by "discharg[ing]
Mr. Thornton as a management employee for refusing to
"(c) Any employee, who believes that his discharge was in violation of
subsection (a) or (b) of this section may appeal such discharge to the state
board of mediation and arbitration. If said board finds that the employee
was discharged in violation of said subsection (a) or (b), it may order whatever remedy will make the employee whole, including but not limited to
reinstatement to his former or a comparable position.
"(d) No employer may, as a prerequisite to employment, inquire
whether the applicant observes any Sabbath.
"(e) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall not be
fined more than two hundred dollars."
'The collective bargaining agreement in effect for nonsupervisory employees provided that they were not required to work on Sundays if it was
"contrary [to the employee's] personal religious convictions." J. A. 9la.
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work
[on] Thornton's ... Sabbath." J. A. lla, 12a.
The Board ordered respondent to reinstate Thornton with
back pay and compensation for lost fringe benefits. 5 The
Superior Court, in affirming that ruling, concluded that the
statute did not offend the Establishment Clause.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed, holding the
statute did no ave a c ear secular purpose." Caldor, Inc.
v. Thornton~. 33~d 785, 792 (1983). 6
By authorizing each employee to designate his own Sabbath
as a day off, the statute evinced the "unmistakable purpose
. . . [of] allow[ing] those persons who wish to worship on a
particular day the freedom to do so." !d., at 349, 464 A. 2d,
at 792. The court then held that the "primarr eff~ct" of the
statute was to advance religion; the statute "confers its 'benefit' on an explicit! religious basis. Only tliose employees
who
a e a a a are en 1 led not to work on that particular day, and may not be penalized for so doing." !d., at
350, 464 A. 2d, at 794. The court noted that the statute required the State Mediation Board to decide which religious
activities may be characterized as an "observance of Sabbath" in order to assess employees' sincerity, and concluded
that this type of inquiry is "exactly the type of 'comprehensive, discriminating and continuing state surveillance' . . .
which creates excessive governmental entanglements between churcll' and state." !d., at 351, 464 A. 2d, at 794
(quotingt.Cemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 619 (1971)).
We granted certiorari, U.S. (1984). 7 We
affirm.
'The Board refused to consider respondent's constitutional challenge on
the ground that, as a quasi-judicial body, it had no authority to pass on the
constitutionality of state law. J. A. 9a-10a.
• The court expressly chose not to consider whether the statute violated
Article 7 of the Connecticut Constitution. Caldar, Inc. v. Tlwrnton, 191
Conn. 336, 346, n. 7, 464 A. 2d 785, 792, n. 7 (1983).
'We also granted the State of Connecticut's motion to intervene as of
right to defend the constitutionality of the state law.
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II
A
Petitioner and the State of Connecticut assert that decisions such as Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), and
Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U. S. 707 (1981), which recognized the government's duty to take account of the special
needs of religious observers, insulate the Connecticut statute
from constitutional attack. In Sherbert, a Seventh-day
Adventist lost her job because she would not work on Saturday, her Sabbath. Similarly, in Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness lost employment after refusing to participate in the production of armaments, an activity contrary to the tenets of
his faith.
In each of these cases the Free Exercise Clause was held to
require the State to extend unemployment benefits to these
persons who, having lost their jobs as a result of their refusal
to compromise their religious practices at the workplace,
were not able to secure employment. Sherbert, 374 U. S., at
410; Thomas, 450 U. S., at 718-719.
The State must provide the religious employee with the
benefits of "an otherwise available public program," available to all, id., at 716; the Free Exercise Clause prohibited
the State from unduly burdening the employee's exercise of
religion. In other words, the State could not exclude .the
employee from participating in the governm~am
receipt of unemployment compensation-because unemploymentresul~~eligious beliefs.

B
The First Amendment's guarantee against the "establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof"
turned away from the tradition of government-supported religions long prevalent in Europe. 8 Acknowledgment and
8
In Blackstone's words, for example, ''the civil magistrate ... is bound
indeed to protect the established church: and, if this can be better effected,
by admitting none but its genuine members to offices of trust and emolu-
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~~modation 1of religion have been closely identified with

o ~nning at the Constitutional Convention and
notably in actions taken in the first days of the First Congress. See generally Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783
(1983). 9 Since the colonial era, our society has set aside
Sunday as a common day of rest and religious observance. 10
Reviewing the history of "Sunday Closing Laws" extant in
the colonies in 1787 when the Constitution was drafted and
debated, and when the First Amendment was adopted in
1791, this Court recognized the "strongly religious origin of
these laws." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 433
(1961).

Throughout our entire history there has been widespread
acceptance of having one day of the· week set aside for worship and pursuits other than labor. In McGowan, the Court
rejected the contention that the religiousovertones of laws in
vogue since the beginning of the Republic rendered them unconstitutional. On the contrary, the Court held expressly
that such laws were within constitutional bounds because
they so a ·ev a secular oal-providing a uniform day of
rest for all, notwithstanding the widespread use of the day
for religious worship. To conclude otherwise would "give a
constitutional interpretation of hostility to the public welfare
rather than one of mere separation of church and State."
I d., at 445.
r--·---- .
The background of1accommodatio!fmd acknowledgment of
religion must be weignea,-nowever, against an equally instructive lesson from history: that the Establishment Clause
ment, he is certainly at liberty to do so . ... " 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 52*.
'In the space of a single week in the opening sessions of the First Congress in 1789, paid chaplains were authorized for each House. See Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,- (1983).
10
In Connecticut, for example, laws requiring businesses to close on
Sunday, the traditional Christian day of Sabbath, date back to 1656. The
Earliest Laws of the New Haven and Connecticut Colonies 1639-1673, at
47 (J. Cushing ed. 1977).

,~
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was intended to foreclose governmental compulsion o some
of the people to support and facilitate the religious acfvities
of others. Clearly all forms of direct, absolute coercion were
proscribed. See, e. g., Everson v. Board of Educatw n, 330
U. S. 1, 8-16 (1947). Justice Frankfurter, concurring in
McGowan, observed:
"In assuring the free exercise of religion, the Framers
of the First Amendment were sensitive to the then recent history of those persecutions and impositions of civil
disability with which sectarian majorities in virtually all
of the Colonies had visited deviation in the matter of conscience. This protection of unpopular creeds, however,
was not to be the full extent of the Amendment's guarantee of freedom from governmental intrusion in matters of
faith." 366 U. S., at 464-465 (footnotes omitted).
The Framers' fear of governmental coercion in religious
matters 11 stemmed from their awareness of how often in their
own time governmental authority intruded into the religious
sphere and led to unwanted conflict and oppression. See
Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 431-432 (1962). Government, Madison asserted, should not "employ Religion as an
engine of Civil policy," 2 The Writings of James Madison 187
(G. Hunt ed. 1901). Concurring in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 694 (1970), Justice Harlan suggested that
at stake
"is preventing that kind of governmental involvement in
religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead
. to strife and frequently strain a political system to the
breaking point . . . . "
11

The Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, an aclmowledged antecedent of
the First Amendment, proclaimed as one of its guiding principles that
"no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship
... nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body
or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or
beliefs .... " 12 Hening, Statutes of Virginia 84 (1823).

~
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Government must not only guard against activity that impinges on religious freedom, but it must take pains not to
compel citizens to act in the name of any religion. Cf.
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 714-717 (1977). The
genius of the Religion Clauses preserves the Framers'
"awareness of the historical fact that governmentally established religions and religious persecutions go hand in hand."
Engle, supra, at 432. Concurring in McGowan, supra, at
460, Justice Frankfurter pointed to
"the long colonial struggle for disestablishment [that
was] the struggle to free all men, whatever their theological views, from state-compelled obligation to acknowledge and support state-favored faiths."

c
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This history of accommodatin all religious exercise while
guarding against gove
e a efforts to press any religion
on the people counsels agaJnst ri~d rules under the Establishment Clause."' 1 n tlie re~eni ·erm we empfiasiZed that
"[i]if01lr1ii0{Iern, complex society, whose traditions and constitutional underpinnings rest on and encourage diversity and
pluralism in all areas, an absolutist approach in applying the
Establishment Clause is siiii'p1isbc ana lias 6een uniformly rejected by this Court." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. - - ,
- - (1984); see, e. g., Walz, supra, at 671.
In setting the appropriate boundaries in Establishment
Clause cases, the Court has referred to Lemon for a convenient shorthand of ''the cum ative cr1 er1a eve ope y the
Co'UROvermany years." 403 U. S., at 612. However, the
Court has repeatedly rejected the conce t at "an~ sin~e
test or criterion" pro es t e touc stone for resolving
Establishment 'tlause cases, se , e. g., ync , supra, at
- - ; ~ 1 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); id., at
- - , n. 2 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). Courts must look beyond the rhetoric of any single approach to determine
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whether the values protected by the Religion Clauses have
been offended.
When a court considers the extent to which government
may ~ccommodate
___.....____ religion,"'the focus must be on the core
objectives of the Religion Clauses themselves: is the challenged action a step toward the establishment of a religion by
or with the approval of government, or does such action substantially impair the free exercise of religion. Thus, the
government may neither coerce or induce adherence to any
religion, nor compel conduct to conform to a religious creed
or practice. This ciiJ.cumscribe~e of McommodatianJulfills the Constitutional purpose "to promote and assure the
fullest possible scope of religious liberty and tolerance for all
and to nurture the conditions which secure the best hope of
attainment of that end." Abington School District v.
Schempp, 373 U. S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
III
The challenged statute guarantees every employee, who
"states that a particular day of the week is observed as his
Sabbath," the right not to work on his chosen day. Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b). In the view of the legislature, a
Sabbath observer should not be forced to choose between
compromising a religious conviction and jeopardizing a job.
In short, the State has decreed that a person who observes
one day of the week as a matter of religious conviction must
be relieved of any contract duty to work on that day, without
regard to the burdens or inconvenience this imposes on the
employer or fellow workers. We cannot accept the· suggestion that the statute does not arm Sabbath observers with an
absolute and unqualified right not to work on their designated Sabbath. Such a reading of§ 53-303e(b) contradicts
the unambiguous wording of the statute and ignores the statute's construction by the Connecticut authorities entrusted
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with this task, including the State's highest court. 12
This case does not bear on the constitutionalit of the retitle
of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and its various state counterparts. In
1972, Congress amended Title VII, which outlawed employment discrimination based on an individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. As amended, Title VII requires employers only "to reasOnaolyaccommodate''iln
empl~ervances and practiCeSwhen so doing
does not cause "undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business," 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e(j) and 2000e-2(a)(1). A
number of states have comparable legislation. 13 The
u The State Board of Mediation and Arbitration construed the statute as
providing Thornton with the absolute ri ht ot to work on his Sabbath.
Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, Conn.
. & Med. No.
0- Oct.
20, 1980), J. A. lla-12a; accord, G. Fox & Co. v. Rinaldi, Conn. Bd. Arb.
& Med. No. 8182-A-440 (Nov. 17, 1982) ("There is no question that . .. the
employee has an absolute right to designate any day of the week as his or
her sabbath [and that § 53-303e(b) would be violated if] the termination
was as a result of the employee's refusal to work on her sabbath"). Following settled state law, see, e. g., Bruno v. Department of Consumer
Protection, 190 Conn. 14, 18, 458 A. 2d 685, 688 (1983) (per curiam), the
State Superior Court and the Supreme Court of Connecticut adopted the
Board's construction of the statute, Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 Conn.
336, 340-343, 350, 464 A. 2d 785, 789-790, 794 (1983). This construction of
the state law is, of course, binding on federal courts. E. g., Braum v.
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 167 (1977);~na, 368 U.S. 157, 169
(1961); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 (1875).
usee, e. g., Alaska Stat. § 18.80.200 (1983); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 41-1461(6), 41-1463 (1956); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 10-1-570, 45-19-22 (1982);
Iowa Code Ann. § 601A.6(1)(a) (West 1975); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 344.030(5)
(1975); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4572(1)(A) (1979); Mass. Ann. Laws ch.
151B, §4.1A (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.C. Code Ann.§ 1-13-30(k) (Law. Coop. 1976); Tex. Ann. Civ. St. art. 5221k, §§ 1.01, 2.01(13), 5.01 (Vernon
Supp. 1984); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.337 (West Supp. 1983).
Mter the Connecticut Supreme Court invalidated § 53-303e(b), the
Connecticut legislature enacted a statute prohibiting religious discrimination in employment that precisely tracks the language of Title VII. Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 46a-51(18). The legislature, however, did not repeal
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Connecticut statute, however, goes beyond the "accommodation" laws currently in force; the coriiniandsof § 303e(b) are
-::::::=:::::
...----.
absolute and unqualified. 1•
!n essence, the COnnecticut statute imposes on some people an absolute duty to conform their conduct and business
practices~ to the religious practices of others; it enforces
observance of whatever religious holiday the employee designates. The State thus commands that Sabbath religious concerns automatically trump all secular and other reli ·ous interests at t e wo
e; e statute t es no account of the
converue~ts of the employer or those of other
employees who do not observe a Sabbath. The employer
and others must adjust their affairs to the command of the
State whenever the statute is invoked by an employee.
There is no exception under the statute for special circumstances, such as the Friday Sabbath observer employed in a
school with a Monday through Friday schedule; the statute
provides for no special consideration if a high percentage of
an employer's workforce asserts rights to the same day off;
and there is no exception to take account of employers whose
work schedules reflect their own religious practices. In addition, there is no exception when following the dictates of
Sabbath observers would cause the employer substantial economic burdens or when the employer's compliance would require the imposition of significant burdens on other employees who must work in place of the Sabbath observers. 15
§ 53-303e(b), which indicates that Sabbath observers have an absolute
right not to work on their Sabbath.
14
The United States, as amicus curiae, acknowledges that "[i]f there is a
constitutional defect in Section 53-303e(b), it is its absolute character-a
character that Title VII and the parallel state statutes do not share."
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 24.
11
Section 53-303e(b) gives Sabbath observers the valuable right to designate a particular weekly day off-typically a weekend day, widely prized
as a day off. Other employees who have strong and legitimate, but nonreligious reasons for wanting a weekend day off have no rights under the
statute. For example, those employees who have earned the privilege

•.
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Finally, the statute allows for no consideration as to whether
the employer has made reasonable accommodation proposals.
This unyielding weighting in favor of Sabbath observers over
all other interests contravenes a fundamental principle of the
Religion Clauses:
"The First Amendment . . . gives no one the right to insist that in pursuit of their own interests others must
conform their conduct to his own religious necessities."
Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 205 F. 2d 58, 61 (CA2
1953) (L. Hand, J. ).
The government may insist that religion be treated in a
spirit of accommodation, but accommodation is just that-a
re~ of all the competing interests involved,
religious, see, e. g., United States v. Lee,
both secular
455 u. s. 252 (1982).
Connecticut singles out Sabbath observance and commands
that all such observance override every other legitimate
interest of employers and employees alike. Any conflict between Sabbath observance and other interests is resolved
mandatorily under the statute; the State lends its power exclusively to the religious practice of the demanding employee.
This goes well beyond acknowledging religion's place as an
aspect of our society's "diversity and pluralism," Lynch,
465 U. S., at--, and leaves no "play in the joints," Walz,
397 U. S., at 669, for other substantial secular and religious
values.

aruf

through seniority to have weekend days off may be forced to surrender this
privilege to the Sabbath observer; years of service and payment of "dues"
at the workplace simply cannot compete with the Sabbath observer's absolute right under the statute. Similarly, those employees who would like a
weekend day off, because that is the only day their spouses are also not
working, must take a back seat to the Sabbath observer. AB explained
infra, the Establishment Clause does not permit the state to coerce persons' conduct in such a direct and absolute manner in order to facilitate the
religious practices of others .

...
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The question thus becomes wh~e(b) has a ~
that impermissibly advances or inhibits religion.
Lemon, 403 U. S., at 612. The operation of this statute goes
beyond the "benevolent neutrality" that the Religion Clauses
require. By giving to only those people who observe a
workfree Sabbath as a religious practice the right to designate their own particular Sabbath as a non-working day, the
State explicitly favors one traditional religious practice.
The Sabbath observance which § 53-303e(b) advances is a
central practice within three readily identifiable major religions: Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. 16 Members of religious groups not included within the statute's protection,
i. e., those persons belonging to Eastern religions such as
Buddhism and Hinduism, may conclude that only certain Sabbath religions have received the State's imprimatur and endorsement given the statute's inflexible mandate. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437, · 450 (1971); Lynch,
supra, at-- (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). This is not the
"accommodation" envisioned by the Religion Clauses;
§ 53-303e(b), by compelling others to conform their conduct
to the Sabbath observers', virtually "confer[s] [an] imprimatur of state approval on [particular] religious ... practices,"
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 274 (1981).
Given its absolutist character, which automatically subordinates the treatment of all secular interests to those of the
Sabbath observers, § 53-303e(b)'s primary effect is to ad~ct

•• The Supreme Court of Connecticut rejected the argument that the
statute uses the term "Sabbath" to mean simply a time of rest without any
religious significance. Instead, that court construed § 53-303e(b) as designating that day of "rest and worship . . . specifically mandated by the tenets of a particular religion," namely Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.
191 Conn., at 347-348, and nn. 8, 9, 464 A. 2d, 792-793, and nn. 8, 9. Accordingly, the arguments advanced in this Court that the statute protects
all religious groups equally and favors no particular religion are
disingenuous.
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vance a particular religious tenet, 17 and constitutes governmental coercion of conduct on behalf of particular adherents,
see, e. g., Abington School District, supra; Engle v. Vitale,
supra.
IV
The Court's holdings in Sherbert and Thomas on the one
hand, and the Connecticut statute on the other, as in so many
cases arising under the Religion Clauses, call for line drawing. Distinguishing between cases falling next to the line on
either side is often difficult, but lines must be drawn. See,
e. g., United States v. Lee, supra; Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U. S. 599 (1961). Sherbert and Thomas involved situations
where the State was called upon to take steps to "accommodate" religious observers in order to allow them the benefit of
an unemployment insurance program open to all other unemployed; the eligibility factor for that economic benefit could
not be made to rest on a religious conviction or practice. 18
Under such circumstances the Religion Clauses require the
accommodation to avoid a state-created conflict between affinnative governmental action and free exercise of religious
beliefs. 19 Those holdings carried accommodation to its outer
limits.
17

Our decisions make it abundantly clear that the Establishment Clause
does not condemn all governmental efforts that may aid or advance religion. See, e. g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (bus
transportation); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968) (textbook loans); Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664 (1970) (property tax
exemption); Mueller v. Allen,- U. S . - (1983) (tax deduction for tuition transportation and textbook expenses).
11
See also Wisconain v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), where the Court
held that the state must exempt Amish children from compulsory school
attendance laws in order to allow the Amish to exercise their religious beliefs. This did little more than states have done with respect to churchsponsored elementary schools. All such non-public mandatory education
must meet State standards.
11
Sherbert explained that the Free Exercise Clause's requiring the state
to dole out benefits to religious employees did not violate the Establishment Clause because the state was merely fulfilling its "obligation of neu-

..''
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Such accommodation for religious observers or religious institutions from governmental coercion has been long recognized by the Court. In Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S.
437 (1971), for example, the Court rejected an Establishment
Clause challenge to statutory provisions exempting religious
and conscientious objectors from the draft. The Court concluded that such an exemption was "in line with 'our happy
tradition' of 'avoiding unnecessary clashes with the dictates
of conscience.'" I d., at 453 (quoting United States v. M acintosh, 283 U. S. 605, 634 (1931) (Hughes, C. J., dissenting)).
Similarly, as the Court held in Walz, supra, the Establishment Clause did not forbid the granting of a property tax exemption to all churches. The exemption "simply spar[ed]
the exercise of religion from the burden of property taxation
levied on private profit institutions," 397 U. S., at 673, and
avoided tensions between governmental power and religious
institutions. See also Mueller v. Allen, supra; Braunfeld v.
Brown, supra.
---:-1
Our prior ·holdings relied on ~ful bala~ of two
overriding factors: the government's adherence to the com1 mand of the Free Exercise Clause to eliminate a burden ere' ated by governmental action, and the absence of any substan/ tial Establishment Clause concern with governmental

(

,)

trality in the face of religious differences." Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S.
398, 409 (1963). This reasoning was expressly affinned in Thomas v.
Review Board, 450 U. S. 707, 720 (1981).
As is evident from the tension inherent in the Religion Clauses, see,
e. g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465lJ. 5. ---, ... - - (1984); Walz v. Tax
Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 668-669 (1970), the state's adhering to the
constitutional command of one Clause does not readily create a violation of
its counterpart. This is especially true where the state's efforts draw no
lines with respect to particular religions and where the state's actions are
motivated for reasons wholly divorced from religious ones. In the end, it
should come as no surprise that the Establishment Claus 's concern that
government refrain from endorsing or
rem a erence to religton is
imp ca
only slig tly, if at , w en the state admirusters an unemployment benefits p~ consistent with the Free Exercise Clause.
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advancement or coercion of conduct on behalf of religion.
§ 53-303e(b) offers a strikingly different situation. In enforcing the statute, Connecticut coercively burdens a host of
others to conform their conduct in order to facilitate the religious activity of Sabbath observers. Far from preventing
its own programs from unnecessarily burdening religious exercise, the State is reaching out into the private sector to
compel absolute deference to a certain religious practicethis goes beyond accommodation.
The Connecticut statute, unlike governmental actions upheld in our holdings, contravenes a core principle of the
Establishment Clause that the government may not compel
private parties to conform their conduct and subordinate
their own legitimate interests to the religious needs of
others. At the same time, the statute takes
1m erm~ssible step where ther is o equ l om etin constitutional
need o av01 in governmenta coercion of reli 'ous activity.
See, e. g.,
bert, 374 . S., at
-409; Braunfel , supra,
at 603-604.

v

1

I

We hold that the Connecticut statute, which provides Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to
work on their Sabbath, is an impermissible advancement of
religion and constitutes governmental coercion of private
conduct on behalf of religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Connecticut is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
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CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the
Court.
We granted certiorari to decide whether a state statute
that provides employees with the absolute right not to work
on their chosen Sabbath violates the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment.
I
In early 1975, petitioner's decedent Donald E. Thornton 1
began working for respondent Caldor, Inc., a chain of New
England retail stores; he managed the men's and boys' clothing department in respondent's Waterbury, Connecticut,
store. At that time, respondent's Connecticut stores were
closed on Sundays pursuant to state law. Conn. Gen. Stat.
§§ 53-300 to 53-303 (1958).
In 1977, following the state legislature's revision of the
Sunday-closing laws, 2 respondent opened its Connecticut
'Thornton died on February 4, 1982, while his appeal was pending before the Supreme Court of Connecticut. The administrator of Thornton's
estate has continued the suit on behalf of the decedent's estate.
1
The state legislature revised the Sunday-closing laws in 1976 after a
state court held that the existing laws were unconstitutionally vague.
State v. Anonymous, 33 Conn. Supp. 55, 364 A. 2d 244 (Com. Pl. 1976).
The legislature modified the laws to permit certain classes of businesses to
remain open. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-302a (Supp. 1962-1984). At the
same time, a new provision was added, § 53-303e, which prohibited em-
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stores for Sunday business. In order to handle the expanded store hours, respondent required its managerial
employees to work every third or fourth Sunday. Thornton,
a Presbyterian who observed Sunday as his Sabbath, initially
complied with respondent's demand and worked a total of 31
Sundays in 1977 and 1978. In October 1978, Thornton was
transferred to a management position in respondent's Torrington store; he continued to work on Sundays during tlie
first part of 1979. In November 1979, however, Thornton
informed respondent that he would no longer work on Sundays because he observed that day as his Sabbath; he invoked the P,lJ?~E}~t~on of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b) (Supp.
1962-1984),1provi(les:
"No person who states that a particular day of the week
is observed as his Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on such day. An employee's refusal to
work on his Sabbath shall not constitute grounds for his
dismissal." 3
ployment of more than six days in any calendar week and guaranteed employees the right not to work on the Sabbath of their religious faith. See
n. 3, infra. Soon after the revised Sunday-closing law was enacted, the
Court of Common Pleas once again declared it unconstitutional. State v.
Anonymous, 33 Conn. Supp. 141, 366 A. 2d 200 (1976). This decision was
limited to the provision requiring Sunday closing, § 53-302a; the court did
not consider the validity of other provisions such as § 53-303e. In 1978,
the state legislature tried its hand at enacting yet another Sunday-closing
law, Pub. Act No. 78-329, 1978 Conn. Pub. Acts 700-702; the Supreme
Court of Connecticut declared the statute unconstitutional. Caldor's Inc.
v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn. 304, 417 A. 2d 343 (1979). As had the
Court of Common Pleas, the Connecticut Supreme Court did not address
the constitutionality of§ 53-303e and that provision remained in effect until
challenged in this action.
1
Thornton had learned of this statutory protection by consulting with
an attorney. See App. 88a-90a.
Section 53-303e was enacted as part of the 1976 revision of the Sundayclosing laws. Apart from the 6-day w~k and the Sabbath-observance
provisions, see n. 2, supra, the remainder of the statute provides:
"(c) Any employee, who believes that his discharge was in violation of

•'
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Thornton rejected respondent's offer either to transfer him
to a management job in a Massachusetts store that was
closed on Sundays, or to transfer him to a nonsupervisory
position in the Torrington store at a lower salary. 4 In
March 1980, respondent transferred Thornton to a clerical
position in the Torrington store; Thornton resigned two days
later and filed a grievance with the State Board of Mediation
and Arbitration alleging that he was discharged from his
manager's position in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. §53303e(b).
Respondent defended its action on the ground that Thornton had not been "discharged" within the meaning of the statute; respondent also urged the Board to find that the statute
violated Article 7 of the Connecticut Constitution as well as
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
After holding an evidentiary hearing the Board evaluated
the sincerity of Thornton's claim and concluded it was based
on a sincere religious conviction; it issued a formal decision
sustaining Thornton's gri~vance. The Board framed the
statutory issue as follows, "[i]f a discharge for refusal to work
Sunday hours occurred and Sunday was the Grievant's Sabbath ... ," § 53-303e(b) would be violated; the Board held
that respondent had violated the statute by "discharg[ing]
Mr. Thornton as a management employee for refusing to
work ... [on] Thornton's ... Sabbath." App. lla, 12a.
subsection (a) or (b) of this section may appeal such discharge to the state
board of mediation and arbitration. If said board finds that the employee
was discharged in violation of said subsection (a) or (b), it may order whatever remedy will make the employee whole, including but not limited to
reinstatement to his former or a comparable position.
"(d) No employer may, as a prerequisite to employment, inquire
whether the applicant observes any Sabbath.
"(e) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall not be
fined more than two hundred dollars."
• The collective bargaining agreement in effect for nonsupervisory employees provided that they were not required to work on Sundays if it was
"contrary [to the employee's] personal religious convictions." App. 91a.
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The Board ordered respondent to reinstate Thornton with
backpay and compensation for lost fringe benefits. 5 The Superior Court, in affirming that ruling, concluded that the
statute did not offend the Establishment Clause.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed, holding the
statute did not have a "clear secular purpose." Caldor, Inc.
v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 349, 464 A. 2d 785, 793 (1983). 6
By authorizing each employee to designate his own Sabbath
as a day off, the statute evinced the "unmistakable purpose
... [of] allow[ing] those persons who wish to worship on a
particular day the freedom to do so." ld., at 349, 464 A. 2d,
at 793. The court then held that the "primary effect" of the
statute was to advance religion; the statute "confers its 'benefit' on an explicitly religious basis. Only those employees
who designate a Sabbath are entitled not to work on that particular day, and may not be penalized for so doing." ld., at
350, 464 A. 2d, at 794. The court noted that the statute required the State Mediation Board to decide which religious
activities may be characterized as an "observance of Sabbath" in order to assess employees' sincerity, and concluded
that this type of inquiry is "exactly the type of 'comprehensive, discriminating and continuing state surveillance' . . .
which creates excessive governmental entanglements between church and state." ld., at 351, 464 A. 2d, at 794
(quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 619 (1971)).
We granted certiorari, 465 U. S. - - (1984). 7 We affirm.
'The Board refused to consider respondent's constitutional challenge on
the ground that, as a quasi-judicial body, it had no authority to pass on the
constitutionality of state law. Id., at 9a-10a.
1
The court expressly chose not to consider whether the statute violated
Article 7 of the Connecticut Constitution. Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191
Conn. 336, 346, n. 7, 464 A. 2d 785, 792, n. 7 (1983).
'We also granted the State of Connecticut's motion to intervene as of
right to defend the constitutionality of the state law. 465 U. S. (1984).

·'
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II

The First Amendment's guarantee against the "establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof"
turned away from the tradition of government-supported religions long prevalent in Europe. 8 Acknowledgment and
accommodation of religion have been closely identified with
our history, beginning at the Constitutional Convention and
notably in actions taken in the first days of the First Congress. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783, 787-788
(1983). 9 Since the colonial era, our society has set aside
Sunday as a common day of rest and religious observance. 10
Reviewing the history of "Sunday Closing Laws" extant in
the colonies in 1787 when the Constitution was drafted and
debated, and when the First Amendment was adopted in
1791, this Court has sustained such laws as having a valid
secular purpose, notwithstanding the pervasive use of that
day for religious worship. The Court acknowledged the
"strongly religious origin of these laws." McGowan v.
. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 433 (1961). To conclude otherwise
would "give a constitutional interpretation of hostility to the
public welfare rather than one of mere separation of church
and State." I d., at 445.
The background of accommodation and acknowledgment of
religion must be weighed, however, against an equally instructive lesson from history: that the Establishment Clause
8
In Blackstone's words, for example, "the civil magistrate ... is bound
indeed to protect the established church: and, if this can be better effected,
by admitting none but its genuine members to offices of trust and emolument, he is certainly at liberty to do so .... " 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *52.
• In the space of a single week in the opening sessions of the First Congress in 1789, paid chaplains were authorized for each House. See Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783, 788 (1983).
10
In Connecticut, for example, laws requiring businesses to close on
Sunday, the traditional Christian day of Sabbath, date back to 1656. J.
Cushing, The Earliest Laws of the New Haven and Connecticut Colonies
1639-1673, p. 47 (1977).

·"
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was intended to foreclose governmental compulsion of some
of the people to support and facilitate the religious activities
of others. Clearly all forms of direct, absolute coercion were
proscribed. See, e. g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U. S. 1, 8-16 (1947). Justice Frankfurter, concurring in
McGowan, observed:
. "In assuring the free exercise of religion, the Framers
of the First Amendment were sensitive to the then recent history of those persecutions and impositions of civil
disability with which sectarian majorities in virtually all
of the Colonies had visited deviation in the matter of conscience. This protection of unpopular creeds, however,
was not to be the full extent of the Amendment's guarantee of freedom from governmental intrusion in matters of
faith." 366 U. S., at 464-465 (footnotes omitted).
The Framers' fear of governmental coercion in religious
matters 11 stemmed from their awareness of how often in their
own time governmental authority intruded into the religious
sphere and led to unwanted conflict and oppression. See
Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 431-432 (1962). Government, Madison asserted, should not "employ Religion as an
engine of Civil policy," 2 Writings of James Madison 187 (G.
Hunt ed. 1901).
'
Government must not only guard against activity that impinges on religious freedom, but it must take pains not to
compel citizens to act in the name of any religion. Cf.
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 714-717 (1977). The values of the Religion Clauses preserve the Framers' "awareness of the historical fact that governmentally established religions and religious persecutions go hand in hand." Engle,
11

The Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, an acknowledged antecedent of
the First Amendment, proclaimed as one of its guiding principles that
''no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship
... nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body
or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or
beliefs .... " 12 W. Hening, Laws of Virginia 86 (1823).
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supra, at 432. Concurring in McGowan, supra, at 460, Justice Frankfurter pointed to

"the long colonial struggle for disestablishment [that
was] the struggle to free all men, whatever their theological views, from state-compelled obligation to acknowledge and support state-favored faiths."
In setting appropriate boundaries in Establishment Clause
cases, the Court has frequently referred to our holding in
Lemon for guidance in this sensitive area. This familiar
three-part inquiry provides:
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally the
statute must not foster an excessive governmental entanglement with religion." 403 U. S., at 612-613.
Although Lemon provides no rigid, fixed formula applicable
to all Establishment Clause cases, the criteria properly focus
on whether the values protected by the Religion Clauses
have been undermined.
In considering the extent to which government may accommodate religion, we must answer the key question going to
the core objectives of the Religion Clauses: is the challenged
action a step toward the establishment of a religion by or
with the approval of government or does such action substantially impair the free exercise of religion? The government
is neither to coerce nor induce adherence to any religion, nor
is it to compel conduct conforming to any particular religious
creed or practice; the Lemon criteria themselves are designed generally to determine whether government has respected this Constitutional tenet. This circumscribed scope
of governmental action fulfills the Constitutional purpose "to
promote and assure the fullest possible scope of religious liberty and tolerance for all and to nurture the conditions which
secure the best hope of attainment of that end." Abington

'
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School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
III
Given the statute's particular operation, it is appropriate to
consider§ 53-303e(b)'s validity under the second aspect of the
Lemon inquiry, namely whether the statute has a primary ef
feet that impermissibly advances or inhibits religion. Se,
e. g., Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.
756, 783, n. 39 (1973); Lemon, 403 U. S., at 612. Should 1
statute fail to comply with any one of these criteria,
Court need not inquire further. See, e. g., Stone v. G1
ham, 449 U. S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (per curiam).
The challenged statute guarantees every employee, who
"states that a particular day of the week is observed as his
Sabbath," the right not to work on his chosen day. Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b). In the view of the legislature, a
Sabbath observer should not be forced to choose between
compromising a religious conviction and jeopardizing a job.
Here, in short, the State has decreed that a person wh<;> observes one day of the week as a matter of religious conviction
must be relieved of any duty to work on that day, no matter
what burden or inconvenience this imposes on the employer
or fellow workers. Clearly the statute arms Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work
on their designated Sabbath. Petitioner's reading of
§ 53-303e(b) conflicts with the unambiguous wording of the
statute and ignores the statute's construction by the
Connecticut authorities entrusted with this task, including
the State's highest court. 12
11

The State Board of Mediation and Arbitration construed the statute as
providing Thornton with the absolute right not to work on his Sabbath.
Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, Conn. Bd. Med. & Arb. No. 7980-A-727 (Oct.
20, 1980), App. lla-12a; accord, G. Fox & Co. v. Rinaldi, Conn. Bd. Med.
& Arb. No. 8182-A-440 (Nov. 17, 1982) ("There is no question that ... the
employee has an absolute right to designate any day of the week as his or
her sabbath "and that § 53-303e(b) would be violated if" the termination
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This case does not bear on the constitutionality of the religious ·accommodation provisions of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of i964 and its various state counterparts. In
1972, Congress amended Title VII, which outlawed employment discrimination based on an individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. As amended, Title VII requires employers only "to reasonably accommodate" an
employee's religious observances and practices when so doing
does not cause "undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business," 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000eU) and 2000e-2(a)(l). A
number of states have comparable legislation. 13 The Connecticut statute, however, goes beyond the "accommodation"
laws currently in force; the commands of§ 53-303e(b) are absolute and unqualified. 14
was as a result of the employee's refusal to work on her sabbath"). Following settled state ll:\W, see, e. g., Bruno v. Department of Consumer
Protection, 190 Conn. 14, 18, 458 A. 2d 685, 688 (1983) (per curiam), the
State Superior Court and the Supreme Court of Connecticut adopted the
Board's construction of the statute, Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 Conn.
336, 340-343, 350, 464 A. 2d 785, 789-790, 794 (1983). This construction of
the state law is, of course, binding on federal courts. E. g. , Brown v.
Ohio, 432 U. S. 161 , 167 (1977); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157, 169
(1961); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 (1875).
11
See, e. g., Alaska Stat. § 18.80.200 (1981); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 41-1461(6), 41-1463 (1974); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 10-1-570, 45-19-22 (2)
(1982); Iowa Code § 601A.6(1)(a) (1983); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 344.030(5) (1983);
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. , Tit. 5, § 4572(1)(A) (1979); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ,
ch. 151B, § 4.1A (1982); S. C. Code § 1-13-30(k) (Supp. 1984); Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5221k, §§ 1.01, 2.01(13), 5.01 (Vernon Supp. 1984);
Wis. Stat. § 111.337 (1981-1982).
After the Connecticut Supreme Court invalidated § 53-303e(b), the
Connecticut legislature enacted a statute prohibiting religious discrimination in employment that precisely tracks the language of Title VII.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-51(18). The legislature, however, did not repeal
§ 53-303e(b), which indicates that Sabbath observers have an absolute
right not to work on their Sabbath.
"The United States, as amicus curiae, acknowledges that "[i]fthere is a
constitutional defect in Section 53-303e(b), it is its absolute character-a
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In essence, the Connecticut statute imposes on employers
and employees an absolute duty to conform their conduct and
business practices to the religious practices of others; it en..urces observance of whatever religious holiday the employee
•ldlaterally designates. The State thus commands that Sabbath religious concerns automatically trump all secular and
other religious interests at the workplace; the statute takes
no account of the convenience or interests of the employer or
those of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath.
The employer and others must adjust their affairs to the command of the State whenever the statute is invoked by an
employee.
There is no exception under the statute for special circumstances, such as the Friday Sabbath observer employed in an
occupation with a Monday through Friday schedule-a school
teacher, for example; the statute provides for no special consideration if a high percentage of an employer's workforce asserts rights to the same Sabbath; and there is no exception to
take account of employers whose work schedules reflect their
own religious practices. Moreover, there is no exception
when following the dictates of Sabbath observers would
cause the employer substantial economic burdens or when
the employer's compliance would require the imposition of
significant burdens on other employees who must work in
place of the Sabbath observers. 15 Finally, the statute allows
character that Title VII and the parallel state statutes do not share."
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24.
11
Section 53-303e(b) gives Sabbath observers the valuable right to designate a particular weekly day off-typically a weekend day, widely prized
as a day off. Other employees who have strong and legitimate, but nonreligious reasons for wanting a weekend day off have no rights under the
statute. For example, those employees who have earned the privilege
through seniority to have weekend days off may be forced to surrender this
privilege to the Sabbath observer; years of service and payment of "dues"
at the workplace simply cannot compete with the Sabbath observer's absolute right under the statute. Similarly, those employees who would like a
weekend day off, because that is the only day their spouses are also not
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for no consideration as to whether the employer has made
reasonable accommodation proposals.
This unyielding
weighting in favor of Sabbath observers over all other interes•'' •:o, l".tavenes a fundamental principle of the Religion
Cl . ~< ses that:
"The First Amendment ... gives no one the right to insist that in pursuit of their own interests others must
conform their conduct to his own religious necessities."
Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 205 F. 2d 58, 61 (CA2
1953) (L. Hand, J.).
Connecticut singles out Sabbath observance and commands
that all such observance override every ather legitimate
interest of employers and employees alike. Any conflict between Sabbath observance and other interests is resolved
mandatorily under the statute; the State lends its power
exclusively to the particular religious practice of the demanding employee. This goes well beyond accommodation and
acknowledging religion's place as an aspect of our society's
"diversity and pluralism," Lynch, 465 U. S., at - - , and
leaves no "play· in the joints," Walz, 397 U. S., at 669, for
other substantial secular and religious values.
The Connecticut statute allocates a substantial and valuable benefit solely along relig;ous lines and imposes a burden
on others who choose not to observe a Sabbath. The statute
effectively arms Sabbath observers with the right to impose
on others in order to practice their particular religious tenet.
As such, the statute goes beyond having an incidental or
remote effect of advancing religion. See, e. g., Roemer v.
Maryland Public Works Board, 426 U. S. 736, 747 (1976);
Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968). On the
contrary, the very operation of this provision makes it clear
that § 53-303e(b) has a primary effect that impermissibly
working, must take a back seat to the Sabbath observer. As explained
infra, the Establishment Clause does not permit the State to coerce persons' conduct in such a direct and absolute manner in order to facilitate the
religious practices of others .

. ...
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advances a particular religious practice. Lemon, 403 U. S.,
at 612.
The operat.ion nf this statute goes beyond the "benevolent
neutrality" ,, ',I, c h~ Religion Clauses require. By giving to
only those 1.Je•)ple who observe a workfree Sabbath as a religious practice the right to designate their own particular
Sabbath as a nonworking day, the State explicitly favors one
traditional religious practice. The Sabbath observance
which § 53-303e(b) advances is a central practice within three
readily identifiable major religions: Christianity, Judaism,
and Islam. 16 Members of religious groups not included
within the statute's protection, i. e., those persons belonging
to Eastern religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism may,
not unreasonably, conclude that only certain Sabbath religions have received the State's imprimatur and endorsement
given the statute's inflexible mandate. See Gillette v.
United States, 401 U. S. 437, 450 (1971); Lynch, supra, at
--(O'CONNOR, J., concurring). This is not the "accommodation" envisioned by the Religion Clauses; § 53-303e(b), by
compelling others to conform their conduct to the Sabbath
observers', virtually "confer[s] [an] imprimatur of state approval on [particular] religi'ous ... practices," Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 274 (1981).
Given its absolutist terms, which automatically subordinate the treatment of all secular concerns to those of the Sabbath observers, § 53-303e(b), by coercing conduct on behalf of
particular religious adherents, see, e. g., Abington School
•• The Supreme Court of Connecticut rejected the argument that the
statute uses the tenn "Sabbath" to mean simply a time of rest without any
religious significance. Instead, that court construed § 53-303e(b) as designating that day of "rest and worship . . . specifically mandated by the tenets of a particular religion," namely Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.
191 Conn., at 347-348, and nn. 8, 9, 464 A. 2d, 792-793, and nn. 8, 9.
Accordingly, the arguments advanced in this Court that the statute protects all religious groups equally and favors no particular religion are
disingenuous.
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District, supra; Engle v. Vitale, supra, has the primary effect of advancing a particular religious tenet. 17

rv
Petitioner and the cace of Connecticut assert that decisions such as Sherben v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), and
Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U. S. 707 (1981), which recognized the government's duty to take account of the special
needs of religious observers, insulate the Connecticut statute
from constitutional attack. In Sherbert, a Seventh-day
Adventist lost her job because she would not work on Saturday, her Sabbath. Similarly, in Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness lost employment after refusing to participate in the production of armaments, an activity contrary to the tenets of
his faith.
In each of these cases the Free Exercise Clause was held to
require the State to extend unemployment benefits to these
persons who, having lost their jobs as a result of their refusal
to compromise their religious practices at the workplace,
were not able to secure employment. Sherbert, supra, at
410; Thomas, 450 U. S., at 718-719.
The State must provide the religious employee with the
benefits of "an otherwise available public program," available to all, id., at 716; the Free Exercise Clause prohibited
the State from unduly burdening the employee's exercise of
religion. In other words, the State could not exclude the
employee from participating in the government programreceipt of unemployment compensation-because unemployment resulted from the employee's religious beliefs.
The Court's holdings in Sherbert and Thomas on the one
hand, and the Connecticut statute on the other, as in so many
17

Our decisions make it abundantly clear that the Establishment Clause
does not condemn all governmental action that has the effect of aiding religion. See, e. g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (bus
transportation); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968) (textbook loans); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970) (property tax exemption); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 (1983) (tax deduction for tuition
transportation and textbook expenses).
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cases arising under the Religion Clauses, call for line drawing. Distinguishing between cases falling next to the line on
either side is often difficult, bnt. lin"'~ must be drawn. See,
e. g., United States v. Lee, st
'? ·ounfeld v. Brown, 366
u. s. 599 (1961).
: ..
~ ~ccommodation for religious observers or religious institutimis from governmental coercion has been long recognized by the Court. In Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S.
437 (1971), for example, the Court rejected an Establishment
Clause challenge to statutory provisions exempting religious
and conscientious objectors from the draft. The Court concluded that such an exemption was "in line with 'our happy
tradition' of 'avoiding unnecessary clashes with the dictates
of conscience."' !d., at 453 (quoting United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605, 634 (1931) (Hughes, C. J., dissenting)).
Similarly, as the Court held in Walz, the Establishment
Clause did not forbid the granting of a property tax exemption to all churches. That tax exemption "simply spar[ed]
the exercise of religion from the burden of property taxation
levied on private profit institutions," 397 U.S., at 673, and
avoided tensions between g<?vernmental power and religious
institutions. In that sense it indeed aided all religions. See
also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 (1983); Braunfeld v.
Brown, supra.
As we have noted earlier, § 53-303e(b) offers a striking!~
different situation. In enforcing the statute, Connecticut C(
ercively burdens a host of others to conform their conduct .
order to facilitate the religious activity of Sabbath observer~.
Far from preventing its own programs from unnecessarily
burdening religious exercise, the State is reaching out into
the private sector to compel absolute deference to a certain
religious practice-this goes beyond accommodation and constitutes an impermissible advancement of a particular religious practice.
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v
We hold that the Connecticut statute, which provides Sabbath observers with an absolute and UD"""~ l:t:d right not to
. rnent Clause
work on their Sabbath, violates the l~ ·
of the First Amendment. The judgr t !..1t of the Supreme
Court of Connecticut is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

To: Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-1158

ESTATE OF DONALD E. THORNTON AND CONNECTICUT, PETITIONERS v. CALDOR, INC.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
CONNECTICUT
[May-, 1985]

CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opm10n of the
Court.
We granted certiorari to decide whether a state statute
that provides employees with the absolute right not to work
on their chosen Sabbath violates the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment.
I
In early 1975, petitioner's decedent Donald E. Thornton 1
began working for respondent Caldor, Inc., a chain of New
England retail stores; he managed the men's and boys' clothing department in respondent's Waterbury, Connecticut,
store. At that time, respondent's Connecticut stores were
closed on Sundays pursuant to state law. Conn. Gen. Stat.
§§ 53-300 to 53-303 (1958).
In 1977, following the state legislature's revision of the
Sunday-closing laws, 2 respondent opened its Connecticut
1
Thornton died on February 4, 1982, while his appeal was pending before the Supreme Court of Connecticut. The administrator of Thornton's
estate has continued the suit on behalf of the decedent's estate.
'The state legislature revised the Sunday-closing laws in 1976 after a
state court held that the existing laws were unconstitutionally vague.
State v. Anonymous, 33 Conn. Supp. 55, 364 A. 2d 244 (Com. Pl. 1976).
The legislature modified the laws to permit certain classes of businesses to
remain open. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-302a (Supp. 1962-1984). At the
same time, a new provision was added, § 53-303e, which prohibited em-
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stores for Sunday business. In order to handle the expanded store hours, respondent required its managerial
employees to work every third or fourth Sunday. Thornton,
a Presbyterian who observed Sunday as his Sabbath, initia'· ·
complied with respondent's demand and worked a total of
Sundays in 1977 and 1978. In October 1978, Thornton \\~d
transferred to a management position in respondent's Torrington store; he continued to work on Sundays during tlie
first part of 1979. In November 1979, however, Thornton
informed respondent that he would no longer work on Sundays because he observed that day as his Sabbath; he invoked the protection of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b) (Supp.
1962-1984), provides:
"No person who states that a particular day of the week
is observed as his Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on such day. An employee's refusal to
work on his Sabbath shall not constitute grounds for his
dismissal." 3
ployment of more than six days in any calendar week and guaranteed employees the right not to work on the Sabbath of their religious faith. See
n. 3, infra. Soon after the revised Sunday-closing law was enacted, the
Court of Common Pleas once again declared it unconstitutional. State v.
Anony11WU8, 33 Conn. Supp. 141, 366 A. 2d 200 (1976). This decision was
limited to the provision requiring Sunday closing, § 53-302a; the court did
not consider the validity of other provisions such as § 53-303e. In 1978,
the state legislature tried its hand at enacting yet another Sunday-closing
law, Pub. Act No. 78-329, 1978 Conn. Pub. Acts 700-702; the Supreme
Court of Connecticut declared the statute unconstitutional. Caldor's Inc.
v. Bedding Barn, Inc. , 177 Conn. 304, 417 A. 2d 343 (1979). As had the
Court of Common Pleas, the Connecticut Supreme Court did not address
the constitutionality of§ 53-303e and that provision remained in effect until
challenged in this action.
1
Thornton had learned of this statutory protection by consulting with
an attorney. See App. 88a-90a.
Section 53-303e was enacted as part of the 1976 revision of the Sundayclosing laws. Apart from the 6-day w~k and the Sabbath-observance
provisions, see n. 2, supra, the remainder of the statute provides:
"(c) Any employee, who believes that his discharge was in violation of
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Thornton rejected respondent's offer either to transfer him
to a management job in a Massachusetts store that was
closed on Sundays, or to transfer him to a nonsupervisory
position in the Torrington store at a lower salary. 4 In
March 1980, respondent transferred Thornton to a clerical
position in the Torrington store; Thornton resigned two days
later and filed a grievance with the State Board of Mediation
and Arbitration alleging that he was discharged from his
manager's position in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. §53303e(b).
Respondent defended its action on the ground that Thornton had not been "discharged" within the meaning of the statute; respondent also urged the Board to find that the statute
violated Article 7 of the Connecticut Constitution as well as
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
After holding an evidentiary hearing the Board evaluated
the sincerity of Thornton's claim and concluded it was based
on a sincere religious conviction; it issued a formal decision
sustaining Thornton's gri~vance. The Board framed the
statutory issue as follows, "[i]f a discharge for refusal to work
Sunday hours occurred and Sunday was the Grievant's Sabbath . . . ," § 53-303e(b) would be violated; the Board held
that respondent had violated the statute by "discharg[ing]
Mr. Thornton as a management employee for refusing to
work ... [on] Thornton's ... Sabbath." App. lla, 12a.
subsection (a) or (b) of this section may appeal such discharge to the state
board of mediation and arbitration. If said board finds that the employee
was discharged in violation of said subsection (a) or (b), it may order whatever remedy will make the employee whole, including but not limited to
reinstatement to his former or a comparable position.
"(d) No employer may, as a prerequisite to employment, inquire
whether the applicant observes any Sabbath.
"(e) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall not be
fined more than two hundred dollars."
4
The collective bargaining agreement in effect for nonsupervisory employees provided that they were not required to work on Sundays if it was
"contrary [to the employee's] personal religious convictions." App. 91a.

• 'I
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The Board ordered respondent to reinstate Thornton with
backpay and compensation for lost fringe benefits. 5 The Superior Court, in affirming that ruling, concluded that the
statute did not offend the Establishment Clause.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed, holding the
statute did not have a "clear secular purpose." Caldor, Inc.
v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 349, 464 A. 2d 785, 793 (1983). 6
By authorizing each employee to designate his own Sabbath
as a day off, the statute evinced the "unmistakable purpose
... [of] allow[ing] those persons who wish to worship on a
particular day the freedom to do so." ld., at 349, 464 A. 2d,
at 793. The court then held that the "primary effect" of the
statute was to advance religion; the statute "confers its 'benefit' on an explicitly religious basis. Only those employees
who designate a Sabbath are entitled not to work on that particular day, and may not be penalized for so doing." ld., at
350, 464 A. 2d, at 794. The court noted that the statute required the State Mediation Board to decide which religious
activities may be characterized as an "observance of Sabbath" in order to assess employees' sincerity, and concluded
that this type of inquiry is "exactly the type of 'comprehensive, discriminating and continuing state surveillance' . . .
which creates excessive governmental entanglements between church and state." ld., at 351, 464 A. 2d, at 794
(quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 619 (1971)).
We granted certiorari, 465 U. S. - - (1984). 7 We affirm.
'The Board refused to consider respondent's constitutional challenge on
the ground that, as a quasi-judicial body, it had no authority to pass on the
constitutionality of state law. /d., at 9a-10a.
• The court expressly chose not to consider whether the statute violated
Article 7 of the Connecticut Constitution. Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191
Conn. 336, 346, n. 7, 464 A. 2d 785, 792, n. 7 (1983).
7
We also granted the State of Connecticut's motion to intervene as of
right to defend the constitutionality of the state law. 465 U. S. (1984).

'··
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II
The First Amendment's guarantee against the "establish- ·
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof"
turned away from the tradition of government-supported religions long prevalent in Europe. 8 Acknowledgment and
accommodation of religion have been closely identified with
our history, beginning at the Constitutional Convention and
notably in actions taken in the first days of the First Congress. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783, 787-788
(1983). 9 Since the colonial era, our society has set aside
Sunday as a common day of rest and religious observance. 10
Reviewing the history of "Sunday Closing_ Laws" extant in
the colonies in 1787 when the Constitution was drafted and
debated, and when the First Amendment was adopted in
1791, this Court has sustained such laws as having ~id
secular ...Q.urtf.?se, notwithstanding the pervasive use of that
day for re gious worship. The Court acknowledged the
"strongly religious origin of these laws." McGowan v.
. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 433 (1961). To conclude otherwise
would "give a constitutional interpretation of hostility to the
public welfare rather than one of mere separation of church
and State." I d., at 445.
The background of accommodation and acknowledgment of
religion must be weighed, however, against an equally instructive lesson from history: that the Establishment Clause
8
In Blackstone's words, for example, "the civil magistrate . . . is bound
indeed to protect the established church: and, if this can be better effected,
by admitting none but its genuine members to offices of trust and emolument, he is certainly at liberty to do so . . . . " 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *52.
• In the space of a single week in the opening sessions of the First Congress in 1789, paid chaplains were authorized for each House. See Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783, 788 (1983).
10
In Connecticut, for example, laws requiring businesses to close on
Sunday, the traditional Christian day of Sabbath, date back to 1656. J.
Cushing, The Earliest Laws of the New Haven and Connecticut Colonies
1639-1673, p. 47 (1977).

·L-1~

/'

83-ll~PINION

6

ESTATE OF THORNTON v. CALDOR, INC.

was intended to foreclose governmental compulsion of some
of the people to support and facilitate the religious activities
of others. Clearly all forms of direct, absolute coercion were
proscribed. See, e. g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U. S. 1, 8-16 (1947). Justice Frankfurter, concurring in
McGowan, observed:
. "In assuring the free exercise of religion, the Framers
of the First Amendment were sensitive to the then recent history of those persecutions and impositions of civil
disability with which sectarian majorities in virtually all
of the Colonies had visited deviation in the matter of conscience. This protection of unpopular creeds, however,
was not to be the full extent of the Amendment's guarantee of freedom from governmental intrusion in matters of
faith." 366 U. S., at 464-465 (footnotes omitted).
The Framers' fear of governmental coercion in religious
matters 11 stemmed from their awareness of how often in their
own time governmental authority intruded into the religious
sphere and led to unwanted conflict and oppression. See
Engle v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 431-432 (1962). Government, Madison asserted, should not "employ Religion as an
. engine of Civil policy," 2 Writings of James Madison 187 (G.
Hunt ed. 1901).
'
/
Government must not only guard against activity that impinges on religious freedom, but it must take pains not to
compel citizens to act in the name of any religion. Cf.
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 714-717 (1977). The values of the Religion Clauses preserve the Framers' "awareness of the historical fact that governmentally established religions and religious persecutions go hand in hand." Engle,
"The Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, an aclmowledged antecedent of
the First Amendment, proclaimed as one of its guiding principles that
"no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship
... nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body
or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or
beliefs .... " 12 W. Hening, Laws of Virginia 86 (1823) .

•• 1 .

'

.

J
j

83-1158-0PINION
ESTATE OF THORNTON v. CALDOR, INC.

7

supra, at 432. Concurring in McGowan, supra, at 460, Justice Frankfurter pointed to

"the long colonial struggle for disestablishment [that
was] the struggle to free all men, whatever their theological views, from state-compelled obligation to acknowledge and support state-favored faiths."
In setting appropriate boundaries in Establishment Clause
cases, the Court has frequently referred to our holding in
Lemon for guidance in this sensitive area. This familiar
three-part inquiry provides:
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally the
statute must not foster an excessive governmental entanglement with religion." 403 U. S., at 612-613.
Although Lemon provides no rigid, fixed ~ rmula applicable
to all Establishment Clause cases, the criteria proper y focus
on whether the values protected by the Religion Clauses
have been undermined.
In considering the extent to which government may accommodate reli~on, we must answer th ey question
to
the core objectives of the Religion Clauses: 1s e challenged
action a step toward the establishment of a religion by or
with the approval of gove
ent o oes sue ac 10n su stantially impair the free exercise of religion? The government
is neither to coerce nor induce adherence to any religion, nor
is it to compel conduct conformin~ religious
creed or practice; the Lemon criteria themselves are designed generally to determine whether government has respected this Constitutional tenet. This circumscribed scope
of governmental action fulfills the Constitutional purpose "to
promote and assure the fullest possible scope of religious liberty and tolerance for all and to nurture the conditions which
secure the best hope of attainment of that end." Abington

om-
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School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
III
Given the statute's particular operation, it is appropriate to
consider§ 53-303e(b)'s validity under the second aspect of the
Lemon inquiry, namely whether the statute has a primary effect that impermissibly advances or inhibits religion. See,
e. g., Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S.
756, 783, n. 39 (1973); Lemon, 403 U. S., at 612. Should the
statute fail to comply with any one of these criteria, the
Court need not inquire further. See, e. g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (per curiam).
The challenged statute guarantees every employee, who
"states that a particular day of the week is observed as his
Sabbath," the right not to work on his chosen day. Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b). In the view of the legislature, a
Sabbath observer should not be forced to choose between
compromising a religious conviction and jeopardizing a job.
Here, in short, the State has decreed that a person who observes one day of the week as .a matter of religious conviction
must be relieved of any duty to work on that day, no matter
what burden or inconvenience this imposes on the employer
or fellow workers. Clearly the statute arms Sabbath ob- }
servers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work
on their designated Sabbath. Petitioner's reading of
§ 53-303e(b) conflicts with the unambiguous wording of the
statute and ignores the statute's construction by the
Connecticut authorities entrusted with this task, including
the State's highest court. 12
11
The State Board of Mediation and Arbitration construed the statute as
providing Thornton with the absolute right not to work on his Sabbath.
Caldor, Inc. v. Tlurrnton, Conn. Bd. Med. & Arb. No. 7980-A-727 (Oct.
20, 1980), App. lla-12a; accord, G. Fox & Co. v. Rinaldi, Conn. Bd. Med.
& Arb. No. 8182-A-440 (Nov. 17, 1982) ("There is no question that ... the
employee has an absolute right to designate any day of the week as his or
her sabbath "and that § 53-303e(b) would be violated if" the termination

i
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This case does not bear on the constitutionality of the religious ·accommodation provisions of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of i964 and its various state counterparts. In
1972, Congress amended Title VII, which outlawed employment discrimination based on an individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. As amended, Title VII requires employers only "to reasonably accommodate" an
employee's religious observances and practices when so doing
does not cause "undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business," 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000eU) and 2000e-2(a)(l). A
number of states have comparable legislation. 13 The Connecticut statute, however, goes beyond the "accommodation"
laws currently in force; the commands of§ 53-303e(b) are absolute and unqualified. 14
was as a result of the employee's refusal to work on her sabbath"). Following settled state 11:\W, see, e. g., Bruno v. Department of Consumer
Protection, 190 Conn. 14, 18, 458 A. 2d 685, 688 (1983) (per curiam), the
State Superior Court and the Supreme Court of Connecticut adopted the
Board's construction of the statute, Caldor, Inc. v. Tlwrnton, 191 Conn.
336, 340-343, 350, 464 A. 2d 785, 789-790, 794 (1983). This construction of
the state Jaw is, of course, binding on federal courts. E. g., Brown v.
Ohio, 432 U. S. 161, 167 (1977); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157, 169
(1961); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 (1875).
1
' See, e. g., Alaska Stat. § 18.80.200 (1981); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 41-1461(6), 41-1463 (1974); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 10-1-570, 45-19-22 (2)
(1982); Iowa Code § 601A.6(1)(a) (1983); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 344.030(5) (1983);
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 5, § 4572(1)(A) (1979); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.,
ch. 151B, § 4.1A (1982); S. C. Code § 1-13-30(k) (Supp. 1984); Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5221k, §§ 1.01, 2.01(13), 5.01 (Vernon Supp. 1984);
Wis. Stat. § 111.337 (1981-1982).
After the Connecticut Supreme Court invalidated § 53-303e(b), the
Connecticut legislature enacted a statute prohibiting religious discrimination in employment that precisely tracks the language of Title VII.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-51(18). The legislature, however, did not repeal
§ 53-303e(b), which indicates that Sabbath observers have an absolute
right not to work on their Sabbath.
,. The United States, as amicus curiae, acknowledges that "[i]f there is a
constitutional defect in Section 53-303e(b), it is its absolute character-a
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In essence, the Connecticut statute imposes on employers
and employees an absolute duty to conform their conduct and
business practices to the religious practices of others; it enforces observance of whatever religious holiday the employee
unilaterally designates. The State thus commands that Sabbath religious concerns automatically trump all secular and
other religious interests at the workplace; the statute takes
no account of the convenience or interests of the employer or
those of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath.
The employer and others must adjust their affairs to the command of the State whenever the statute is invoked by an
employee.
There is no exception under the statute for special circumstances, such as the Friday Sabbath observer employed in an
occupation with a Monday through Friday schedule-a school
teacher, for example; the statute provides for no special consideration if a high percentage of an employer's workforce asserts rights to the same Sabbath; and there is no exception to
take account of employers whose work schedules reflect their
own religious practices. Moreover, there is no exception
when following the dictates of Sabbath observers would
cause the employer substantial economic burdens or when
the employer's compliance would require the imposition of
significant burdens on other employees who must work in
place of the Sabbath observers. 15 Finally, the statute allows
character that Title VII and the parallel state statutes do not share."
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24.
11
Section 53-303e(b) gives Sabbath observers the valuable right to designate a particular weekly day off-typically a weekend day, widely prized
as a day off. Other employees who have strong and legitimate, but nonreligious reasons for wanting a weekend day off have no rights under the
statute. For example, those employees who have earned the privilege
through seniority to have weekend days off may be forced to surrender this
privilege to the Sabbath observer; years of service and payment of "dues"
at the workplace simply cannot compete with the Sabbath observer's absolute right under the statute. Similarly, those employees who would like a
weekend day off, because that is the only day their spouses are also not
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for no consideration as to whether the employer has made
reasonable accommodation proposals.
This unyielding
weighting in favor of Sabbath observers over all other interts contravenes a fundamental principle of the Religion
<..;iauses that:
"The First Amendment ... gives no one the right to insist that in pursuit of their own interests others must
conform their conduct to his own religious necessities."
Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 205 F. 2d 58, 61 (CA2
1953) (L. Hand, J.).
Connecticut singles out Sabbath observance and commands
that all such observance override every uther legitimate
interest of employers and employees alike. Any conflict between Sabbath observance and other interests is resolved
mandatorily under the statute; the State lends its power
exclusively to the particular religious practice of the demanding employee. This goes well beyond accommodation and
acknowledging religion's place as an aspect of our society's
"diversity and pluralism," Lynch, 465 U. S., at - - , and
leaves no "play·in the joints," Walz, 397 U.S., at 669, for
other substantial secular and religious values.
The Connecticut statute allocates a substantial and valuable benefit solely along reli~ous lines and imposes a burden
on others who choose not to observe a Sabbath. The statute
effectively arms Sabbath observers with the right to impose
on others in order to practice their particular religious tenet.
As such, the statute goes beyond having an incidental or
remote effect of advancing religion. See, e. g., Roemer v.
Maryland Public Works Board, 426 U. S. 736, 747 (1976);
Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968). On the
contrary, the very operation of this provision makes it clear
that § 53-303e(b) has
a primary effe.ct that impermissibly
,-

---------

working, must take a back seat to the Sabbath observer. As explained
infra, the Establishment Clause does not permit the State to coerce persons' conduct in such a direct and absolute manner in order to facilitate the
religious practices of others.
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The operation of this statute goes beyond the "benevolent

I
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'' )1at the Religion Clauses require. By giving to
only hose people who observe a workfree Sabbath as a religious practice the right to designate their own particular
Sabbath as a nonworking day, the State explicitly favors one
traditional religious practice. The Sabbath observance
which§ 53-303e(b) advances is a central practice within three
readily identifiable major religions: Christianity, Judaism,
and Islam. 16 Members of religious groups not included
within the statute's protection, i. e., those persons belonging
to Eastern religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism may,
not unreasonably, conclude that only certain Sabbath religions have received the State's imprimatur and endorsement
given the statute's inflexible mandate. See Gillette v.
United States, 401 U. S. 437, 450 (1971); Lynch, supra, at
--(O'CONNOR, J., concurring). This is not the "accommodation" envisioned by the Religion Clauses; § 53-303e(b), by
compelling others to conform their conduct to the Sabbath
observers', virtually "confer[s] [an] imprimatur of state approval on [particular] religtous ... practices," Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 274 (1981).
Given its absolutist terms, which automatically subordinate the treatment of all secular concerns to those of the Sabbath observers, § 53-303e(b), by coercing conduct on behalf of
particular religious adherents, see, e. g., Abington School
1
'

The Supreme Court of Connecticut rejected the argument that the
statute uses the tenn "Sabbath" to mean simply a time of rest without any
religious significance. Instead, that court construed § 53-303e(b) as designating that day of ''rest and worship ... specifically mandated by the tenets of a particular religion," namely Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.
191 Conn., at 347-348, and nn. 8, 9, 464 A. 2d, 792-793, and nn. 8, 9.
Accordingly, the arguments advanced in this Court that the statute protects all religious groups equally and favors no particular religion are
disingenuous.

'

'
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District, supra; Engle v. Vitale, supra, has the primary effect of advancing a particular religious tenet. 17
IV
Petitioner · l j the State of Connecticut assert that decisions such as Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), and
Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U. S. 707 (1981), which recognized the government's duty to take account of the special
needs of religious observers, insulate the Connecticut statute
frQm constitutional attack. In Sherbert, a Seventh-day
Adventist lost her job because she would not work on Saturday, her Sabbath. Similarly, in Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness lost employment after refusing to participate in the production of armaments, an activity contrary to the tenets of
his faith.
In each of these cases the Free Exercise Clause was held to
require the State to extend unemployment benefits to these
persons who, having lost their jobs as a result of their refusal
to compromise their religious practices at the workplace,
were not able to secure employment. Sherbert, supra, at
410; Thomas, 450 U. S., at 718-719.
The State must provide the religious employee with the
benefits of "an otherwise available public program," available to all, id., at 716; the Free Exercise Clause prohibited
the State from unduly burdening the employee's exercise of
religion. In other words, the State could not exclude the
employee from participating in the government programreceipt of unemployment compensation-because unemployment resulted from the employee's religious beliefs.
The Court's holdings in Sherbert and Thomas on the one
hand, and the Connecticut statute on the other, as in so many
17

Our decisions make it abundantly clear that the Establishment Clause
does not condemn all governmental action that has the effect of aiding religion. See, e. g., Everson v. Board of Educatian, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (bus
transportation); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968) (textbook loans); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970) (property tax exemption); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 (1983) (tax deduction for tuition
transportation and textbook expenses).
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cases arising under the Religion Clauses, call for line drawing. Distinguishing between cases falling next to the line on
either side is often difficult. but lines must be drawn. See,
e. g., United States v..
Jra; Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
v. s. 599 (1961).
~ ~ccommodation for religious observers or religious institutions from governmental coercion has been long recognized by the Court. In Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S.
437 (1971), for example, the Court rejected an Establishment
Clause challenge to statutory provisions exempting religious
and conscientious objectors from the draft. The Court concluded that such an exemption was "in line with 'our happy
tradition' of 'avoiding unnecessary clashes with the dictates
of conscience."' I d., at 453 (quoting United States v. M acintosh, 283 U. S. 605, 634 (1931) (Hughes, C. J., dissenting)).
Similarly, as the Court held in Walz, the Establishment
Clause did not forbid the granting of a property tax exemption to all churches. That tax exemption "simply spar[ed]
the exercise of religion from the burden of property taxation
levied on private profit institutions," 397 U. S., at 673, and
avoided tensions between g~vernmental power and religious
institutions. In that sense it indeed aided all religions. See
also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 (1983); Braunfeld v.
Braum, supra.

I

As we have noted earlier, § 53-303e(b) offers a strikingly
different situation. In enforcing the statute, Connecticut coercively burdens a host of others to conform their conduct in
order to facilitate the religious activity of Sabbath observers.
Far from preventing its own programs from unnecessarily
burdening religious exercise, the State is reaching out into
the private sector to compel absolute deference to a certain
religious practice-this goes beyond accommodation and constitutes an impermissible advancement of a particular religious practice.

I
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v
W~ hold that the Connecticut statute, which provides Sabbath observers with an absolute ·n.,rl 1mqualified right not to
work on their Sabbath, violate~ r.,
':.'>tablishment Clause
of the First Amendment. Th,, judgment of the Supreme
Court of Connecticut is affirmed.
It is so ordered .

..
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Justice Brennan
Justice•White
Justice' Marshall
Justice Blackmun
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Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
From:

Justice O'Connor

Circulated: __________
Recirculated: --------~

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
~--No. 83- 1158
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CONNECTICUT
[May - , 1985]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
.
I join Parts I and III of the opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE
and the Court's judgment that Connecticut General Statute
§ 53-303e(b) violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.
Both THE ' CHIEF JuSTICE and JUSTICE
BRENNAN apply the test enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971) and conclude that the Connecticut sabbath law has a primary effect that impermissably advances religion. In my view, whether the statute has an impermissible effect turns on whether it conveys a message of
endorsement of the Sabbath observance. Although I would
prefer to let the Connecticut courts address this issue in the
first instance,* the Court chooses to reach and apply the "ef*A remand on this issue might also clarify an issue on which there is
some disagreement in the briefs. The Court reads the Connecticut Supreme Court's opinion as holding that § 53-303e(b) confers an "absolute"
right not to work on one's Sabbath. As I read the record, however, the
situation is somewhat more complex. The Arbitration Board apparently
assumed that the statute imposed an absolute accommodation requirement. App. 12a. In part because it thought itself required to defer to the
statutory interpretation of the Arbitration Board, and in part because the
parties submitted to the factual and legal determinations of the arbitrators
without restriction, the Connecticut Supreme Court considered itself
bound as a matter of state law by the Arbitration Board's interpretation of
the statute. 484 A. 2d 785, 790 (1983). The Connecticut Supreme Court
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,
I agree with,._their( ~ LJ.~

fects" prong of the Lemon test.
conclusion.
All employees, regardless of their religious orientation,
would value the benefit which this Connecticut statute bestows upon Sabbath observers-the right to select the day of
the week in which to refrain from labor. Yet Connecticut requires private employers to confer this valued and desirable
benefit only on those employees who adhere to a particular
religious belief. The statute singles out Sabbath observers
for special and, as the Court concludes, absolute protection
without according similar accommodation to ethical and religious beliefs and practices of other private employees.
There can be little doubt that Mr. Thornton's co-workers and
the public at large will perceive this statutory scheme precisely as THE CHIEF JUSTICE does today:
"The State . . . commands that Sabbath religious concerns automatically trump all secular and other religious
interests at the workplace; the statute takes no account
of the convenience or interests of the employer or those
of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath. The
employer and others must adjust their affairs to the command of the State whenever the statute is invoked by an
employee." Ante, at 1~.
The message conveyed is one of endorsement of a particular
religious belief, to the detriment of those who do not share it.
then struck down the statute, not on the grounds that it imposed an "absolute" accommodation requirement, but because it apparently viewed any
accommodation of Sabbath observances as violating all three prongs of the
Lemon test. As a result of this peculiar procedural posture, the Connecticut Supreme Court has never held that § 53-303e(b) generally imposes an
absolute accommodation requirement, but has rather held only that these
parties cannot challenge the Arbitration Board's legal conclusion to that effect. It is conceivable that the Connecticut Supreme Court, when faced
with a restricted submission to the Arbitration Board in a case where reasonable accommodation is infeasible, would interpret the statute as requiring only reasonable accommodation.
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As such, the Connecticut statute has the effect of advancing
religion, and cannot withstand Establishment Clause
scrutiny.
Although I agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE that Connecticut cannot cure this infirmity in its statute by labeling it an
"accommodation" of the free exercise of religion, I do not join
the "accommodation" analysis contained in Parts II and IV of
THE CHIEF JUSTICE's opinion. As the opinion concurring in
the judgment in Wallace v. Jaffree, - - U . S . - - , - (1985) explained, "one can plausibly assert that government
pursues free exercise clause values when it lifts a government imposed burden on the free exercise of religion."
Connecticut's statute requires private employers to defer to
religious practices of employees. Accordingly, it does not
lift a government-imposed burden, and cannot be properly
viewed as an accommodation statute. I agree with those
portions of JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion that embrace this
analysis. See ante at - - .
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
I join Parts I and III of the opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE
and the Court's judgment that Connecticut General Statute
§ 53-303e(b) violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.
Both THE ' CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE
BRENNAN apply the test enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971) and conclude that the Connecticut sabbath law has a primary effect that impermissably advances religion. In my view, whether the statute has an impermissible effect turns on whether it conveys a message of
ou
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first instance,* the Court chooses to reach and apply the "ef*A remand on this issue might also clarify an issue on which there is
some disagreement in the briefs. The Court reads the Connecticut Supreme Court's opinion as holding that § 53-303e(b) confers an "absolute"
right not to work on one's Sabbath. As I read the record, however, the
situation is somewhat more complex. The Arbitration Board apparently
assumed that the statute imposed an absolute accommo.dation requirement. App. 12a. In part because it thought itself required to defer to the
statutory interpretation of the Arbitration Board, and in part because the
parties submitted to the factual and legal determinations of the arbitrators
without restriction, the Connecticut Supreme Court considered itself
bound as a matter of state law by the Arbitration Board's interpretation of
the statute. 484 A. 2d 785, 790 (1983). The Connecticut Supreme Court
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fects" prong of the Lemon test. I agree with~ 1\- ~
conclusion.
All employees, regardless of their religious orientation,
would value the benefit which this Connecticut statute bestows upon Sabbath observers-the right to select the day of
the week in which to refrain from labor. Yet Connecticut requires private employers to confer this valued and desirable
benefit only on those employees who adhere to a particular
religious belief. The statute singles out Sabbath observers
for special and, as the Court concludes, absolute protection
without according similar accommodation to ethical and religious beliefs and practices of other private employees.
There can be little doubt that Mr. Thornton's co-workers and
the public at large will perceive this statutory scheme precisely as THE CHIEF JUSTICE does today:
"The State . . . commands that Sabbath religious concerns automatically trump all secular and other religious
interests at the workplace; the statute takes no account
of the convenience or interests of the employer or those
of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath. The
employer and others must adjust their affairs to the command of the State whenever the statute is invoked by an
employee." Ante, at 1~.
The message conveyed is one of endorsement of a particular
religious belief, to the detriment of those who do not share it.
then struck down the statute, not on the grounds that it imposed an "absolute" accommodation requirement, but because it apparently viewed any
accommodation of Sabbath observances as violating all three prongs of the
Lemon test. As a result of this peculiar procedural posture, the Connecticut Supreme Court has never held that § 53-303e(b) generally imposes an
absolute accommodation requirement, but has rather held only that these
parties cannot challenge the Arbitration Board's legal conclusion to that effect. It is conceivable that the Connecticut Supreme Court, when faced
with a restricted submission to the Arbitration Board in a case where reasonable accommodation is infeasible, would interpret the statute as requiring only reasonable accommodation.
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As such, the Connecticut statute has the effect of advancing
religion, and cannot withstand Establishment Clause
scrutiny.
Although I agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE that Connecticut cannot cure this infirmity in its statute by labeling it an
"accommodation" of the free exercise of religion, I do not join
the "accommodation" analysis contained in Parts II and IV of
THE CHIEF JusTICE's opinion. As the opinion concurring in
the judgment in Wallace v. J affree, - - U. S. - - , - (1985) explained, "one can plausibly assert that government
pursues free exercise clause values when it lifts a government imposed burden on the free exercise of religion."
Connecticut's statute requires private employers to defer to
religious practices of employees. Accordingly, it does not
lift a government-imposed burden, and cannot be properly
viewed as an accommodation statute. I agree with those
portions of JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion that embrace this
analysis. See ante at - -.
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring.
The Court applies the test enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971) and concludes that Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b) has a primary effect that impermissibly advances religion. I agree, and I join the Court's opinion
and judgment. In my view, the Connecticut Sabbath law
has an impermissible effect because it conveys a message of
endorsement of the Sabbath observance.
All employees, regardless of their religious orientation,
would value the benefit which the statute bestows on Sabbath observers-the right to select the day of the week in
which to refrain from labor. Yet Connecticut requires private employers to confer this valued and desirable benefit
only on those employees who adhere to a particular religious
belief. The statute singles out Sabbath observers for special
and, as the Court concludes, absolute protection without according similar accommodation to ethical and religious beliefs
and practices of other private employees. There can be little
doubt that an objective observer or the public at large would
perceive this statutory scheme precisely as the Court does
today. Ante, at - - [slip opinion at 6-7]. The message
conveyed is one of endorsement of a particular religious belief, to the detriment of those who do not share it. As such,
the Connecticut statute has the effect of advancing religion,
and cannot withstand Establishment Clause scrutiny.
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring.
The Court applies the test enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971) and concludes that Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 53-303e(b) has a primary effect that impermissibly advances religion. I agree, and I join the Court's opinion
and judgment. In my view, the Connecticut Sabbath law
has an impermissible effect because it conveys a message of
endorsement of the Sabbath observance.
All employees, regardless of their religious orientation,
would value the benefit which the statute bestows on Sabbath observers-the right to select the day of the week in
which to refrain from labor. Yet Connecticut requires private employers to confer this valued and desirable benefit
only on those employees who adhere to a particular religious
belief. The statute singles out Sabbath observers for special
and, as the Court concludes, absolute protection without according similar accommodation to ethical and religious beliefs
and practices of other private employees. There can be little
doubt that an objective observer or the public at large would
perceive this statutory scheme precisely as the Court does
today. Ante, at - - [slip opinion at 6-7]. The message
conveyed is one of endorsement of a particular religious belief, to the detriment of those who do not share it. As such,
the Connecticut statute has the effect of advancing religion,
and cannot withstand Establishment Clause scrutiny.
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I do not read the Court's opinion as suggesting that the religious accommodation provisions of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act are similarly invalid. These provisions preclude
employment discrimination based on a person's religion and
require private employers to reasonably accommodate the religious practices of employees unless to so would cause undue
hardship to the employer's business. 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e(j)
and 2000e-2(a)(1). Like the Connecticut Sabbath law, Title
VII attempts to lift a burden on religious practice that is imposed by private employers, and hence it is not the sort of
accommodation statute specifically contemplated by the Free
Exercise Clause. See Wallace v. J affree, - - U. S. - - ,
- - (1985) (opinion concurring in the judgment). The provisions of Title VII must therefore manifest a valid secular purpose and effect to be valid under the Establishment Clause.
In my view, a statute outlawing employment discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin has the
valid secular purpose of assuring employment opportunity to
all groups in our pluralistic society. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63, 90, n. 4 (1977) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Since Title VII calls for reasonable
rather than absolute accommodation and extends that requirement to all religious beliefs and practices rather than
protecting only the Sabbath observance, I believe an objective observer would perceive it as an anti-discrimination law
rather than an endorsement of religion or a particula.r religious practice.
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment:
I concur in the Court's judgment that Conn. Gen.
Stat. §53-303e(b) violates the Establishment Clause of the
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment:
I concur in the Court's judgment that Conn. Gen.
Stat. §53-303e(b) violates the Establishment Clause of the
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I

would hold simply and briefly that the Connecticut statute
violates the "effects" prong of the Lemon test, and hence,
that the judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court should
be affirmed.
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To: The Chief Justice
· Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor

05/18

From:

Justice Powell

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Recirculated: - - - - : , - - - - - - - 1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-1158
ESTATE OF DONALD E. THORNTON AND CONNECTICUT, PETITIONERS v. CALDOR, INC.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
CONNECTICUT
[May-, 198~

y;;;P ~
jj4.

-

I

-

L.~ ~

.;.

~~
~ ~- IJ. ~~
i

~
•
~

JUSTICE POWELL, concUITing fn the judgment:
~ <:_~ I concur in t
ourt's judgment that Conn. Gen
§ 53-303e(b) olates the Establishment Clause of th First
Amendment. I agree with JUSTICE BRENNAN t at the .
three-pronged test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. . 602,
612-613 (1971), and our Establishment Clause case provide
the proper framework for analysis of this case, ~~HJ!iart--o~
CQ......PilE;ffflSe§...invowiftg ~~e-~xei'eise Glame. I ould hold
simply and briefly that the Connecticut statute 10lates the
"effects" prong of the Lemon test, and ~art e "udgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court should be a
e .-- ~

__.l ·

RECEIVED
SUPREHf COURT. U.S
PUBLICATIONS UNI1

.

15 HAY 23 Pl2 :17

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment:
I concur in the Court's judgment that Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 53-303e(b) violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. I agree with JUSTICE BRENNAN that t
2,
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment:
I concur in the Court's judgment that Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 53-303e(b) violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. . I · agree ·
t a t e
. three-pronged test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602,
612-613 (1971), and our Establishment Clause cases provide
the proper framework for analysis of this cas~r~
·
·
·
e. I would hold
simply and briefly that the Connecticut statute io tes th
~~
"effects" prong of the Lemon test, and
at e judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court should
affirmed.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice ~arshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor

05/23

From:

Justice Powell
MAY 2 3 1985

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No.

83-1158

ESTATE OF DONALD E. THORNTON AND CONNECTICUT, PETITIONERS v. CALDOR, INC.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
CONNECTICUT
[May -

, 1985]

JusTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.
I concur in. the Court's judgment that Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 53-303e(b) violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. I agree with JUSTICE BRENNAN that the
three-pronged test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602,
612-613 (1971), and our Establishment Clause cases provide
the proper framework for analysis of this case. I would hold
simply and briefly that the Connecticut statute-at least as
applied in this case-violates the "effects" prong of the
Lemon test, and therefore, that the judgment of the
Connecticut Supreme Court should be affirmed.
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To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice ·~arshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
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JusTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the Court's judgment that Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 53-303e(b) violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. I agree with JUSTICE BRENNAN that the
three-pronged test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602,
612-613 (1971), and our Establishment Clause cases provide
the proper framework for analysis of this case. I would hold
simply and briefly that the Connecticut statute-at least as
applied in this case-violates the "effects" prong of the
Lemon test, and therefore, that the judgment of the
Connecticut Supreme Court should be affirmed.
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To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
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Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
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JusTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the Court's judgment that Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 53-303e(b) violates the Establishment Clause of the Fjrst
Amendment. I agree that the three-pronged test of Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971), and our Establishment Clause cases provide the proper framework for analysis of this case. I would hold simply and briefly that the
Connecticut statute-at least as applied in this case-viol~
the "effects" prong of the Lemon test, and therefore.(that
the judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court should be
affirmed.

